MUHAMMAD
AND
THE JEWS
A RE-EXAMINATION

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‘ABDUL ‘AZĪZ
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To those who believe
And do deeds of righteousness
Hath Allāh promised forgiveness
And a great reward.

The Qurʾān, V, 9.
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PREFACE

Intergroup relations, specially when religion is also involved, are full of conflict and suffering. Martyrology feeds the myth, and prejudice adds bitterness to the legend. Political expediency and biased scholarship invest the legend with the status of history. The account of Muhammad's relations with the Jews of the Hijaz is one of such legends. I have analysed this chapter of early Muslim history which has been uncritically accepted both by Muslim and non-Muslim historians. If this re-examination succeeds in raising valid doubts about the evidence on which the account is based, the attempt was worth making.

Of the many friends who have helped me at various stages of the progress of this study I wish to thank, in particular, Professors Bernard Lewis, Nicola Ziadeh and Husain Mohammad Jafri. Prof. Nicola Ziadeh helped me to formulate my ideas when the book was little more than a conversation piece. Without his encouragement this book would have never materialised. Prof. Husain Mohammad Jafri subjected each chapter of the first draft to detailed criticism. Prof. Bernard Lewis went over the manuscript word by word and gave practical and helpful suggestions which have influenced almost every chapter of this book. I consider myself most fortunate to have been alerted by him to the many pitfalls which a book such as this is bound to encounter. The book has greatly benefited from his penetrating comments and his advice on the value of Muslim and Jewish sources. My debt to these friends who have been so generous with their time and advice is immeasurable. None of them, however, is responsible for the views and opinions expressed in this book. In fact they hold opposite views on several points raised in this book. My only consolation is that in most of the cases their criticism was not concurrent, wherever it was I bowed to their cumulative judgment. All errors are sadly mine.

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PROLOGUE

The Historian does not set out to prove a thesis, or select material to establish some point, but follows the evidence where it leads. No human being is free from human failings, among them loyalties and prejudices which may color his perception and presentation of history. The essence of the critical scholarly historian is that he is aware of this fact, and instead of indulging his prejudices seeks to identify and correct them.

The recoverers of history begin of course with what is remembered and transmitted. Unlike their predecessors, however, they are not content merely to repeat and pass on the memories of the past. They seek rather to fill its gaps and correct its errors, and their goals are accuracy and understanding. A frequent result, and sometimes perhaps even a purpose of their efforts, is that by analyzing the past they kill it. The minute and critical examination of treasured memories may reveal them to be false and misleading. Once this exposure becomes generally known, that part of the past loses its power. The scholarly recoverers of the past may therefore exercise a powerful destructive influence. In compensation, they can bring much that is new and enrich the collective memory as well as cleansing it.

BERNARD LEWIS
INTRODUCTION

Historians, commentators of the Qur'ân and eminent transmitters have committed frequent errors in reporting stories and events. They accepted them as they were transmitted, without regard for their value. They did not check them with the principles underlying such historical situations, nor did they compare them with similar material. They neither measured them with the yardstick of philosophy, with the help of knowledge of the nature of things, nor with the help of speculation and historical insight. Therefore, they strayed from the truth and found themselves lost in the desert of untenable assumptions and errors.

— IBN KHALDUN

In 1833 the Rabbi at Wiesbaden, Abraham Geiger wrote a prize essay *Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen?* Rudolf Leszynsky, who also wrote a book on a related subject, called Geiger’s essay “epoch-making Schrift” (epoch-making writing). Since then several books and articles dealing with various aspects of the Muslim-Jewish relations have been written. The latest is, probably, Goitein’s book *Jews and Arabs.* For Western scholars the origin of Islam, and specially of the Qur'ân, has always been a fascinating subject. “Who instructed the Prophet, who were these teachers?” After observing that “a somewhat uneven literature has grown up around the question” Goitein concludes that it seems reasonable to assume that in his early years Muhammad had close contact with Jews, who were not very different from those portrayed in the Talmudic literature.

Consequently the beliefs of the Apostle's Jewish neighbours and the nature of his contact with them had a direct bearing on the substance of what he borrowed from Judaism. Western scholarship is, however, mainly confined to these factors. Its research work has helped us in understanding the Apostle's relations with the Jews of the Hijâz and specially those of Yathrib. But some of the reports on which this research depends have not been critically examined. Scholars have also not paid sufficient attention to the socio-political aspects of intergroup relations.

Rabbi Geiger, whose book is “still valuable” had both the advantage and disadvantage of working without the vast Arabic literature the modern orientalist has at his disposal. But *Al-Muqtaṣar fi Ta'rikh al-Bâsha're* of Abû al-Fidâ (672/1273-732/1331) was available to him through J. Gagnier, *De vita Mohammedis* (Oxford, 1723), J. J. Reiske and J. G. Chr. Adler’s *Annales Moslemici* (Leipzig, 1754 and Copenhagen, 1789-94) and *Historia Anteislamica.* He was also acquainted with al-Bayḍâwi’s commentary on the Qur'ân and the “excellent unpublished commentary by Elpherar which begins with the 7th Surah.” He dealt with his subject fairly extensively. From his point of view the nature of the Apostle’s relationship with the Jews of Yathrib was not pertinent. He made a passing reference to the Banû Qaynuqa, the Banû al-Nadîr and also to the Jews of Khaybar, but did not mention the Banû Qurayṣah. He must have known about them not only through Abû al-Fidâ but also through the commentary on the Qur'ân. If he had thought it necessary he had the material at hand to deal with the struggle “forced on the Jews and Muḥammad”, which according to Goitein, “has left its mark on the Holy Book of Islam.”

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1 Geiger’s book was translated into English by F.M. Young and printed in India in 1896 under the title *Judaism and Islam.* Ktav Publishing House, New York, republished the translation in 1970.
2 *Die Juden in Arabien zur Zeit Mohammeds* (Berlin, 1910).
5 Such works as Ibn Hishâm’s *Sirah,* al-Wâqidi’s *Maghâzî,* and Ibn Sa’d’s *Tabaqût* were neither published by then nor probably known to him.
6 It is a universal history covering the pre-Islamic period and Muslim history down to 729/1329.
7 Geiger, p. VII Yahya b. Ziyâd b. ʿAbd Allâh b. Manzûr (144/761-207/822) known as al-Farrâ was a commentator on the Qur'ân, *Ma’dîn al-Qur'ân,* which is still in manuscript form.
8 Goitein, p. 64.
Between Geiger and Leszynsky, while Muir, Grimme, Caetani, Graetz and others dealt with the subject within the larger context of their researches, Wensinck wrote a doctoral thesis on the Apostle and the Jews of Medina. Since Leszynsky, Lammens, Wolfenson, Horovitz, Torrey, Hirschberg, Baron and Goitein have dealt with the same material.

Montgomery Watt in his Muhammad at Medina also devoted a whole chapter to the Jews of Yathrib. No Muslim, as far as I know, has given such an importance to the subject in an independent study and research. Most of the non-Muslim scholarship is tied down to the main theme of the Jewish influence on Islam, the Apostle's disappointment at his rejection by the Jews and the subsequent expulsion and 'extermination' of the Jews. The subject has not been dealt with in its proper socio-political context.

Some of the familiar intellectual attitudes towards non-Muslims, crystallized into patterns of thought, have been repeated for centuries and worn smooth by generations of Muslim jurists and historians. The theme of prejudice and discrimination against ahli al-dhimma, mainly based on the works of Muslim jurists, invariably serves as an introduction to the history of Muslim-Jewish relations. The approach, unfortunately, too often sacrifices history to jurisprudence and ignores historical facts in favour of legend which, in the course of time acquired theological colouring.

The study is essentially based on the following sources:
1. The Qur'an;
2. Kitab Strat Rasul Allah, Ibn Hisham's recension of the original work of Ibn Isfah (d.151/768);
3. Al-Tami al-Shafi'i compiled by Imam al-Bukhari (d. 256/869);
4. Al-Shafi'i of Muslim b. al-Hajjaj (d. 261/874).
Throughout this study I have, of course, examined Kitab al-Maghazi of al-Waqidi (d. 207/822) and Kitab al-Tabaqat al-Kabir of Ibn Sa'd (d. 230/845), but the main burden of the argument rests on the four sources given above.

The basic source of the history of early Islam is of course the Qur'an. It is contemporaneous with the Apostle's life and offers a running commentary on all the important events which took place in his lifetime. But the Qur'an is not a book of history; history depends on precise chronology, whereas no real idea of the dates or sequence of events can be obtained from it. But it plays a very important role in checking the truth of many an incident which happened during the Apostle's lifetime.

Muslim compilers of the biographical dictionaries of the Companions of the Apostle, later Muslim historians, Western scholars and modern Muslim historians have written exhaustively in criticism of Ibn Isfah, al-Waqidi and Ibn Sa'd. We shall not cover that ground once again. Historical understanding, however, is the constant rethinking of the past. Historical knowledge is inseparable from personal knowledge, which is very much involved with contemporary problems. "It is thus that, in a sense, all history is contemporary, too".

1 Sir William Muir, Life of Muhammad (London, 1861).
2 H. Grimme, Mohammed (Münster, 1892-1895).
3 Leone Caetani, Annali dell' Islam (Milan, 1905 ft).
4 H. Graetz, History of the Jews (Philadelphia, 1894) Vol. III.
7 Israel Wolfenson, Taurā'id al-Yahud fi Bilād al-ṭārīq al-'Arab (Cairo, 1927).
10 Joachim Wilhelm (Haim Zeev) Hirschberg, Israel in Arabia (Tel Aviv, 1946), in Hebrew.
In other words, whatever past the historian chooses to discover, he does it with the historical consciousness of his time. “There is not a part of history which is objective—the facts—and another part—the historian’s interpretation or judgment—which is subjective. Judgment and interpretation are equally inherent in deciding what are facts, which are the relevant ones in a certain context, and how significant they are.”

Ibn Isḥaq, al-Waqidi and Ibn Sa‘d, who wrote during the early Abbasid period, have been closely scrutinized in terms of Shi‘ite and Sunni partisanship, or their bias towards B. Umayyah or B. al-‘Abbās. Muslim historians and orientalists have been so preoccupied with “the outbreak of the fitna” and the early schism in Islam that they have overlooked the total environment in which the eighth/ninth century straḥ and maghdāṭi writers worked. They noted Shi‘ite and Sunni tendencies of their early authors, their Umayyad and Abbasid bias, and their attitude to the prevailing theological controversies. But the historical consciousness of Ibn Isḥaq and others was influenced by several other factors also. As Petersen observes: “The Abbasid period’s political situations might have influenced the historical recorders’ changing attitudes to the earliest history of Islam.”

But these situations did not involve only “the new rulers’ settling with their revolutionary past, the coalition with Shi‘ism in the combat against the Syrian caliphate”. New lands were being conquered, more and more non-Arab and non-Muslims with their distinct cultures, languages and religions were entering the world of Islam. They brought new ideas and new problems. All these new elements had an impact on the thinking of the early authors. From our point of view their attitude to contemporary Jewish life under the Abbasids is a vital factor in judging the information they impart on the relations of the Jews with the Apostle.

Our earliest and most important source for events which took place in the Apostle’s lifetime is Muḥammad ibn Isḥaq b. Yaṣār b. Khiyār who was born in Medina in about 85/704 during the last year of ʿAbd al-Malik’s reign. His grandfather, Yaṣār, was among those

3 Petersen, p. 19.

taken prisoner at ʿAyn al-Tamr. He became the slave of Qays b. Makhrimah b. al-Muṭṭalib b. ʿAbd Manāf b. Qusayy, and having accepted Islam became his mawla. It was during ʿAbd al-Malik’s reign that Mecca was besieged and the Ka‘bah destroyed. But he was also the caliph who consolidated the Arab rule and left a splendid empire. For about thirty years Ibn Ṣa‘d lived in Medina where Imām Mālik and Sa‘id al-Musayyib were his contemporaries. He was taught by many teachers who were sons of the salābīḥah. The great Traditionist al-Zuhri was among his teachers. The man who roused the antagonism of Imām Mālik and the admiration of al-Zuhri was obviously not an ordinary person, and the time in which he lived was not ordinary either. Spain, Kashghar and Multan were conquered while he was still in Medina. He also saw the collapse of the Umayyads and the rise of the Abbasids. He died in Baghdad between 150/767 and 154/770 in the reign of al-Manṣūr. Much has been written about his life, and his work has been evaluated from every point of view. Muslim and non-Muslim scholarship has, however, ignored the events which took place in his lifetime and influenced his views regarding the Jews living under Muslim rule. On his arrival in the Abbasid capital Ibn Ṣa‘d must have observed that the Jewish community

which had the appearance of a state, had a peculiar constitution. The Exilarch and the Gaon were of equal rank. The Exilarch’s office was political. He represented Babylonian-Persian Judaism under the Caliphs. He collected the taxes from the various communities, and paid them into the treasury. The Exilarchs, both in bearing and mode of life, were princes. They drove about in a state carriage; they had outriders and a kind of body-guard, and received princely homage.

1 ʿAbū Muhammad Sa‘īd b. al-Musayyib (15/636-94/712) was born during the caliphate of ʿUmar. *A faqīḥ and muftī*, he was highly regarded by ʿUmar II. Al-Zuhri, Makhūl and Qatādah considered him one of the greatest scholars.
MUHAMMAD AND THE JEWS

Now that the Exilarch everywhere met with the respect due a prince, he was installed with a degree of ceremony and pomp... In a large open place, which was lavishly adorned, seats were erected for him and the presidents of the two schools. The Gaon of Sora delivered an address to the future Exilarch, in which he was reminded of the duties of his office... Both officials put their hands upon the head of the nominee and declared amidst the clang of trumpets, "Long live our lord, the Prince of the Exile."1

Leon Nemoy has accused Graetz of pro-Muslim bias and said that "Graetz must bear a large share of the blame" for the current illusion that Jewish life under the rule of the Crescent was somehow far easier than it was under the sway of the Cross.2 What Graetz wrote about the Exilarchate is factually correct and is supported by Margolis and Marx3, Hirschberg4 and Bashan5. But Graetz wrote his history in 1894 under the shadow of the Dreyfus affair, and Leon Nemoy wrote his words of criticism in 1956, probably on the eve of the Israeli occupation of Gaza and Sinai. It is not the facts which have changed, it is the perspective. Graetz is pre-Herzl (the first Zionist Congress was held in Basel in 1897), Nemoy is post-Israeli. But even Goitein, whose book Nemoy was reviewing, after cautious qualifications admits that under the Abbasids the Resh Galutha occupied a very honoured position as the general representative of the Jewish community. According to a Christian source, he had precedence over the Christian dignitaries at the Caliph's court, but as a rule he had no administrative function within the Muslim state. He was addressed by the Muslims as 'Our Lord, the son of David', and as David is described in the Koran as one of the greatest prophets, naturally his office was surrounded by the halo of sanctity...

Of far greater importance for the Jews in Islamic countries than the office of the Resh Galutha was another ecumenical dignity, that of the Gaon, which became indeed so prominent in Jewish life during the first five centuries of Islam that these are labelled in Jewish history as 'the Gaonic Period'. Gaon was the title borne by the heads of the two great Jewish academies of Babylonia-Iraq (originally only one of the two) who were regarded by Jews all over the world as the highest authority in all religious matters, which to be sure, also included at that time civil law.1

While Ibn Ishq was still in Medina, a Syrian, Serene (Serenus)6 by name claimed to be the Messiah and held out the promise of a miraculous restoration of Palestine. He set himself up not only as a prophet of the Jews but also as a prophet of the Muslims. He abolished the dietary laws, allowed marriage without a marriage contract and "inscribed the release from Talmudical Ordinances" upon his banner.7 His fame spread as far as Spain, which was now under Muslim rule, and "the Jews of that country resolved to abandon their property and to place themselves under the leadership of the pseudo-Messiah".8 He was finally captured and brought before Yazid II (101/720-105/725), who handed him into the hands of Jews. He was sentenced to death by a Jewish-Muslim court.9

Within less than a quarter of a century Abû Muslim hoisted the black flag of revolt at Merv, and Abû al-Abbâs, after eliminating the Umayyads, proclaimed himself Caliph in 132/749. His successor al-Manšûr treacherously murdered Abû Muslim in 137/755. Iran and specially Khurasan, which was loyal to Abû Muslim, once more became a centre of storms and revolutions. New uprisings followed. Sinbadh (140/757)6, Ustadbsis (149/766-151/768)7, al-Muqanna8 (161/777-164/780)9 rose to avenge Abû Muslim's death. All of them were crushed by al-Manšûr.

It was sometime during this period, but before the Sirah was compiled, that a second Jewish Messiah arose in the strong Jewish centre of Isfahan. Ibn 6Isa Obadiah10 claimed that Palestine was to be


INTRODUCTION

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1 Goitein, pp. 120-121. During the first hundred years of Fatimid rule the Gaon, or head of the Jerusalem Academy, occupied a similar position with regard to the Jews of the Fatimid empire. See Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, Vol. II, pp. 5-18, 519-524.
2 There seems to be considerable controversy about his name.
3 Graetz, Vol. III, p. 120.
4 Ibid., p. 121.
5 Margolis and Marx, p. 259.
7 Ibid., p. 317.
8 Ibid., p. 318.
9 The name is variously given. The Encyclopaedia Judaica version has been followed. Hyamson (infra n. 2 on p. 10) gives it as Isaac ben Ya'qob Obadiah Abû 6Isa al-İspahānī. Shahristani calls him Ishq b. Ya'qob (infra n. 1 on p. 10).
restored not by a miracle but by force. He called the Jews to his standard and some ten thousand Jews collected under his leadership hailing him as the Messiah.1 His uprising was well-timed, since the Abbasid Caliphate was still not consolidated. “The affairs of the Khalifate were at that period in a chaotic condition, and a military movement, such as Isaac’s soon became, had good chances of success”.2 Ibn ʿIsa had planned to join forces with a Persian rebel chief against the Caliph, but al-Manṣūr defeated him at Rayy, where he fell in battle.3

“These messianic uprisings”, Grayzel observes, “were based on a strange mixture of ideas. The desire of a fairly large number of Jews to throw off the yoke of their new Mohammedan masters was bound up, somehow, with rebelliousness against Jewish authority.”4

It is difficult to say how the author of the Strah reacted to these events. As a confident member of the dominant elite he could ignore the revolts, smugly look at Jewish prosperity and freedom under Islam and deal with the history of the Jews in the Hijāz during the life of the Apostle with detachment. Or did the impact of the messianic movements juxtaposed with the pomp and show of the Exilarch give him an impression of Jewish infidelity and ungratefulness? Were his reporters (who were the sons of converted Jews)5 aware of these events, nervous and outdoing the Arab Muslims in their loyalty by embellishing their reports about the Jews of Medina? One is tempted to speculate—and not without reason—that the B. Qaynuqa6, the B. al-Naḍīr and above all the B. Qurayḥah were not so much part of the maghūzī of the Apostle as much as a warning to the Jews of the Abbasid empire: ‘one more Ibn ʿIsa and you will be exterminated like the B. Qurayḥah’. It is idle to ask whether Ibn Isḥaq was not hearing the echoes of the trumpets at the installation of the Exilarch retro-

3 In addition to Shahrastānī and Maimonides see Graetz, Vol. III, p. 124-5, and Margolis and Marx, p. 259.
5 Ibn Ḥajar Al-ʿAsqalānī, Taḥdīḥ al-Taḥdīḥ, IX, p. 45.

spectively when the camel caravan of the unlucky B. al-Naḍīr wound its way from Medina to Khaybar. It was on such an occasion when Nödeke simply remarked: “It may have been so; but maybe it was entirely different.”1

But one thing is certain: Ibn Isḥaq’s attitude, as we shall see later in our examination of his reports, is consistently tilted against the Jews of the Hijāz.

Ibn Isḥaq has been commended by the early Muslim rijāl specialists and modern scholars—Muslim and non-Muslim. Though “as is usual in the literature of dīrāh wa taʿḍīl, we find the early Muslim critics expressing diametrically opposed judgments on Ibn Isḥaq”2 the majority holds him in high regard. Al-Zuhri described him as “the most knowledgeable of men in maghāzī”3 and ʿĀṣim b. ʿUmar b. Qatādah said that “knowledge will remain amongst us as long as Ibn Isḥaq lives”.4 Shuʿbah b. al-Ḥajjāj (85/704-160/776) described him the amīr of Traditionists because of his memory.5 Sufyān b. ʿUyaynah (107/725-198/813) said he did not know anyone who accused (yattahim) Ibn Isḥaq (in Ḥadīth).6 ʿĪmām ʿAbd al-Rasūl said, “he who wants to study the maghāzī in depth should consult Ibn Isḥaq”.7 Yahya b. Maʿān and ʿĪmām ʿAṣmad b. Ḥanbal considered him trustworthy.8 Mālik b. Anas, however, called him a “daḵḏal (charlatan) who belongs to the daḵḏaḵaḏaḵ”.9 According to various versions, Hishām b. ʿUrwah also did not consider Ibn Isḥaq worthy of credence.10 The

most pertinent criticism, from our point of view, is Ibn Ishâq’s method of “tracing the ghazawât of the Prophet by means of the sons of the Jews who had become Muslims and remembered the story of Khaybar and other matters”.\textsuperscript{1} Dealing with this charge and the quarrel between Ibn Ishâq and the great Traditionist Mâlik b. Anas, Ibn Sayyid al-Nâs concludes that both of them were finally reconciled and when Ibn Ishâq left Medina for Iraq Mâlik gave him fifty dinars and half of his date crop of the year as a gift. Mâlik did not intend to malign him as a Traditionist but he did question his acceptance of the reports of Khaybar, Qurayzah and al-Nâdir and such other unattested events from the Jewish converts (from their fathers). Ibn Ishâq followed these reports in his maghâzi without necessarily ascertaining the true facts whereas Mâlik himself did not report except from reliable men.\textsuperscript{2}

As we shall see while examining the various reports of Ibn Ishâq, the charge does not seem to be without substance. While converts from one religion to another are not necessarily unreliable, a historian should closely scrutinize reports emanating from them. The very fact of their conversion means that they considered the attitude, the policy and the action of their erstwhile co-religionists objectionable, if they were sincere in their conversion; it was expedient to disassociate themselves from their action, if the conversion was forced. In any case their tendency in remembering and reproducing the events of their past or the past of their ancestors directly involved in conflicts with their new co-religionist will be subconsciously—and sometimes deliberately—prejudicial to the task of ascertaining true facts. One might, however, ask in parenthesis if Mâlik b. Anas’s charge was fair. It shows a latter-day prejudice against the Jewish converts. Why should they be less reliable than the sons of the pagan Arab converts? Would the Muslim sons of those Meccan pagans who fought the Apostle not distort the role of their ancestors in the same manner as the sons of the Jewish converts, to gain acceptability? Their reports need as much verification as those of the Jewish converts.

Referring to Ibn Ishâq’s methodology of reporting the events in Medina Horovitz observes:

Here the isnâd is the rule, and the authorities of Ibn Ishâq are his Medina teachers, above all al-Zuhri, \textsuperscript{5}Asim b. Umar and \textsuperscript{6}Abdullah ibn Abî Bakr, to whom also he is already indebted for the chronological scaffolding... For the presentation of the actual maghâzi, Ibn Ishâq employs a fixed scheme; he sends a brief comprehensive statement of contents on in front, follows it up with a collective account composed of the statements of his weightiest teachers and completes this principal account by individual reports gathered by him from other sources.\textsuperscript{3}

Horovitz’ observations are mainly valid as far as Ibn Ishâq’s general narrative is concerned. His account of the four Jewish maghâzi, however, is at variance with his general scheme. \textsuperscript{6}Asim b. Umar b. Qatâdah is the main informant of the important events in the affair of the B. Qaynuqâ and no Jewish reporter is involved. The deportation of the B. al-Nâdir also follows the general pattern. The main story begins with Yazid b. Rumân reporting it direct to Ibn Ishâq. With the B. Qurayzah the pattern seems to break down. Most of the main events, as we shall see, are not preceded by isnâds. Several reliable reporters like al-Zuhri and Qatâdah appear during the narrative, but a closer examination discloses that they are reporting minor details, not the major events. The account of the expedition to the Khaybar presents the same mixture of reports, some based on isnâds, others without isnâds. Again one comes across important names preceding some reports, but most of them pertain to either juristic matters or minor details.

It might perhaps be safe to say that generally speaking Ibn Ishâq does not give isnâds on crucial matters concerning the B. Qurayzah or the Jews of Khaybar. Writing on Ibn Ishâq’s use of the isnâd Robson agrees with the observation of Horovitz quoted above and goes on to say:

He commonly begins his treatment of some incident by a general statement of what happened without any authority being quoted but this is merely his method of introducing the subject, for he usually goes on to give isnâds of various kinds for details of the incident, or to present different statements of what happened.\textsuperscript{2}

Robson further observes:

... Ibn Ishâq is quite open about his methods. He does not claim that all the information he gives is full of authority, nor does he try to trace everything back to the Prophet. We may therefore be inclined to trust him when he does quote direct authorities and when he gives connected isnâd.\textsuperscript{3}

When Ibn Ishâq does not give an isnâd he is either dealing with material

\textsuperscript{1} Horovitz, \textit{IC} (1928), p. 176.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 457.
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which was "so well known and well authenticated that it was unnecessary to produce the evidence of an isnād" or is drawing upon "a common corpus of ḡāṣṣ and traditional material, which they (strah-magħāzēt writers) arranged according to their own concepts and to which they added their own researches." It would be reasonable therefore, to assume that the lack of an isnād for some of the major events concerning the B. Qurayḥah and most of the important events of Khaybar indicates that Ibn Ishaq drew his material from the 'common corpus of ḡāṣṣ'. We may revert here to Imām Mālik's charge that Ibn Ishaq traced the ghazawāt of the Apostle by means of the sons of the converted Jews who remembered the stories of the B. al-Naḍīr, the B. Qurayḥah and Khaybar. An examination of Ibn Ishaq's isnāds shows that out of three hundred and four isnāds, which he used in the Sira there are only nine in which a Jewish convert or a Jew is involved. The names of the Jewish reporters and the subjects of their reports are given below:

1. Abū Mālik b. Tha'labah b. Abū Mālik al-Quraṣi, The Himyarites accepted Judaism after the rabbis with their sacred books hanging from their necks walked through fire without any harm to them;
2. Muhammad b. Ka'b al-Quraṣi, i) Conversion of the people of Najrān to Christianity by ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Thāmir;
   ii) ʿUtbah b. Rabīʾah's proposal to the Apostle offering him money, honour etc. if he stopped insulting their gods;
   iii) The Apostle badly treated by the Thaqīf in Ṭāʾif;
5. One of the family of ʿAbd Allāh b. Salām, The story of ʿAbd Allāh b. Salām's conversion to Islam;
6. ʿSafiyyah bint Huyayy b. Akhtāb, Huyayy b. Akhtāb's determination to oppose the Apostle;
7. One of the B. Qurayṣah, ʿAbd Allāh b. Sūriya's testimony that the Jews knew Muhammad was a prophet sent by God;
8. One of Yāmin's family, Yāmin gave a man money to kill ʿAmr b. Jīḥāsh, who had attempted to kill the Apostle;
9. ʿAṭiyah al-Quraṣi, ʿAṭiyah was not executed with other adults of the B. Qurayṣah as he was a lad.

None of the above reports refers to Khaybar and only the last two reports provide information on one minor episode each in the

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3 The isnād count is based on Isnād Index given in Ibn Hishām, Kitāb Strat Rassāl Allāh, ed. by Dr. Ferdinand Wüstenfeld (2 Vols. Gottingen, 1860), pp. 58-69. This number does not include Ibn Hishām's isnāds.
4 I have tried to follow as closely as possible the order in which a Jewish reporter appears in the Sira.
5 Ibn Hishām, p. 17.
6 Ibid., pp. 24.
7 Ibid., pp. 185-87.
8 Ibid., pp. 279-80.
ghazawāt of the B. al-Naṣir and the B. Qurayzah. It seems to be obvious that Imām Mālik’s charge was not based on the above reports. A more reasonable explanation is that Imām Mālik had a fuller knowledge of the qāṣṣ material current at the time and was in a position to locate the stories which originated from the sons of the Jewish converts. Ibn Isḥāq seems to have seen no harm in incorporating this material in his Sīrah without verification and without isnād. Imām Mālik objected to this procedure. Levi Della Vida’s observation on the subject confirms our view:

The abundance and the variety of material collected by Ibn Isḥāq forced him to enlarge the circle of his authorities and to accept a number of insufficiently supported traditions. He even takes care to give the source, not always particularly clear, of some of his information, especially when, as is often the case, it goes back to Jewish or Christian sources.1

Ibn Isḥāq had no direct knowledge of the events and in view of the self-contradictory nature of the accounts one would have expected that he would either qualify his statements or absolve himself of the responsibility of reporting something of which he either had no direct knowledge or which he thought was of a doubtful nature. In all other doubtful cases he normally uses phrases such as “in what has reached me”2, or “it was mentioned to me”3 or he would simply finish a story by adding that God knows best what happened. Ibn Isḥāq does not show this caution and scrupulousness in his account of the B. Qurayzah.

The Umayyads encouraged the collection and preservation of the Traditions, anecdotes and accounts of the maghāzī. Many tābi’in were involved in these efforts; scholars like Mūsā b. Ḥubayrah wrote the accounts of maghāzī while a Traditionist like Mālik b. Anas collected the Traditions. But it was Ibn Isḥāq whose Sīrah provided a complete history: pre-Islamic background, pre-Hijrah struggle in Medina, the expansion of Islam after the truces of Hudaybiyyah and Khaybar, together with a biography of the Apostle (complete with miracles) which could stand up to any hagiography of a Christian saint. It is this original and personal character of the work of Ibn Isḥāq, which, while it explains the hostility of the school of Traditions, justifies the immense success which it has enjoyed through the centuries, a success which has not only overshadowed similar previous works and some which closely followed him ... but made him a decisive influence on the future development of the Sīrah. In addition to Ibn Hishām’s recension, Ibn Isḥāq’s biography was reproduced for the most part by al-Ṭabarī in his two great compilations, the Tārīkh and the Taʾrīkh and through the intermediary of these two writers it has become the principle source of later historiography.4

By the time al-Wāqidī (130/747–207/823) and Ibn Saʿd (168/784–230/845) completed their works both the Abbāsid caliphate and the post-Islamic Exilarchate were firmly established. Ibn ʿIsa al-Isfahānī’s rebellion had been forgotten and forgiven. The Savoras who headed the two leading academies at Sura and Pumbeditha had given themselves the new title of Gaon, “Your Eminence”, and were recognized by the Caliphs as the judicial authority for the Jews within the Muslim Empire. Yehudi ben Naham during his brief term of office (760–764) helped to lay the foundations of what may be described as the invisible Jewish government in exile. The Jews in the Diaspora were governed through the Gaonic Responsa.

Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muhammad b. ʿUmar al-Wāqidī was born in Medina and was called al-Wāqidī after his grandfather al-Wāqid, who was a mawla of Abū Allāh b. Buraida who belonged to a Medinite family. His only surviving work is Kitāb al-Maghāzī (The Book of Expeditions). Within that limited scope he has collected some very useful information about the Medinite life of the Apostle. Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kabīr of Ibn Saʿd, who was al-Wāqidī’s pupil and secretary, is

To sum up, the character of Ibn Isḥāq in comparison with the authors who preceded him is that of a real historian and in him we have the final fusion of biography of the religious type of the muḥaddithin with that of the epic-legendary type of the kūtub. It is this original and personal character of the work of Ibn Isḥāq, which, while it explains the hostility of the school of Traditions, justifies the immense success which it has enjoyed through the centuries, a success which has not only overshadowed similar previous works and some which closely followed him ... but made him a decisive influence on the future development of the Sīrah. In addition to Ibn Hishām’s recension, Ibn Isḥāq’s biography was reproduced for the most part by al-Ṭabarī in his two great compilations, the Tārīkh and the Taʾrīkh and through the intermediary of these two writers it has become the principle source of later historiography.

2 Tran quoted by Melvin Maddocks, the reviewer of his biography by John Clive, Macaulay: The Shaping of the Historian (New York, 1974), in Time, April 22, 1974, p. 90.

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Based mostly on his teacher's work, but it is a compilation of great value. Named *The Great Book of Classes*, it is in fact an extended dictionary or *Who's Who* containing biographies of the Apostle, his *āshāb* (Companions) and *fātānin*, the later bearers of Islam, conveniently arranged under classes.

Both of them are chroniclers of events, collectors of anecdotes and repositories of the remembered past, but lack historical consciousness, which Ibn Isḥaq and Ibn Hishām show. We shall, therefore, use them, depending on the reliability of their reports, to check, supplement and evaluate Ibn Isḥaq's account of the events with which we are concerned.

The *rijāl* critics consider al-Wāqiḍī unreliable. Imām ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Ḥanbal calls him a liar and al-Dhahabī says, "he is no longer cited". According to Ibn Khallikān, "the Traditions received from him are considered of feeble authority, and doubts have been expressed on the subject of his veracity". On the other hand, Western scholarship quotes complimentary opinions on his reliability. Petersen, who has done considerable work on the growth of early Muslim historical writing, however, warns that al-Wāqiḍī's Traditional material must "be treated with greater reservation than that of other scholars".

Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Saʿd b. Mānī al-Baṣrī al-Hāshimi kāthib of al-Wāqiḍī was a mawla (client) of the B. Hāshim, his grandfather being a freedman of Ḥusayn b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUbayd Allāh b. ʿAbbās. Though "as a comparison with the text of Wāqiḍī's *Maghāzī* shows, Ibn Saʿd relies above all upon Wāqiḍī" the *rijāl* critics consider Ibn Saʿd a "trustworthy authority". As we shall see, however, after providing a comprehensive list of his main transmitters before giving an account of the *maghāzī*, he rarely provides *insād* for the individual incidents and events, though there are exceptions such as Badr etc. Therefore, in spite of his general trustworthiness, it is not possible to isolate any one of the accounts with which we are concerned and then to identify the source of his information.

With these three works, all written or collected approximately a century and a half more after the events under study took place, our earliest record of the remembered past of early Islam comes to a close. What was remembered by our informants, the original reporters and transmitters, and above all what was recorded by Ibn Isḥaq, al-Wāqiḍī and Ibn Saʿd is their historical importance which they attached to the events as preserved. It is their historical consciousness on which we depend. It is definitely not comparable to our sense of history. Details which might have been of interest to us have been lost for ever, for the early observers of that history were not concerned with them. For example, Ibn Isḥaq begins his account of the affair of the B. Qaynuqā with the following words:

The Apostle assembled them in their market and addressed them as follows: 'O Jews, beware lest God bring upon you the vengeance that he brought upon Quraysh and become Muslims ...'

Ibn Isḥaq does not tell us why the Apostle assembled them to give such a warning, though he goes on to state that the B. Qaynuqā were the first of the Jews to break their agreement with the Apostle and go to war between Badr and Uhud. What was that agreement, when was it signed and how did the B. Qaynuqā break it? There is no information. Almost a hundred years later, Ibn Hishām (d. 218/833) editing the *Sirah*, noticed that the account lacked some important information. So he added that a Muslim woman was insulted by the B. Qaynuqā in their market. Was that the only reason? Was it an act of war? Did it mean the breach of an agreement? We can only conjecture, reconstruct and try to search for the reasons which led the Apostle to assemble the B. Qaynuqā and administer them such a warning. For Ibn Isḥaq, who never suppresses relevant evidence, this information was not important. If he knew, he did not care to record it; if he did not know, he did not think it was necessary to obtain it. Before giving an account of the battle of Uhud, Ibn Isḥaq records that the Apostle said, 'kill any Jew that falls into your power'. Thereupon Muḥayyīḥ b. Masʿūd leapt upon Ibn Sunaynah, a Jewish merchant.

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5 Petersen, p. 83.
7 Horovitz, (1928), p. 524.
with whom they had social and business relations, and killed him.\textsuperscript{1} It seems to be a drastic order. Could the Apostle enforce it in the third year of the Hijrah? What was the occasion? And in spite of the language of the order which covered every Jew it seems Ibn Sunaynah was the only unfortunate Jew who fell into Muslim hands. It is obvious that Ibn Ṣaḥāq gave this information without context; some important link is missing. For Ibn Ṣaḥāq that link was not significant, and for us it is impossible to recover. Ibn Islā'īq quotes a conciliatory letter which the Apostle wrote to the Jews of Khaybar\textsuperscript{2}, but does not tell us who carried the letter, how the messenger transmitting the letter was treated, how the Jews reacted to it, whether they replied, and if they did what their reply was. That information is lost to us.

One may agree with Lord Raglan's conclusion, which he has drawn after careful study, that "any fact about a person which is significant, and for us it is impossible to recover. Ibn Islā'īq quotes a conciliatory letter which the Apostle wrote to the Jews of Khaybar, but does not tell us who carried the letter, how the messenger transmitting the letter was treated, how the Jews reacted to it, whether they replied, and if they did what their reply was. That information is lost to us.

One may agree with Lord Raglan's conclusion, which he has drawn after careful study, that "any fact about a person which is not placed on record within a hundred years of his death is lost."\textsuperscript{3}

Add to this the fact that "every incident begins to fade as soon as it has occurred".\textsuperscript{4}

Considerable critical work on the authenticity of the Hadith literature has been done by Goldziher\textsuperscript{5}, Margoliouth\textsuperscript{6}, Lammens\textsuperscript{7}, Robson\textsuperscript{8} and Schacht\textsuperscript{9}. Al-Ṣabīhain, the first two collections of authoritative traditions known as "The Six Genuine Ones", the Šaḥīḥ of Mūhammad b. Ismā'īl al-Bukhari (194/810-256/870) and the Šaḥīḥ of Muhammad b. al-Ḥajjāj (210/816-261/785), though slightly later, represent for the first time in the literature a more rigorous criticism of the isnād than that customary in the preceding period”.\textsuperscript{1} Both of them had their shurūf (conditions) and if a Tradition did not comply with those conditions it was not included in their collection. Robson, discussing degrees of authority in Traditions points out that Muslim scholars like Muhammad b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Nāṣibūrī put first on their list those which were given by both Al-Bukhārī and Muslim\textsuperscript{2}. This, in fact, is a general view not limited to al-Nāṣibūrī.

But the criticism of the Hadith does not apply to the Traditions quoted in this study. Traditions concerning legal and juristic subjects, though they may not always be obvious, have not been used. The Traditions, which might have been fabricated under Umayyad or Abbasid influence are not relevant to our research. Similarly Traditions concerning the Shi'i-Sunni differences are suspect and do not concern us. Most of the criticism by classical and Western scholars is aimed at such Traditions. My attitude, therefore, in dealing with the Hadith material has been identical to that of Montgomery Watt who says:

In the legal sphere there may be some sheer invention of traditions, it would seem. But in the historical sphere, in so far as the two may be separated, and apart from some exceptional cases the nearest to such invention in the best early historians appears to be a 'tendentious shaping' of material . . . in as much as many of the questions in which the historian of the mid-twentieth century is interested are not affected by the process of shaping, there should be little difficulty in obtaining answers to his questions from the sources.\textsuperscript{2}

Wherever no motive can be ascribed, or wherever a Hadith is not directly involved in a controversy of the subject under study I am inclined to depend more on it than on our three maghāzi sources. Guillaume's remarks on the subject are pertinent in this connection:

A man who laboured sixteen years on the compilation of his corpus, who sought the ādāb of prayer before committing a tradition to writing and who interrogated over one thousand sheikhs living in places so distant as Balkh, Merv, Nisapur, the principal towns of Mesopotamia, the Hijaz, Egypt, and Syria, deserved well of his co-religionists . . . The man Bukhārī has always been immeasurably greater in the popular estimation than Muslim, and the tendency has been for the work of the former to take precedence of the latter. The one is prized for its range over the whole field of fiqh and the strictness of the shurūf or rules for determining the trustworthiness of rāwits, while the other is preferred for its more concise treatment.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[1]{Goldziher, Muslim Studies, Vol. II, p. 227.}
\footnotetext[2]{Robson, The Muslim World, Vol. XLI, p. 32.}
\footnotetext[3]{Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford, 1968), p. 13.}
\end{footnotes}
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of the material. Together they form an almost unassailable authority, subject indeed to criticism in details ... 1

My preference for the Sahihain is strictly confined to the study of the historical data concerning the Jews during the time of the Apostle. This would not necessarily apply to the discussion of other subjects, particularly to the origin of Shi'ism or controversies emanating from the Umayyad and Abbasid claims and would certainly not apply to fiqh questions pertaining to non-Muslims.

The Qur'an and the five works mentioned above exhaust our primary sources. Besides these sources I have also used the Sunan of Abū Dā'ūd and al-Samhūdī's Wafā' al-Wafā' bi Akhbār Dar al-Muṣṭafā. Abū Dā'ūd (202/817-275/888) was a contemporary of al-Bukhārī and a pupil of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal. Abū Dā'ūd is less strict with his conditions (shurūṭ) and where a favourable verdict has been accorded by a lenient scholar he has “accepted the Hadith despite the weight of adverse criticism”. 2 This does not mean that he did not exercise proper caution. “He wrote down half a million Hadith, from which he selected 4,800; he calls these authentic, those which seem to be authentic, and those which are nearly so”. 3

Nūr al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan 4Alī b. 5Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad al-Samhūdī (844/1440-911/i505) 6studied in Cairo under the most renowned man of his time, the Ṣūfī saint al-İbrāqī. In 860/1455 he went on pilgrimage and afterwards settled in Medina where he stayed for nearly six years. During this period he made extensive researches on the original state of the Mosque of the Apostle. In 886/1471 he went to pilgrimage and then returned to Egypt where he was admitted to the circle of Sultan al-Asḥaṣf Qāṭībey. He returned to Medina in 890/1485 and remained there till his death. His principal work, which I have used, is Wafā' al-Wafā' bi Akhbār Dar al-Muṣṭafā. 4 This work is the main source of information for the history and the topography of Medina. 5

I have used the two above-mentioned works for supplementary information and supportive evidence but not as independent authorities.

2 Guillaume, p. 34.
3 Ibid., p. 34.
4 It was published in Cairo in four volumes in 1955.

INTRODUCTION

Abū Dā'ūd provides additional information or explanation of events, where our primary sources have been silent or vague. Al-Samhūdī is the earliest source on Medina after Islam. During the course of research other important sources of Muslim history, which were conceived in another tradition and were inspired by different motives, such as Yahyā b. Ādām’s Kitāb al-Kharaq and Abū al-Faraj al-Iṣbāḥānī’s Kitāb al-Ağıhani have also been sifted for relevant material. The main facts or arguments, however, do not depend either on them or on al-Waqīdī and Ibn Sa'd, and the present study would still stand if references to these works were omitted.

Lord Acton once observed that when an interesting statement is discovered, the critical method “begins by suspecting it”; the historian’s basic duty “is not the art of accumulating material, but the sublimer art of investigating it—of discerning truth from falsehood”. The punishment of the B. Qurayzhah is unique in the life of the Apostle. The total number of men reported to be executed on surrender is said to be six hundred to nine hundred, while the total number of Muslims and non-Muslims killed during all the battles and expeditions which were undertaken during the Apostle’s lifetime is less than five hundred killed on both sides—the number of non-Muslims killed is less than three hundred. “This dark episode, which Muslim tradition, it must be said, takes quite calmly, has provoked lively discussion among Western biographers of Muḥammad, with caustic accusations on the one hand and legalistic excuses on the other”. 1 But in this lively discussion both sides seem to have paid little attention to critical examination of the evidence. The Western scholar quoted Ibn Iṣḥāq, al-Waqīdī and Ibn Sa'd and the Muslim apologist answered back with Deuteronomy 2 and 2 Samuel 3.

Stories of massacres and mass murders have a way of impressing themselves on man’s imagination. Once circulated it is difficult to remove them from the collective memory of people. Even when historically demolished they become part of popular legend. George W. Hartman in the Journal of Social Psychology 4 has analysed the

2 Deuteronomy 20, 13-14, quoted by Muhammad Ali, Muhammad the Prophet (Lahore, 1924), p. 163.
4 Vol. XXII, November 1945, pp. 221-236.
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emotional factors which lead to the continued acceptance of such myths in the absence of any substantial and trustworthy evidence.

Of all historical 'facts', stories of massacres and mass executions and murders are most susceptible to doubt and the most likely to prove either pure fabrications or high exaggerations. Ibn Ishāq and to a lesser degree, al-Waqidi and Ibn Sa'd and their predecessor al-Zuhri and Mīsa b. Uqbah remembered, noted and reproduced what they considered to be significant facts. Events and details which are significant from our point of view were probably not of any consequence to them. They were not of any importance to the Jews either. There were no Jewish historians and writers, no correspondents, no travellers who carried the tales of the misfortunes of the Jews of the Hijāz when these tragic events were taking place. It is improbable and difficult, however, to believe that in the second and third centuries of Islam when Ibn Ishāq and Ibn Sa'd were collecting their material, the learned rabbis of the Gaonate and the Exilarchate of Babylon were unable to obtain the Jewish version of the events which had a profound influence on the life of the Jewish community of the Hijāz at the time of the Apostle. It is not normal with the Jews not to record their misfortunes. The Jews of Khaybar reported to be expelled by ʿUmar were settled in Kufa, which was not very far from the Gaonate. They were the descendants of the B. al-Naḍīr and the children of the B. Qurayṣah; Jewish scholars could gather their material from them. Samuel Usque's book A Consolation for the Tribulations of Israel—Third Dialogue is a sixteenth-century classic of Jewish martyrology. This 'deft painter of Jewish suffering', who 'caused the long procession of Jewish history to file past the tearful eyes of his contemporaries, in all its sublime glory and abysmal tragedy' reports neither the expulsion of the B. Qaynuqa and the B. al-Naḍīr nor the execution of the B. Qurayṣah. Jewish history up to Geiger's time (1833) seems to be free of these stories.

The Jews lost their dominant position in Yathrib and Khaybar because they could not adapt like the Quraysh of Mecca although the terms offered to them were different and far less stringent than those to the Quraysh and other pagan Arabs.

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CHAPTER I

THE JEWS OF ARABIA ON THE EVE OF THE HIJRAH

By slow infiltration several Arab tribes drifted into Medina and its vicinity, and were hospitably received by the Jewish farmers. By the sixth century, these new arrivals, steadily reinforced from the south and unified under an able leader, Malik ibn Ajar, eventually prevailed over their hosts. Nevertheless, Mohammed still found vigorous Jewish tribes in and around that centre of northern Arabia, possibly constituting the majority of the settled population.

—SALO WITTMAYER BARON

The beginnings of the Jewish settlements in the Arab peninsula are "buried in misty tradition". There is no reliable historical evidence to establish the approximate date of their arrival. Taymā was known to the Prophets and may be said to have been the first city in Arabia in which something like a Jewish community had existed in ancient biblical times. Seafaring Israelites and Jewish fugitives escaping from persecution by Nebuchadnezzar and later by the Romans, had, it seems, established their colonies in the Arabian peninsula. In southern Arabia (Yemen) they were scattered and "lived without social or political cohesion". Towards the beginning of the fifth century they had, however, established themselves by their industry and enterprising spirit. They obtained so great an influence over the Arab tribes of Yemen that one of the kings of Ḥimyar, Dhū Nuwās, embraced Judaism and assumed the name of Yūsuf.

1 See supra, pp. 19 and 20 for examples.
4 Ibid., p. 16.
5 Graetz, Vol. III, p. 54.
7 Graetz, Vol. III, p. 56.
8 See Irfan Shahid, The Martyrs of Najran: New Documents, (Bruxelles, 1971), pp. 269-68 for his background and "the bewildering variety of names" which he adopted.
The Arab legends trace the first Jewish settlers in the Hijaz to the time of Moses who had ordered some of his followers to fight the Amalek, a people of Edomite stock and described by Rabbinic literature as "Israel's permanent arch-enemy". According to Abū al-Faraj al-İshbāhānī (284/897-356/967) these Jews were sent to destroy the Amalek in the Hijaz. But they failed to fulfil the commandment of total annihilation; they took pity on the handsome son of the Amalek king and took him back alive instead of killing him. As a punishment these Jews were banished and they settled in Yathrib, which they had earlier conquered. Among those who settled were the Jews of the B. Quraysh, the B. al-Naḍīr and the B. Qaynuqa. Though there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this legend the historical evidence takes us only to the first century A.D. The tombstone inscriptions of a Shubait “Yehudaya” erected in al-Hijr in 42 A.D. (or 45 B.C.) and that of one Simon in 307 (which incidentally is the latest Nabatean inscription yet discovered) are some of the few remnants of Arab-Jewish life in pre-Islamic Arabia. Werner Caskel, referring to these two inscriptions, considers the Jews to be the main representatives of Nabatean culture in the Hijaz after 300 A.D. and declares:

These are the beginnings of the Jewish population, which later occupied all the oases in the northwest including Medinah.

Yathrib, an oasis on the caravan route running from north to south, rich in underground water supplies, springs and fountains, provided the Jews with a land where they could apply their farming experience. They planted it with palms, fruit trees and rice, and seem to have pioneered in introducing advanced methods of irrigation and cultivation of the soil. They also developed new arts and crafts from metal work to dyeing and the production of fine jewellery, and taught the neighbouring tribes more advanced methods of exchanging goods and money.

Though distinguished from the Arabs by their religion, these Jews became Arabised to such an extent that their tribes adopted Arabic names. Banū Za‘ūr seems to be the only exception. “Jewish names such as Ḥādiya, Samau‘al, Sara are comparatively rare”. The proportion in which the Arab element was mixed with the Jews is difficult to determine, but probably purely Arab tribes had embraced Judaism. Graetz observes:

Interrusmarriage between the two nations tended to heighten the similarity of their characters. Like the Himyarites, the Jews of southern Arabia applied themselves more particularly to the trade between India, the Byzantine empire and Persia. The Jews of northern Arabia, on the contrary, led the life of Bedouins; they occupied themselves with agriculture, cattle breeding, transport of caravan traffic in weapons, and probably also the calling of robbers.

Graetz' view that the Jews of northern Arabia did not take part in trade seems to be based on the silence of Jewish sources on the subject. But Yathrib was on the caravan route, and it is improbable that the rich Jews of the region with their agricultural produce, their jewellery and arms industry, and—above all—capital would not trade with Syria. Wolfenson has referred to the possibility of wide trading contacts between the Jews of Yathrib and the Christian tribes of Ghassān, the Syrian auxiliaries of the Byzantine Empire. Shaban concurs with the view and observes:

In the light of close connections between the Medinan Jews and other Jewish communities in Arabia it is not unreasonable to suggest that a Jewish trade network existed there at the time.

He further points out that

These connections extended as far north as with Adhra‘āt in Syria, and at least as far as Najrān in the south.

The Jews of Arabia, as Graetz observes, enjoyed complete liberty. They concluded offensive and defensive alliances and carried on feuds.

4 Wolfenson, Ta‘īrīkh al-Yahūd fi Bilād al-‘Arab, p. 60.
6 Ibid.
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Here they were not shut out from the paths of honour, nor excluded from the privleges of the state, but, untrammelled, were allowed to develop their powers in the midst of a free, simple and talented people, to show their manly courage, to compete for the gifts of fame, and with practised hand to measure swords with their antagonists. Instead of bearing the yoke, the Jews were not infrequently the leaders of the Arabian tribes. 1

The Jews of the Hijâz, unlike other Jewish communities, did not seem to interest themselves in literary or scholarly pursuits. The authenticity of their poetical remains has been questioned by Margoliouth and others. 2 Al-Samaw'al is but a legend and Kā'bi b. al-Ashraf was the son of an Arab, though "he behaved as if he belonged to his mother's clan of al-Na[qir]." 3 Baron admits:

Arabian Jewry's intellectual equipment seem to have been limited to some scrolls of law, Hebrew prayer books, and other paraphernalia of worship and study, while the availability at that time of more than fragmentary Arabic translations from Scripture is extremely dubious. 4

The knowledge of the Bible which the Arabian Jews possessed, according to Graetz,

...was not considerable. They were acquainted with it only through the medium of the Agadic exegesis, which had become familiar to them in their travels or had been brought to them by immigrants. For them the glorious history of the past coalesced so completely with the Agadic additions that they were no longer able to separate the gold from the dross. 5

They maintained trade contacts with the Jews of Syria 6 and religious ties with Babylon 7 , "but they had few intellectual contacts with the centres of Jewish life" in these two places. 8 In the absence of any historical evidence it is difficult to agree with the romantic claim of Baron that during the few generations of Jewish control the focal northern areas were raised almost to the high level of the southern civilization, which had long earned for Himyar and its vicinity the Roman designation of Arabia Felix. 9

In fact the Jews of Arabia "contributed little or nothing to the religious and cultural development of post-biblical Judaism." 2 As Margoliouth points out they do not "appear to have produced any man whose name was worth preserving". 3

More than twenty Jewish tribes were settled in Medina. 4 Prominent among these were the Banû Qurayzah, the Banû al-Na[qir, the Banû Qaynuqa', the Banû Tha'labah and the Banû Hadîl. The Banû al-Na[qir and the Banû Qurayzah claimed to be the descendants of Jewish priests, 'al-Kāhinun', Kāhin being the Arabic rendering of Hebrew Kohen. Al-Ya'quíbi, who does not give the source of his information, however, says:

The Banû al-Na[qir were a subtribe of the Banû Judham, who embraced Judaism. The Banû Qurayzah were brothers of the Banû al-Na[qir and it is said that they embraced Judaism in the days of ʿAdiyah the son of Sama[w]al. 5

According to Al-Ya'quíbi, the Banû al-Na[qir and the Banû Qurayzah had taken their names after the hills on which they first settled. Margoliouth does not consider them Jews, and is inclined "to regard the term of Judaism applied to these Medinese tribes as indicating some form of monotheism". 6 Reissner also does not consider them 'Jews'. He says:

Less than a hundred years prior to Muhammad's birth, the Talmud had been completed in Babylon. At that time, there was complete agreement, intra muros et extra, as to who was a Jew and what constituted the essence of Judaism. A Jew was a follower of the Mosaic Law as interpreted by the teachers of the Law in accordance with principles laid down in the Talmud... whoever did not conform... was discounted. If he was Israelitic by descent, he could not be deprived of his birthright, vir, to be called Ben Israel, as in Arabia...? 7

Friedlaender does not agree with Graetz and Reissner. Working on

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2 See D.S. Margoliouth, The Relations between Arabs and Israelites Prior to the Rise of Islam (London, 1924) and Horovitz, Islamic Culture, III, pp. 188-90.
6 Ibid., pp. 58-59, and supra, p. 27.
7 Infra, p. 30.
8 Baron, Vol. III, p. 72.
Gaonate documents he established the contact of Arab Jews with the Gaonate in Babylon. He observes:

It is characteristic of the central position of the Gaonate in Jewish life that even in its last representatives it was able to exert its influence over the distant half-mythical Jews in free Arabia and shape their professional and civil life. It shows at the same time that the Arabian Jews, however far removed from the centre of Jewish learning, recognized the authority of the Talmud and were not in any way guilty of these anti-Talmudic sentiments which Graetz is prone to ascribe to their forefathers.1

The Banū Qurayjah and the Banū al-Naḍīr called themselves Kāḥitūn and so presumably claimed to be of the house of Aaron.2 The Banū Qaynuqā— who practised crafts such as that of the goldsmith— manufactured arms and conducted a market and were possibly "north Arab, Idumaean or such like".3 They possessed no agricultural lands, but had a compact settlement in the suburbs of Medina.4 The Banū Qurayjah and the Banū al-Naḍīr were the owners of some of the richest lands towards the south of Medina on higher ground. Other Jewish clans were dispersed. In total the Jewish clans of Medina owned almost sixty ʿajām.5 These ʿajām, (singular, ʿutm) which formed a prominent feature of Yathrib, were in fact forts stocked with provisions, provided with water, strong enough to withstand attacks and big enough to stand long sieges. There were schools and synagogues and council halls.

The second most important settlement of the Jews was Khaybar. Approximately ninety miles from Yathrib, it is located on a very high mountainous plateau entirely composed of lava deposits and covered by malarial swamps. The valleys, though uninhabitable, are very fertile. The Jews cultivated grapes, vegetables and grain, and raised sheep, cattle, camels, horses and donkeys. They also had palm groves. They traded with Syria and benefited from the caravan trade between Arabia, Syria and Iraq. They also manufactured metal implements such as battering rams and catapults.6 They owned several groups

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3 O'Leary, p. 173.
of forts, many built on the tops of hills in virtually impregnable positions. According to al-Ya˒qūbī twenty thousand fighters lived in these forts.3 Fadak, Wādī al-Qura and Taymā˒ were the other three Jewish strongholds.

Torrey's thesis that there were Jews in Mecca at the time of the Apostle2 is, however, without foundation. Al-Azra'qi makes no mention of any Jewish settlement in Mecca, but refers to their reverence for Ka˒bah; they took their shoes off when they reached the boundaries of the sanctuary.3 As Lammens remarks, the fact that the Quraysh sent a delegation to Medina to consult the Jews regarding the Apostle's claims proves there were no Jews in Mecca whom they could consult.4

When Banū Qaylah arrived in Yathrib from the south, they were presumably allowed by the Jews to settle on those lands in and around Yathrib which had not yet been brought under cultivation. Divided into the Aws and the Khazraj and further sub-divided into clans they accepted the dominant position of the Jews and entered into a relationship with them which was that of jiwa˒r (neighbour) or hilf (confederation). Hilf is a compact between quite separate tribes, general in scope, made for the object of establishing a permanent state of peace between the tribes. It did not diminish their autonomy, but united them for purposes of common defence, for mutual payment of settlements to third parties, for vengeance, and for the common use of pasturage.5

Towards the middle of the sixth century the situation changed, largely owing to Mālik b. al-˒Ajlān's revolt against the Jewish prince al-Fityawn of the Zubra tribe who as a mark of Khazraj subordination bowed to his leadership. Mālik became independent and it is probable that with him nearly all the Khazraj and most of the Aws freed themselves from the 'Jewish' over-lordship.1 Ibn Khurradādhibh (d. 309/911) reports that the Marzūbān al-bādī˒yah appointed a ˒amīl over Medina who collected taxes. The B. Qurayzah and the B. al-ʾNaḏīr, the report continues, were kings who were appointed to collect these taxes from the Aws and the Khazraj.2 Yāqūt (d. 626/1229) also reports that the B. Qurayzah and the B. al-ʾNaḏīr were the kings driven out by the Aws and the Khazraj, who had formerly paid tax to the Jews.3 Altheim and Stiehl consider Ibn Khurradādhibh's report sound, and observe that such a situation could endure as long as the Jewish tribes dominated the Aws and the Khazraj, till the middle of the sixth century.4 It is probably safer to assume that the Jews of Medina had lost their position as a dominant group sometime before the birth of the Apostle.

Various developments after the middle of the sixth century tended to weaken the Jewish community of Yathrib. The fact that before the battle of Bu˒āth, the Banū al-ʾNaḏīr and Banū Qurayzah had given hostages to the Khazraj suggests that they were fully conscious of their weakness. But at the battle of Bu˒āth both the tribes helped the Aws against the Khazraj even at the cost of the lives of some of their hostages. This help made it possible for the Aws to gain victory at Bu˒āth, which was fought a few years before the Hijrah.5

By the first quarter of the seventh century the Banū Qaylah were, probably, on the way to becoming a dominant group in Yathrib. Yathrib at this time was not much of a city. It was a disorganised collection of hamlets and houses, farms and fortified huts scattered over an oasis, rich in underground water supplies and springs and fountains. Though the Aws seemed to have the upper hand, relations between the different groups had reached a very low ebb. They were divided, and unimportant quarrels assumed dangerous proportions.

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1 Al-Ya˒qūbī (Beirut, 1960), II, p. 56.
2 Charles Cutler Torrey, The Jewish Foundation of Islam, second and third lectures, pp. 28-104.
6 Al-Samḥūdī, Vol. I, p. 178. F. Krenkov (EI[I], Vol. II, p. 938) read the name of the Jewish prince as al-Qayṭān and considered it as fictitious since it is originally Greek. Al-Samḥūdī, however, has clearly stated that the name begins with “j”.

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1 Al-Samḥūdī, Vol. I, pp. 177-98. See also Watt, Muhammad at Medina, pp. 192-95.
4 F. Altheim and R. Stiehl, Finanzgeschichte der Spätantike (Frankfurt am Main, 1957), p. 149, n. 63.
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The balance established by the battle of Bu'ath was tenuous and there was every danger that war might break out again. It was in this atmosphere of chaos, suspicion and lawlessness that the Aws and the Khazraj tried to unite under Abd Allâh b. Ubayy b. Salul al-Awfi of the clan of the Banû al-Hublà. 1

For the Jews, however, Yathrib had become the centre of a region which Lammens calls a petite patrie ruled by Talmudic Law. 2 Compact and flourishing Jewish communities occupied Fadak, Wâdi al-Qura, Tayma 3 and Khaybar.

An examination of both the Arab sources and the results of modern research indicates that the Jews of Arabia were not an isolated people. Irfan Shahid, who is the latest among the scholars who have worked on this period, considers that the relations of the Yathrib Jews with Yusuf Dhû Nuwâs “must have been very close indeed”. 3 They had incited him to make war against Najrân. 4 The ruler of Hirah Mundhir III (505-553) had a contingent of Jews in his army and his son Mundhir IV (580-583) married a Jewess, Salmah bint al-Sâ'igh, the mother of the last of the Lakhmids, the famous Nu'man III 5 (592-604).

This was the state of affairs when Islam brought the hope of a new way of life to the quarrelling sons of the Banû Qaylah. Six men of the Khazraj were the first definite converts, who went to Mecca most probably in 620. A year later, five of them returned with four others from the Khazraj and three from the Aws. They pledged themselves solemnly to the Apostle. In June 622 seventy-three men and two women went to Mecca for pilgrimage and on that occasion secretly by night took the pledge not only to obey the Apostle but to fight for him. Ka'b b. Mâlik, who was present on this occasion, has described the significance of that pledge in simple words:

The Apostle spoke and recited the Qur'an and invited men to Allah and commended Islam and then said: 'I invite your allegiance on the basis that you protect me as you protect your women and children'. Al-Bara 6 took his hand and said 'By Him Who sent you with the truth we shall protect you as we protect our women. We give our allegiance and we are men of war possessing arms which have been passed on from father to son'. While Al-Bara 7 was speaking Abû al-Haytham al-Tayyihan interrupted him and said, 'O Apostle, we have ties with other men (meaning the Jews), and if we sever them perhaps when we have done that and Allah will have given you victory, you will return to your people and leave us'. The Apostle smiled and said: ‘No, your blood is my blood and what is sacred to you is sacred to me. I will fight against them that fight against you and be at peace with those who are at peace with you.’ 8

The precise nature of the Apostle’s agreement with the Muslims of Medina before he left Mecca is not clear. But two things would seem to be certain, some pledge of war must have been involved, and the Jews of Medina were not a party to any agreement before the Hijrah. It is not known exactly what the terms of that pledge were. Before leaving Medina to meet the Quraysh at Badr the Apostle asked for advice. He said ‘Give me advice, O Men! Ibn Ishaq says by this he meant the Ansâr.

This is because they were in the majority, and because when they took the oath of fealty at al-Qâhab they stipulated that they were not responsible for his safety until he entered their territory, and that when he was there they would protect him as they did their wives and children. So the Apostle was afraid that the Ansâr would not feel it incumbent upon them to go with him against an enemy outside their territory. When he spoke these words Sa’d b. Mu’âdh said, ‘Perhaps you refer to us’, and when the Apostle said ‘Yes’, Sa’d replied, ‘We believe in you, we declare your truth, and we witness that what you have brought is the truth, and we have given you our word and agreement to hear and obey. We now stand by you, whatever you ask us to do.’ 2

The Battle of Badr took place towards the later part of the second year of the Hijrah. It is, therefore, significant to note that neither the Apostle nor Sa’d b. Mu’âdh even obliquely refer to the document called the Sahih. Had it been signed immediately after the arrival of the Apostle in Medina or even during the first two years of his stay, a reference would not have been made to a penultimate and obviously obsolete agreement reached at al-Qâhab.

As regards the Jews, our sources are contradictory and vague. It is not at all clear if there was a formal agreement with the Jews at all. Ibn Ishaq reports that, when the Apostle reminded the Jews of the condition imposed on them, the Jews—probably the B. al-Na’jir—said, “No covenant was ever made with us about Muhammad” 9. This incident is reported before the B. Qaynuqâ 10 came into conflict

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1 Ibn Hishâm, p. 411.
2 H. Lammens, p. 53.
4 Hamzah al-Ijạfahâni, Ta’rikh, p. 113, cited by Irfan Shahid, p. 268.
6 Ibid., pp. 296-97.
7 Ibid., pp. 434-35.
8 Ibid., p. 379.
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with the Muslims. Since there is no definite information about any agreement with the Jews, the relationship between the Muslims and the Jews in Medina rested on some sort of status quo. To be more precise, it seemed to be an uneasy truce which lasted till the "Sahīfa" was signed.

Historians dealing with the pre-Islamic alliances among the tribes might reasonably ask if the Jews of Medina became an unwitting victim of clanish jealousies or complexities of inter-tribal alliances. As our examination of the incidents shows, such alliances played no part in the Jewish-Muslim conflict. The Jewish trust in the munāfiqūn, however, played a far more important role in their misfortunes. From the very first executions of Ābū ʿAfāk of the B. Āmr b. Āwfi and Āṣmāʾ bint Marwān of Umayyā b. Zayd, the Apostle had taken care to emphasize that Islam had terminated tribal alliances. It would not be correct to conclude that tribal affiliations did not play an important role in the Arab dealings with the Apostle, but they had no part—or no significant part—in the steep decline of the Jewish influence in the Ḥijāz during the first ten years of their encounter with Islam.

CHAPTER II

THE PEOPLE OF THE SAHĪFAH

...the concept of the ummah as a political confederation of tribes and clans, including non-Muslims, Jewish ones, had inevitably to yield to Muhammad’s original understanding of a body whose foundation may be ethnic but whose reason for being is shaped by the divine purpose of salvation. The Jews were such an ummah, and in Medina they were more than just a historical and literary illustration of a theological point; they were a political reality.

—F. E. Peters

Yathrib, as we have seen in the previous chapter, presented a picture of political chaos at the time of the Apostle’s arrival. Though no formal peace was made after the Battle of Buq'āth (about 615 A.D.), the feuding clans and their allies were too exhausted to continue an active struggle. In this uneasy state of political vacuum the Jews enjoyed a position of considerable influence. Āmr b. al-Nu‘mān and al-Ḥuḍayr b. Simāk, who died in the battle of Buq'āth, did not have the qualities of leaders who could unite a people in the existing state of affairs in Yathrib, which to say the least “was intolerable”. But “there were opportunities for a strong man to gain control over a large section of Medina, perhaps, even over the whole”.2 Abd Allāh b. Ubayy, as we have seen earlier, seemed to be a man of wider vision. If the Apostle had not arrived at Medina, he might have provided that leadership which Medina so badly needed.

The situation not only offered a challenge to the Apostle, but also several solutions. He could have worked for a full political integration on the basis of religion, which the ruling Zeitgeist seemed to have demanded. This would have meant the exclusion of the Jews,

1 See infra, Chapter III. While the B. al-Nadir were ready to comply with the terms offered by the Apostle it was Ābd Allāh b. Ubayy and others who asked them to resist the Apostle.

1 Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 173.
2 Ibid.
assigning them a subordinate status with no participation in the life of the Muslim society. He could have united the Ānasār and the Mulājīrān, who had accepted him as their religious leader into one political group. But it seems at this stage he decided against such a grouping and tried to establish a security-community in which there could be reasonable assurance that its members would not fight each other physically but would settle their disputes by peaceful means. The Apostle’s attempts to create such a community culminated in a document which is called the Ṣahīfah. An examination of this document, which was signed in Yathrib between the Muslims from the Quraysh, the various clans of the Ānasār and the Jews, shows that it was based on a liberal conception of the rule of law with two simple principles: the safeguarding of individual rights by impartial judicial authority, and the principle of equality before the law.

The Arabs of the Ḥāhilīyah had practically nothing that can be described as positive law. It is common knowledge and therefore needs hardly any proof that the modern sanction of the law, i.e., a fine or imprisonment for the offender, did not exist. No society is, however, absolutely lawless and the Arab tribes maintained security by the solidarity of the tribal group. If a member of the group was killed, other members of the group avenged him; if a member of the group was in danger, he was supported by other members of the tribe irrespective of the right or wrong of the matter in dispute. The working of the lex talionis was, however, modified by the acceptance of wergeld as an alternative. But the system could work only by the solidarity and strength of the kinship group, and by a swift and effective way of settling disputes and paying wergeld. Thus the lex talionis restrained wanton killing and became an important feature of pre-Islamic Arab society.

The Ṣahīfah sought to provide the basis of positive law. The object of the document was limited to the resolution of conflict without violence. The community thus created is called the ummah. The ummah, is specifically a Qur'ānic term. It occurs nine times in the Meccan and forty-seven times in the Medinan sīrahs. It describes the totality of individuals bound to one another, irrespective of their colour, race or social status, by the doctrine of submission to one God. According to Montgomery Watt, it is “the community formed by those who accept the messenger and his message”. Rudi Paret has also reached a similar conclusion and says the word “always refers to ethical, linguistic or religious bodies of people who are the objects of the divine plan of salvation”. While the orientalists differ as regards the development of the term in the Qur'ān, some Muslim scholars assert that the term ummah describes the community of Muslims, but this is only partly true. It describes the de facto position. In theory the use of the term ummah during the major portion of the Apostle’s career was not restricted to Muslims alone. The main difficulty in dealing with the history of ideas is that terms are more permanent than their definitions. While institutions continually change, the terms describing them remain unaltered. A precise and comprehensive definition of the ummah is, however, not required for our purpose. The term ummah, therefore, within the context of our discussion is restricted to the sense in which it has been used in the Ṣahīfah i.e., ‘the people of the Ṣahīfah’.

The Ṣahīfah signed by the Muslims and the Jews, and erroneously called ‘The Constitution of Medina’, is a very important document for the understanding of the status of non-Muslims in a Muslim-dominated society. Scholars of all schools of thought, such as Watt, Serjeant and Hamidullah, agree that the document is “unquestionably authentic”. No later falsifier writing under the Umayyads or Abbasids, would have included the articles against the Quraysh, and would have given Muhammad so insignificant a place.

Most of the modern scholars dispute the date and unity of the document and there is no clear indication as to the number of agreements which constitute it. Various dates for signing these documents can only be assigned after some reasonable method is found to separate

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6 Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 225.
the individual agreements. There are, however, certain clear indications as to the possible dates, which are significant in determining the character of the ummah. Ibn Isḥāq assigns it to the first year of the Hijrah. But textual comparison of the chronological material in the Sirah shows that the various biographers differ even on the dating of important events.\(^1\) The Sahifah itself, however, provides indications of its approximate date, which, even though obvious, have been ignored by historians.

Firstly, there is no mention of the B. Qaynuqa\(^5\), the B. al-Naḍīr and the B. Qurayḥah in the Sahifah. While most of the Muslim historians have not paid any attention to the omission of these three important Jewish clans from the Sahifah, some orientalists have tried to explain it away by remarking that the Apostle “grouped the Jews according to the Arab clans in whose districts they lived”.\(^2\) This explanation is obviously not convincing. The Jews of the Banū ʿAwf, the Banū al-Naḍīr, the Banū al-Ḥārith, the Banū Sāʾidah, the Banū Jusham, the Banū Thaʿlabah and even a subdivision of the Banū Thaʿlabah, Jafnah, were all confederates of the Khazraj and have been mentioned as such. If this formula was sufficient to cover the Banū Qaynuqa\(^6\) who were the allies of the Khazraj, then the name of their patrons Baʿl-Ḥublā or B. Sālim should have been mentioned. As Wellhausen observes, unless the Jews of the Banū al-Aws and Thaʿlabah are the B. al-Naḍīr and the B. Qurayḥah, these two tribes did not enter into any agreement with Muhammad at the beginning, A.H. 2.\(^3\) But the B. al-Naḍīr and the B. Qurayḥah were not the mawātī of al-Aws. Their relationship was that of alliance and not of patronage.\(^4\) The simple explanation is that the document was signed after the expulsion of the B. Qurayḥah. Montgomery Watt finds difficulty in this explanation because the Sahifah pays that much attention “to Jewish affairs at a time when there were few Jews in Medina”.\(^5\) Though the remaining Jews of Medina had lost their “news-value” for the Muslim historian, there are references to their presence in Medina after the expulsion of the B. al-Naḍīr and the B. Qurayḥah. Ibn Saʿd reports that the Apostle’s expedition to Khaybar was very painful to the Jews.\(^6\) The Jews were even politically active and continued to offer opposition to the Apostle. When the Apostle ordered the Muslims to prepare for an expedition against the Byzantines (9/630) at Tabūk the disaffected and the waverers assembled in the house of a Jew, Suwaylim, making plans to encourage disaffection. Suwaylim was not punished personally but the Apostle ordered Tallāh b. c.ubayd Allāh to burn his house to the ground.\(^7\)

The presence of the Jews in Medina after the expulsion of their three clans seems to be supported by the Qurʾān as well. There is general consensus that Al-Miʿādah is the last surah which was revealed to the Apostle. \(^8\) Aṣmāʾ, daughter of Yazīd reported that the whole of this surah was revealed together.\(^9\) There are other reports also to...

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1. The Jews of Banū ʿAwf,
2. The Jews of Banū al-Naḍīr,
3. The Jews of Banū Sāʾidah,
4. The Jews of Banū Jusham,
5. The Jews of Banū al-Aws,
6. The Jews of Banū Thaʿlabah,
7. Banū al-Shuṭaybah,
8. The Jews of Banū Zurayq,
9. The Jews of B. Ḥārithah,
10. The Banū Qaynuqa\(^6\).\(^1\)

The names of the first seven Jewish tribes are given in the Sahifah; the names of the B. Zurayq and the B. Ḥārithah are given by Ibn Isḥāq in the list of the Jewish opponents of the Apostle.\(^2\) Our sources do not indicate that there was any general exodus of the Jews during the Apostle’s life. Watt rightly concludes that “the document in its final form was intended as a charter for the Jews remaining in Medina”.\(^3\) Though the remaining Jews of Medina had lost their “news-value” for the Muslim historian, there are references to their presence in Medina after the expulsion of the B. al-Naḍīr and the B. Qurayḥah. Ibn Saʿd reports that the Apostle’s expedition to Khaybar was very painful to the Jews who remained in Medina.\(^4\) The Jews were even politically active and continued to offer opposition to the Apostle. When the Apostle ordered the Muslims to prepare for an expedition against the Byzantines (9/630) at Tabūk the disaffected and the waverers assembled in the house of a Jew, Suwaylim, making plans to encourage disaffection. Suwaylim was not punished personally but the Apostle ordered Tallāh b. c.ubayd Allāh to burn his house to the ground.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) As we shall see in the next chapter, the evidence seems to indicate that the B. Qaynuqa\(^6\) were not expelled during the Apostle’s lifetime.

\(^2\) Ibn Hishām, p. 351.

\(^3\) Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 277.


\(^5\) Ibn Hishām, p. 858.

the same effect. Nöldeke, while accepting it as the last revelation—114th, has placed some of the verses between 2/623 and 7/628. Verses 45-55, however, have been placed after "the massacre of Bani Quraidha" and prior to the expedition against the Jews of Khaybar in A.H. 7; by Nöldeke, and Wherry concurs with the view. 

Should they (the Jews) come to thee seeking judgment in a dispute, either judge between them or leave them. If thoukestet away from them, they shall not harm thee at all. But if thou undertake to judge, then judge between them with equity. Surely Allah loves the just.

And how will they make thee their judge, when they have the Torah containing Allah's commandments? Yet, they turn their backs, and they certainly do not believe.

A reference to the Jews seeking the Apostle's judgment in their disputes would be pointless if there were no Jews in Medina. Since the verses were revealed prior to the expedition to Khaybar, the Jews of Khaybar, Fadak and the neighbouring regions were not expected to bring their disputes to the Apostle.

No demographic data of the population of Yathrib at the time of the Hijrah is available to us, so it is not possible to give any exact figures for the Jewish population of Medina during the lifetime of the Apostle. However some definite figures have been provided by Ibn Ishaq and other biographers, which give an approximate idea of the Jewish strength. The B. Qaynuqa provided 700 men to protect 4Abd Allāh b. Ubayy and 600 to 900 fighting men of the B. Qurayyah for the three tribes which clashed with the Apostle. When the B. al-Naḍr and the reported execution of the B. Qurayzah twelve to fourteen thousand Jews left Medina, which leaves the number of Jews in Medina at the signing of the Šahifah between 24,000 to 28,000. This is not a small number and did require the Apostle's attention.

The second pointer to the probable date of the Šahifah is the declaration of Yathrib as haram. As Gil points out "the haram clause is one of the identifying points which oral tradition has preserved in reference to the document kept in the sheath of Dhūl'Iqār". The treatment of a territory as sacred presupposes either a strong tradition and unbroken custom, as was the case with Mecca, or the military strength to enforce and protect that sacredness from external threat and internal strife. In the first years of the Hijrah, specially up to the Battle of the Aḥzāb (A.H. 5), the Apostle and his followers were not secure, and were certainly not sure if they could successfully protect the town. The peace within Medina, as we shall see, was not secure either. The B. Qaynuqa tried to provoke at least one if not two riots. The B. al-Naḍir were in touch with the Meccans and the B. Qurayzah's attitude during the battle of the Aḥzāb was a source of great anxiety to the defenders of Medina. An open conflict between the Muhājirūn and Anṣār after the battle of B. al-Muṣṭaliq was averted by the Apostle with considerable restraint. It was on this occasion that 4Abd Allāh b. Ubayy had said, "By Allāh when we return to Medina the stronger will drive out the weaker". During the battle of Badr (2/624) the Apostle could muster 313 fighters. This was hardly the strength with which approximately more than 36,000 Jews and a large number of munāfiqūn could be forced to respect the haram obligations. The

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2 Ibn Hisham, p. 546.
3 Ibid., p. 690.
Apostle did not take hasty decisions, specially those which he could not execute. It would be wiser to wait till the situation was stabilized. Though the battle of the "Abzāb was a defensive war and the Muslims had gained a victory on the home ground, yet they were not secure enough to declare Yathrib a "haram. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that Yathrib was declared a "haram after the affair of the B. Qurayzah, which in fact was a continuation of the battle of the "Abzāb. It was at about the same time that the munāfīqūn had been brought under control. The Apostle was strong enough to administer a public reprimand to them after the affair of the B. al-Muṣṭāliq. The Surat al-Munāfīqūn was revealed in 6/627.1 Al-Samhūdī, who has dealt with the date, the boundary and the prohibitions within the "haram territory in detail, placed the creation of this "haram according to Ḥadīth after the Apostle's return from Khaybar in 7/628.2 Serjeant refers to al-Samḥūdī and admits that he should have been "inclined to suggest that the declaration of the "haram could have taken place some time after the failure of the Prophet's enemies to take Medina at the battle of al-Khandaq at the earliest, and what more suitable occasion could there be for declaring Medina a sacred enclave than when it had just manifested its holiness by repelling the invader?"3 However, for "many strong reasons, into which I cannot enter here"4 Serjeant falls in line with other historians. One can detect Serjeant's reasons and one of them seems to be the same difficulty which Montgomery Watt 'treachery'. On his arrival in Yathrib the Apostle had not expected much support and help either. The Jews, too, in the first year of the Hijrah, the year normally assigned to the signing of the Šahīfah, had done nothing to arouse among the Muslims fear of deceit and duplicity on their part. In pre-Islamic Arabia the Jews did not have an unfavourable image. They were known for their skill in professions, for their mastery of the art of writing and their steadfastness.5 Above all they were known for their nobility; they did not break their word. Al-Samaw'āl's loyalty to his friend Imru'Qays was proverbial throughout Arabia.6 There were Jews like Qays b. Ma'dikarib, who had committed acts of treachery, but that was not part of their reputation. Poets talked of al-Samaw'āl's fidelity and hospitality.7 It is, therefore, curious that the word 'treachery'8 should have been used in eight articles in the Šahīfah. Except for Article 40, all the seven articles9 in which the word is used pertain to the Jews. The logical conclusion would seem to be that the Muslims became wiser after the events, and, having experienced treachery from the B. al-Nadīr and the B. Qurayzah, they wished to make clear that treachery would automatically cancel all covenants and agreements. The Apostle seemed to be disinclined to suffer the unpleasantness of rejecting intercessions on behalf of the defaulting Jews from the Aws or from the Khazraj.

While we agree with the views expressed both by Sergeant6 and Watt7 that there is much that is bound to remain conjectural and obscure in the existing text of the Šahīfah, we may be nearer to the facts if the history of the Šahīfah is reconstructed in the following manner.

1. The first twenty-three articles form part of the original agreement between the Apostle and the Anṣār at al-"Aqabah or shortly after the Hijrah.8

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2 The sceptical view taken by D.S. Margoliouth in The Relations between Arabs and Israelites prior to the Rise of Islam, pp. 76-81, in regard to the genuineness of Al-Samaw'āl's verses does not affect his reputation.
3 Ilse Lichtenstadter, pp. 185-194.
4 "... The numbering of the articles follows Watt, Muhammad at Medina, pp. 221-225.
5 Articles 25, 31, 33, 37, 39, 46 and 47.
7 Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 228.
8 Ibn Hishām, p. 342; Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 227.
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2. The other articles were added from time to time as the need arose.1
3. In view of our observations above, the articles pertaining to the Jews and the declaration of Medina as haram were concluded after 7/628.

The force of logic, therefore, leads us to believe that the ummah was formed towards the concluding period of the Apostle’s life and not immediately after his arrival in Yathrib. The Apostle died in 11/632.

The Ṣaḥifah is actually not the constitution of a state; it lays the guiding principles for building a multi-cultural and multi-religious ummah in which the dominant group will always be Muslim.2 Having established the Muslim dominance, the Ṣaḥifah also secures the following privileges for the dominant group:

1. The functions of the final court of appeal will be discharged by the Apostle.3
2. The question of war and peace is the prerogative of the Apostle.4
3. Non-Muslims included in the ummah will have equal political and cultural rights with the Muslims. There will be complete freedom of religion and all groups will be autonomous.5
4. Non-Muslims and Muslims will take up arms against the enemy of the ummah and will share the cost of war. Muslims and non-Muslims are sincere friends with honourable dealings and no treachery.6
5. Non-Muslims will not be obliged to take part in the religious wars of the Muslims.7

The Ṣaḥifah is a clear indication of the lines on which the Apostle was building the ummah. It was a multi-religious community. Its basis was neither territorial nor tribal. Article 20 of the Ṣaḥifah implies the exclusion of idolators (mushrikun) from the ummah and since the Ṣaḥifah included the Jews of Yathrib in the ummah it appears that only a belief in the Unity of God was essential for the membership of the ummah.

There were no Christians in Medina, so they did not join the ummah. But in 9/630 when a deputation of Christians under the leadership of ʿAbdul-Masiḥ ʿAqib, al-Ayham and Bishop Abū Ḥāritha b. Ṣalama visited Medina the Apostle invited the Christians to join him on the basis of the unity of God.8 He said:

O People of the Book! Come to a word equal between us and you that we worship none but Allah, and that we associate no partner with him, and that some of us take not others for Lords beside Allah.9 It is significant that this invitation was extended to them after they had declined the Apostle’s offer to accept Islam.10 The Qurʾānic

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1 Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 227.
3 “Whenever there is anything about which you differ, it is to be referred to God and to Muhammad (peace be upon Him)” (Article 23). The text of the Ṣaḥifah is given by Ibn Hishām (pp. 341-344). Hamidullah’s text (pp. 41-54) has been compared with Ibn Abī Khaythamah, Ibn Kathīr and Abu ʿUbayd. See also Watt’s Muhammad at Medina (pp. 221-225).
4 “No one of them may go out (on a military expedition) without the permission of Muhammad (peace be upon Him) but he is not prohibited from taking vengeance for wounds. Whosoever shed blood shall be personally responsible for it as the member of his house, except where a person has been wronged. God is with those who observe this document scrupulously” (Article 36).
5 “The security (dhimmah) of God is one; the humblest of them can, by extending his protection to anyone, put the obligation on all of them; the believers are brother to one another (mawāli) as against all peoples” (Article 15).

1 “The Jews of Bani ʿAwf are an ummah along with the believers. To the Jews their din and to the Muslims their din. This applies both to them and their clients, except for him who is guilty of oppression, or treachery; he brings evil only on himself and members of his house” (Article 25, Articles 26 to 35 are similar).
2 “It is for the Jews to bear their expenses and for the Muslims to bear their expenses. Between them there will be help against those who fight against the people of the Ṣaḥifah. Between them is sincere friendship and honourable dealing, not treachery, no one shall violate the pledge of his ally and there is help for the person wronged” (Article 37).
3 “And if they (the Jews) are invited to a peace to participate in and to adhere to it, they shall participate in it and adhere to it, and if they invoke likewise, the same shall be incumbent upon the believers in their favour, except whoever goes to war in the cause of religion” (Article 45).
4 Ibn Hishām, pp. 401-411.
5 The Qurʾān, Al ʿImrān, 64.
6 Ibn Hishām, p. 411.
invitation "to come to a word equal between us and you" does not, therefore, provide a basis for a compromise on matters of faith. The Apostle's biographers, Tradition collectors and jurists working under a mighty Muslim empire have not preserved for us the answer to this offer given by the Christians of Najrān. But there are indications that they accepted to join the ummah on the terms of the Sabīfah as far as they could be applied to that region. They accepted the dominant role of Muslims as the administrators of justice, and requested the Apostle "to send a man he could trust, to decide between them in certain financial matters in dispute among them." 3 Abu Ubaydah b. al-Jarrāh was accordingly appointed by the Apostle as a judge for the Christians of Najrān. 5

There was, however, flexibility in applying this principle. It was the claim to believe in one God and not the practice which was the criterion. Though the Jews have been accused by the Qur'an of associating 'Uzair with God, Islam accepts them monotheists. This seems to be the foundation of the ummah. It is the concept of the Unity of God which leads to the idea of oneness of the universe and the universal concept of the ummah, emphasizing the essential equality of the rights of all men. The Jews or Christians were not expected to change their religion. Their belief in the Unity of God was sufficient basis for cooperation, but not integration. It was the concept of a multi-religious society. It was a plural society allowing entry on the basis of elective affinities in which racial or ethnic differences had no relevance, but the belief in the Unity of God was essential.

Though the ummah was a pre-political community, yet it was not un-political. By its very nature politics is inherent in any process of community building. "It is interesting to note that this first constitution of the Arabian Prophet dealt almost exclusively with the civil and political relations of the citizens among themselves and with the outside." 6

In this pre-political ummah the Apostle exercised authority by virtue of his divine sanction. While the Quraysh rejected the formula of 'Muḥammad, the Apostle of Allāh', when signing the Treaty of Ḥudaybiyyah, the Jews of Medina seemed to have acquiesced to the adoption of a modified formula for the purposes of the Sabīfah. According to Abu Ubayd the words used were, "Muḥammad the Apostle". 1 It does not say whose Apostle. The formulation seems to have been vague enough to be acceptable to the Jews. Though Ibn Ishaq an earlier authority gives the full formula, "Muḥammad, the Apostle of Allāh", we are inclined to accept Abu Ubayd's version. There seems to be no motive, except caution to use a phrase, which was definitely unconventional and awkward. Having accepted a non-dominant position in the ummah, the Jews of Medina probably had no choice but to agree to the appellation with the tacit understanding that it represented the view of the dominant group. Had this understanding not been there they would have not been described as Jews at all.

To search for any theoretical basis of the distribution of authority in the ummah would be futile. Whatever authority was needed at this formative period of the community was provided by the Apostle. Mecca was conquered soon after the signing of the Sabīfah, if we agree to the date we have sought to establish above. This conquest significantly altered the situation. The pagans of Mecca lost control of the Ka'bah and they were prohibited from approaching "the Sacred mosque after this year of theirs". 2 In the next verse the Muslims were ordered to fight those from among the people of the Book who believe not in Allāh nor in the Last Day, nor hold unlawful what Allāh and His messenger had declared to be unlawful, nor follow the true religion, until they pay the jizyah with their own hand and acknowledge their subjection. 3

Under the terms of the Sabīfah the Jews were not required to pay any tax and there was no explicit clause demanding their subjection. With these verses the dominance of the Muslims was formalised, but no other restriction was added. There is nothing in these verses or any other subsequent verses to change the multi-religious character of the ummah. 4 It might be true to say the Jews of Medina, having lost the struggle to retain their dominant character

1 Ibn Ishāq, pp. 410-411; Ibn Sa'd, p. 412.
2 Ibn Sa'd, p. 412.
4 Even though the modern concept of a community may militate against the existence of two levels of membership, in the seventh century this did not appear to have presented any difficulties.

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1 Abu Ubayd al-Qaṣim b. Sallām, Kitāb al-Anwār (Cairo, 1968) paragraph 517.
2 The Qur'an, Al-Taubah, 27.
3 Ibid., Al-Taubah, 28.
4 49
in Medina, were not in a position to play any significant role. The *maghā zi* writers seem to have lost all interest in the Yathrib Jews after the discomfiture of the B. Qurayyah and other Jews after the peace treaty with the Jews of Khaybar. The Muslim history of the period, as transmitted to us, is actually the history of the *maghāzi*. Since the Jewish population of Medina during the later period of the Apostle's life did not involve itself in any conflict or trouble it ceased to be of any interest to the *maghāzi* writer. The Apostle did not live very long after the conquest of Mecca. It is difficult to say what form the *ummah* would have taken had the author of the *Ṣaḥīfah* lived longer. With his death the *Ṣaḥīfah* and the *ummah* created by it, as well as the Jews who were part of the *ummah*, passed out of the picture. The term *ummah*, as with all living institutions, acquired a new definition under the Apostle's successors. The Shari'ah which determined the status of non-Muslim monotheists “did not derive directly from the Qur'ān, it developed out of a practice which often diverged from the Qur'ān's intentions and even from its explicit wording”.

1 It also did not develop “in close connection with practice, but, as the expression of a religious ideal”, as understood by Muslim theoreticians and ideologists of the Muslim ruling class, which was in fact not only in opposition to practice but in direct contradiction to the original model set by the Apostle.

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**Chapter III**

THE JEWISH SUPPORT TO MEDINAN OPPOSITION

Muḥammad’s followers for their part—quite apart from their adherence to the fundamental ideas of Judaism and to the precepts of Noah—showed perfect willingness to conform to a number of Jewish rituals. In theory, therefore, there was no reason why the two communities should not have lived peaceably together. But the Jewish tribes of Medina had probably not abandoned the idea of exerting a considerable political influence over the oasis as a whole. It was quite obvious to them, probably before very long, that Muḥammad’s behaviour and the importance he was assuming were likely to interfere with this objective.

—MAXIME RODINSON

The *ummah*, as visualized by the Apostle and formalized in the *Ṣaḥīfah*, which we have discussed in the previous chapter, could smoothly function only by the willing cooperation of its various constituents—the *Muhajirūn* the *Anṣār* and the Jews of Medina. The first five years of the Apostle’s life in Medina, it seems, were spent in trying to obtain that cooperation. A section of the *Anṣār*, called the *munāṣibīn*, and three Jewish clans of Medina—the B. Qaynuqā'

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2 Ibid., p. 40.
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the B. al-Naḍīr and the B. Qurayzah— withheld that cooperation without which the ummah could not play an effective role. 6 Abd Allāh b. Ubayy, a prominent Medinan opponent of the Apostle, led the munāfiqūn, while the leaders of the B. al-Naḍīr provided the main Jewish opposition. In the next two chapters we shall examine that Jewish opposition.

The Apostle escaped from the Meccan persecution to the safety of Yathrib in September 622. The date marks not only a new era in Muslim history, but also the second and most crucial phase of the Muslim struggle for survival. While it is admitted that there is "a scarcity of information about the internal politics of Medina" 2 during the early years of the Apostle's Hijrah, the strength of the opposition which the Muslims had to face does not seem to be fully realized. The Muslim hagiographer by playing up the miraculous aspects of the Apostle's maghāzī has complicated the historian's task of ascertaining the true strength of the Apostle's supporters and opponents up to the time of the truces of Ḥudaybiyyah (6/628) and Khaybar (7/628). After an allowance is made for the tendency of the maghāzī writer to exaggerate the opposition and understate the Muslim strength, the fact remains that during the first two years the Quraysh of Mecca, the Jews of Khaybar, the pagan tribes of the Ḥijāz and above all the munāfiqūn and the Jews of Yathrib had collectively superior and decisive strength vis-à-vis the new Muslim community.

Though conscious of their strength, the pagans and the Jews were not unmindful of the progress the Apostle was making. They were worried at the advance of Islam. To stop its further progress the total communication media of the time were employed against the Apostle. The propagandist poets, whom Rodinson describes as "the journalists of the time", and Carmichael as kindlers of battle 3 accused the Muslims of Medina of dishonouring themselves by submitting to an outsider. Abū ʿAfak taunted the children of Qaylah (the Aws and the Khazraj):

I have lived a long time, but I have never seen
Either a house or gathering of people

1 See Ibn Hishām, pp. 351-400 for the details of the Jewish opposition to the Apostle.
2 Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 180.
3 Maxime Rodinson, Mohammed, tr. Anne Carter (New York, 1971), p. 194. "A tribal poet among the Bedouin", as Joel Carmichael puts it, was "no mere versifier, but a kindler of battle", his poems were "thought of as the serious beginning of real warfare". (The Shaping of the Arabs, A Study in Ethnic Identity, New York, 1967, p. 38).

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more loyal and faithful to
Its allies, when they call on it,
Than that of the children of Qayla
( the Aws and Khazraj) as a whole.
The mountains will crumble before they submit
Yet here is a rider come among them who had divided them.
(He says) 'This is permitted; this is forbidden'
to all kinds of things.
But if you had believed in power
And in might, why did you not follow a tubba.1

Abū ʿAfak in effect asked: The Tubba was after all a south Arabian king of great reputation, but you resisted him; now what has happened to you that you have accepted the claims of a Meccan refugee?

ʿAṣmāʾ bint Marwān 2 was more forceful and forthright:

Fucked men of Mālik and Nābit
And of ʿAwf, fucked men of Khazraj
You obey a stranger who does not belong among you,
Who is not of Murād, nor of Mādhūbīj (Yemenite tribes)
Do you, when your own chiefs have been murdered, hope in him
Like men greedy for meal soup when it is cooking?
Is there no man of honour who will take advantage of an unguarded moment
And cut off the gulls' hopes?3

While ʿAṣmāʾ was putting ʿAwf and Khazraj to shame, Kaʾb b. al-Asārī was singing erotic prologues to the Apostle's wives,4 and composing insulting verses about the Muslim women.5 Ibn Jaḥṣāq has preserved for us some of Kaʾb's amatory verses which give an idea

2 Goitein like Rodinson observes that "the women of ancient Arabia were famous not only for their dirges and songs of praise, but in particular for their satirical poems, which largely served the same function as the press of today". (Jews and Arabs, p. 30).
5 Ibn Hishām, p. 550.
of his style. The following lines are devoted to Umm al-Fadl bint al-Harith:

Are you off without stopping in the valley
And leaving Umm al-Fadl in Mecca?
Out would come what she bought from the pedlar of bottles,
Henna and hair dye
What lies twisted ankle and elbow is in motion
When she tries to stand and does not
Like Umm Haskim when she was with us
The link between us firm and not to be cut
She is one of B. Amir who bewitches the heart,
And if she wished she could cure my sickness.
The glory of women and of a people is their father
A people held in honour true to their oath.
Never did I see the sunrise at night till I saw her
Display herself to us in darkness of the night.

While this campaign of vulgarity and abuse was conducted by the poets, a Jew from the B. Qaynuqā, Shāb b. Qays, ordered a Jewish youth to recite some poems composed on the occasion of the battle of Bu'ath to a mixed gathering of Muslims composed of the Aws and the Khazraj till they got so worked up that both the Aws and the Khazraj challenged each other saying, "If you wish we will do the same again". The excited parties said, 'We will. Your meeting place is outside—that being the volcanic tract—To arms! To arms!' As soon as the Apostle heard the news he hurried to the spot with the Emigrants and addressed the men of the Aws and the Khazraj thus:

O Muslims, remember God. Remember God. Will you act as pagans while I am with you after God has guided you to Islam and honoured you thereby and made a clean break with paganism; delivered you thereby from unbelief; made you friends thereby? The following verses were revealed on the occasion:

O ye who believe, be mindful of your duty to Allah in all respects, every moment of your lives, so that death, whenever it overtakes you, should find you in a state of complete submission to Him. Take fast hold, all together, of the rope of Allah, and be not divided. Call to mind the favour of Allah which He bestowed upon you when you were at enmity with each other and He united your hearts in love so that by His grace you became as brethren.

This was the atmosphere of unrest in Medina in which the Battle of Badr took place. Within less than two years of the Hijrah (Ramaḍān 2 A. H./March 624) three hundred and fourteen Muslims led by the Apostle defeated a Meccan army of a thousand Qurayshites at Badr. The dead Meccans numbered between fifty and seventy, including the leading Quraysh opponent of the Apostle, Abū al-Ḥakām Asim b. Hishām (Abū Jahl) and several other leaders. Another seventy or so were taken prisoners. On the other side only fourteen Muslims were killed. There were no Muslim prisoners. This was the first major encounter with the Meccans after the Apostle's migration from Mecca.

This notable victory considerably strengthened the Muslim position in Medina, "which had perhaps been deteriorating during the previous few months when it looked as if he (the Apostle) was unlikely to achieve anything". The incipient opposition in Medina, which had earlier taken the Apostle and his followers rather lightly, seems to have become restive. The Jews and their allies, who had joined the Muslim ranks, but were sitting on the fence, waiting for the opportunity to expel the Muslims from Medina, were naturally disturbed. It seems they were spoiling for a confrontation in Medina, which the Apostle intended to avoid at any cost. During this period probably some incident took place in Medina creating friction between the Muslims and the B. Qaynuqā. Ibn Isḥāq did not report it, but his editor, Ibn Hishām added it to his narrative. An Anṣārī woman, according to him, was immodestly exposed by a Jewish gold-smith in the market place of the B. Qaynuqā. She uttered a loud cry

1 Guillaume's translation (The Life of Muhammad, pp. 366-67). The pornographic nature of this line becomes evident when it is realised that it refers to the motion of Umm al-Fadl's buttocks when she is reclining.
3 Ibn Hishām, p. 386.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 387.
and one of the Muslims leapt upon the goldsmith and killed him. So the Jews fell upon the Muslim and killed him, whereupon the Muslim's family called on other Muslims for help against the Jews. The Muslims were enraged, and bad feeling sprang up between the two parties. Though al-Waqidi also reported the incident, Ibn Sa'd has not included it in his account. Al-Tabari following the original narrative of Ibn Ishaq has also not reported the incident. Probably the incident got into the qisas material at a later stage, or perhaps seeing it as a minor incident Ibn Ishaq did not consider it important enough to report. But in a tense situation charged with emotions on both sides even minor and trivial incidents can assume dangerous proportions. Discussing political change in plural societies Kuper observes:

... conflict may move rapidly from one sector to another in a seemingly irrational and unpredictable manner. Thus minor, isolated events may have great resonance and precipitate societal intersectional conflict. So too, issues of conflict are readily superimposed, contributing to the likelihood and intensity of violence.

Whatever the incident which became the immediate cause of conflict, the relations between the B. Qaynuqii and the Muslims had reached a point where the Apostle was compelled to assemble the B. Qaynuqii in their market for a warning. Since he claimed to be the Apostle of God his first duty was to warn them in the following words:

'O Jews, beware lest Allāh bring you the vengeance that he brought upon the Quraysh and become Muslims. You know that I am a prophet who has been sent—you will find that in your books and Allāh's covenant with you.'

The Jewish reply to this appeal was a challenge. They said:

'O Muhammad, you seem to think that we are your people. Do not deceive yourself because you encountered a people with no knowledge of war and

1 Ibn Hishām, p. 568.
3 Al-Tabari, Ta'rikh al-Rusul wa a l-Muluk (Cairo, 1961), Vol. II, pp. 479-83. Since Al-Tabari has taken in full Ibn Ishaq's Sirah according to the rivwiyah of Salamah b. Faḍl al-Abrash al-Anṣārī (See Guillaume, p. xvii) no further references will be made to his Ta'rikh, unless the account varies from Ibn Ishaq's Sirah.
5 Ibn Hishām, p. 545.
7 Ibn Sa'd, Vol. II, p. 29.

No peaceful settlement was possible after this reply. The B. Qaynuqii took the initiative at the most appropriate moment. It was barely two years after the Apostle had settled in Medina. Some of the influential Ansār like ʿAbd Allāh b. Ubayy were still sitting on the fence; the Aww and the Khazraj were still susceptible to pre-Islamic rivalries; and the Jewish position in Medina had not yet been significantly affected by the arrival of the Apostle and the Emigrants. As we have noted earlier the Jewish population of Medina at that time was between 36,000 and 42,000, forming a majority of the city's inhabitants.

The Battle of Badr gave a good idea of the strength of the Muslims at that time; they could muster only two horses, seventy camels and three hundred and fourteen men to fight against nine hundred and fifty Meccans who in addition to a large number of camels had two hundred horses. The B. Qaynuqii or for that matter any other observer would have formed a very poor opinion of the Meccans' strategy, logistics and command. At the same time the Muslim weakness, both in men and equipment, was exposed. Even if other Jews and their Medinan allies would not help, the B. Qaynuqii could manage to settle with the Apostle and his helpers alone. They were seven hundred strong, three hundred of them with armour, in comparison to some three hundred Muslims without armour. They also had the advantage of their well-provided strongholds. The B. Qaynuqii after all were the bravest of the Jews and they called themselves the "men of war", so they decided to take the initiative

1 Ibn Hishām, p. 545.
2 Our sources have not preserved the names of other prominent munāfiqūn, but the frequent reference to them in the Qurʾān indicates that their number was not inconsiderable.
3 See Supra p. 43.
4 There seems to be no reason to suspect these figures. The Muhājirūn and the Ansār who participated in the Battle of Badr have been given a place of honour by Muslims; their names have been recorded by Ibn Ishaq and Ibn Sa'd and their descendants get preference over the descendants of other companions of the Apostle.
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and “went to war.” They shut themselves up inside their forts. The Apostle went and sat down outside with his men. The combat was as unequal as at Badr, and the outcome was no less surprising. After only a fifteen-day siege the B. Qaynuqāc surrendered. Margoliouth has made an interesting observation on the fighting qualities of the Jews of Medina:

It is rather curious that in the Prophet’s biography, the Jews figure as dealers in arms and armor just as they do in the medieval England of Scott. Apparently they could be trusted not to use them effectively.

The claim of being “men of war” and “the bravest of the Jews” has been reported by al-Waqidi and his pupil Ibn Sa’d. Ibn Isḥāq’s language is more cautious. He does not mention anything about their bravery.

The other two most powerful Jewish tribes, the B. al-Naḍīr and the B. Qurayyāh, did not help. Nor did “Abd Allāh b. Ubayy b. Sa‘lūl make a move to provide any support to the besieged Jews. Only after their surrender did “Abd Allāh b. Ubayy espouse their cause. The B. Qaynuqāc were their confederates; they had fought by his side before the Hijrah. After their surrender “Abd Allāh b. Ubayy went to the Apostle and asked him to “deal kindly with my clients……” The Apostle replied, “Confound you, let me go”. Ibn Ubayy answered, “No, by God, I will not let you go until you deal kindly with my clients. Four hundred men without mail and three hundred mailed protected me from all mine enemies. Would you cut them down in one morning? By God, I am a man who fears that circumstances may change”. The Apostle said, “You can have them.” Ibn Isḥāq, al-Waqidi and Ibn Sa’d reported this story. They all leave the impression that “Abd Allāh b. Ubayy had some influence on the Apostle. The wording of “Abd Allāh b. Ubayy’s plea with the Apostle is by itself of a doubtful nature. Ibn Isḥāq has not reported that the Apostle had at all indicated that he intended to order the execution of the B. Qaynuqāc. It was al-Waqidi who introduced it, and Ibn Sa’d who copied it from his master. As a political leader it was not the Apostle’s way of dealing with his adversaries. He did not believe in

non-violence and went to war when necessary, but as a principle he avoided unnecessary bloodshed. In any case, in the second year of the Hijrah, even if he had wanted to, he was not in a position to impose a severe punishment. A more acceptable line of reasoning would be to consider the attack on the B. Qaynuqāc as a lesson to the munaffīqun and especially “Abd Allāh b. Ubayy, who would have been a direct beneficiary if the B. Qaynuqāc had succeeded. “Ubadah b. al-Ṣāmit of al-Qawāqilah, who was also a confederate of the Jews, hastened to renounce his relationship with the B. Qaynuqāc. “Abd Allāh b. Ubayy was thus not only exposed and isolated, but also weakened. The Apostle had taught a lesson; there was no need for further action.

Ibn Isḥāq’s account of the whole affair is short and restrained. He has not reported the incident at the B. Qaynuqāc market; it was added by Ibn Hishām. Ibn Isḥāq begins by reporting the Apostle’s address to the B. Qaynuqāc in their market. But he does not report that the B. Qaynuqāc were expelled. The Apostle told “Abd Allāh b. Ubayy “You can have them.” It is al-Waqidi who had added the phrase “and ordered them to be expelled from Medina”. Ibn Sa’d copied his teacher’s phrase without investigation. Evidence seems to support Ibn Isḥāq, who did not report their expulsion. Neither al-Bukhārī nor Muslim reported any Ḥadith on the Apostle’s conflict with the B. Qaynuqāc though both of them dealt with the B. al-Naḍīr and the B. Qurayyāh. The expulsion of the B. Qaynuqāc has been reported by both of them together with the general expulsion of the Jews from Medina. No dates are given in these reports, but the name of the B. Qaynuqāc was mentioned after that of B. al-Naḍīr and the B. Qurayyāh. Both these reports seem to refer to Umar’s caliphate. As we have already noted, the Jews were still in Medina in the ninth year of the Hijrah and the Apostle’s biographies do not mention any general expulsion of the Jews from Medina during his life. Abū Yūsuf (113/731-182/798), who deals in his Kitaab al-Kharaj with the problems of land taxation, the legal position of non-Muslims and related matters and gives precedents, wherever possible, from the Apostle’s time to establish the law according to his Sunnah, makes no reference to the expulsion of the B. Qaynuqāc and the distribution of their property.

1 Ibn Hishām, p. 546.
5 Supra, Chapter II, p. 42.
Yahya b. Ādam (140/757-203/818), who “is usually said by critics to be reliable . . . and was primarily a traditionist and legist of the orthodox school” reports that the B. al-Naḍīr were the first to be deported from Yathrib. Imām Shāfi‘ī (150/767-204/820) mentions that the Apostle employed Jewish auxiliaries of the B. Qaynuqā against the Jews of Khaybar (7/628). Ibn al-‘Imād (1032/1623-1089/1679), though a late writer yet “still useful as a preliminary source of information”, has covered in Shādharat al-Dhahab important events of the Apostle’s life from the time of his Hījrah. He also did not mention the expulsion of the B. Qaynuqā from Yathrib in the second year of the Hījrah or during the Apostle’s life. The Qur’ān supports this view. Sūrat al-Ḥasr, which was revealed after the Battle of Uhud, in the fourth year of the Hījrah and deals with the banishment of the B. al-Naḍīr from Medina, refer to their expulsion as “the first exile”.

While the Qur’ān mentions the B. al-Naḍīr’s expulsion and the B. Qurayţah’s punishment, it does not refer to the B. Qaynuqā’s expulsion although they were the first who came into conflict with the Muslims. Al-Wāqī‘idī, and Ibn Sā‘d report that the following verse was revealed regarding the B. Qaynuqā:

And if thou apprehend treachery from a people,
who have made a pact with thee terminate the pact with equity. Surely Allāh loves not the treacherous.

The above passage has been quoted out of context. The penultimate verse of the same sūrah explicitly excludes the B. Qaynuqā.

1 Joseph Schacht, Encyclopaedia of Islam (1), Vol. IV, p. 1150.
9 The Qur’ān, Al-Anfūl, 58.
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It seems that though the arms of the B. Qaynuqā were confiscated, they were allowed to continue in possession of all their properties.

While the B. al-Naḍīr and other Jews did not move to help the B. Qaynuqā, they were not inactive. Ka'b b. al-Ashraf, who was elected Chief of the Jews, replacing Mālik b. al-Ṣayf, lamented the loss of the Quraysh at Badr, and set out for Mecca to rouse the Meccans to avenge the defeat at Badr. In one of his elegies he sang of the nobility of those who fell at Badr and cried out for vengeance:

Badr's mill ground out the blood of its people,
At events like Badr you should weep and cry.
The best of the people were slain round their cisterns.
Don't think it strange that the princes were left lying
How many noble handsome men,
the refuge of the homeless were slain
Liberal when the stars gave no rain
Who bore other's burdens, ruling and taking their due fourth . . .
I was told that al-Iṣṭārīh ibn Hishām
Is doing well and gathering troops
To visit Yathrib with armies
For only the noble, handsome man protects the loftiest reputation.

In another elegy, he said:

Drive off that fool of yours that you may be safe
From talk that has no sense!
Do you taunt me because I shed tears
For people who loved me sincerely?
As long I live I shall weep and remember
The merits of people whose glory is Mecca’s houses.

In a year’s time the Meccans were ready to take the battle-field again.

On 7 Shawwāl, 3 Hijr (22 March, 625) the inconclusive battle of Uḥud took place. The Apostle lost the battle. Seventy Muslims were killed as against the twenty-two of the Quraysh. Though the Meccans did not take the fullest advantage of the Muslim loss, yet Muslim prestige had reached its lowest. Soon after at Bīr Māṣūmah, forty to seventy Muslims were killed; only one Muslim, ṢAmr b. Umayyah al-Ḍamrī, escaped the massacre. On his way home he came across two men from the B. ʿĀmir lying asleep. Not knowing that the B. ʿĀmir had taken no direct part in the massacre, he killed both of them to avenge his companions. Since the Apostle and the Jewish clan of the B. al-Naḍīr were obliged by virtue of a pact with the B. ʿĀmir to pay the blood money, the Apostle accompanied by a number of important men of his community appeared at the Council of the B. al-Naḍīr for contributions to the blood money. The Council, having agreed to contribute to the blood money, asked the Apostle and his companions to wait outside the wall. While the Apostle waited there he noticed movements which made him suspicious. He had never been so close to the Jews: he was in their quarters and the assassination of ʿAṣmāʾ bint Marwān, Abū ʿAfāk and Kaʾb b. al-Ashraf by the Muslims in similar circumstances was still fresh in everyone’s mind. The Apostle quietly left and after sometime his companions also left. Later intelligence confirmed the Apostle’s worst fears. There was a conspiracy to kill him. The Apostle had already been informed of their contacts with the Quraysh of Mecca. Nabiya Abbott in her Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri has edited a passage which contains the account of the causes which led to the Apostle’s campaign against the B. al-Naḍīr. Kister has carefully re-examined the passage and after an elaborate discussion proved that its author was Ibn Lahlān, who lived in Egypt and was the Qādi from 155/771 to 164/780. The passage reads:

and they sent secretly to the Quraysh when they encamped at Uḥud in order to fight the Prophet and they incited them to fight and showed them the weak spots.

This account, which comes from a source almost contemporaneous to Ibn Ishaq throws additional light on the role of the B. al-Naḍīr.
On an earlier occasion, approximately three months after the Battle of Badr, Sallām b. Mishkam, the chief of the B. al-Naḍīr, had secretly entertained Abū Sufyān b. Ḥarb and two hundred Meccan riders with food and drink and had supplied Abū Sufyān secret information about the Muslims. This abortive Meccan attempt to attack Medina was named, according to Abu al-Faraj, the 'Raid of al-Sawiq' after the name of the wine Sallām b. Mishkam had served on the occasion. Al-Sawiq is made of wheat and barley. Praising Sallām's hospitality on the occasion Abū Sufyān said:

I chose one man out of Medina as an ally, I had no cause to regret it, though I did not stay long. Sallām ibn Mishkam gave me good wine, He refreshed me in full measure despite my haste.

Referring to the conspiracy hatched by the B. al-Naḍīr, Rodinson remarks, “it was a not altogether unlikely assumption and one which, given a minimum of political intuition, anyone less intelligent than the Prophet might have suspected”. Within a period of four months the Muslims had lost more than a hundred men at Udūd and Bīr Ma‘ūnah. They needed peace at home and looked for reassurance from their Medinan neighbours. The Apostle approached the B. Qurayḥah and the B. al-Nadir for the renewal of the agreement; the B. Qurayḥah renewed it, but the B. al-Nadir rejected the request. Though the Muslims were not in a strong position, they decided to force the issue. Muhāmmad b. Maslamah, an Anṣārī belonging to a tribe allied to the B. al-Nadir, was sent by the Apostle to give them an ultimatum; they were given ten days to leave Medina.

The B. al-Nadir were ready to comply with the terms of the ultimatum, but Abū Abd Allāh b. Ubayy, Wadī Ḥabb, Mālik b. Abū Qawqal, Suwayd and Dā’is advised them to resist. Ibn Ubayy would support them and so would the B. Qurayzah and the B. Ghatafan. The B. al-Nadir shut themselves up inside their forts and waited for the help. The story of the B. Qaynuqa was repeated. The Apostle went with his Companions and sat down till they surrendered. No one moved to help the B. al-Nadir. Surat al-Hāshr, which was revealed on this occasion, deals with the incident. Referring to the promised help the Qurʾān says:

Knowest thou not the hypocrites who say to their disbelieving companions among the people of the Book: if you are turned out of Medina, we will surely go out with you, and we will never obey anyone at all against you, and if you are fought against we will certainly help you.

The siege lasted for a fortnight and then the B. al-Nadir surrendered. They were deported, but allowed to take what they could carry on their camels, except for their weapons. They went with six hundred camels loaded with their possessions, even dismantling their houses and carrying away the lintels of the doors. Wood was expensive and they would need it for their new houses. Some went to Khaybar and others went to Syria. Sallām b. Abū al-Ḥuqayq, Kinānah b. al-Rabī b. Abū al-Ḥuqayq and Ḥuyayy b. Akhtāb were among those who went to Khaybar. Ibn ʿIsḥāq reports that the defeated clan wound its way “with such pomp and splendour as had never been seen in any tribe in their days”. Al-Wāqidi, not to be outdone by Ibn ʿIsḥāq, added that the women of the B. al-Nadir wore their finest dresses and decked themselves in their jewels. No one had ever seen women so beautiful who vied with shining pearls and the full moon. Ibn Saʿd with his usual restraint dropped this embellishment from his account.

A great many factors seemed to have conspired in the second year of the Hijrah to produce conditions which made the B. Qaynuqa, probably, an unsuspecting victim of the munāfiqun’s machination. This benefit of doubt could not be given to the B. al-Nadir. The B. Qaynuqa seemed to have invited conflict at a time when the Muslims could respond from a position of strength and consequently afford

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1 Ibn Hishām, p. 543.
3 Ibn Hishām, p. 544, Guillaume’s translation.
4 Rodinson, pp. 191-92.
7 Ibn Hishām, p. 655.
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generosity. The B. al-Naḍīr adopted a hostile posture at a time when the Apostle and his followers were in deep waters. To treat them with the same leniency which was shown to the B. Qaynuqāṣ would have been a sign of weakness, and disastrous to the Muslim prestige.

CHAPTER IV

THE FAILURE OF THE CONFEDERACY

It seems as if the strain and trouble of trying to take a critical view of confident assertions so troubles the human mind that men and women are prepared to concede the most damning case against their fathers and grandfathers in order to avoid the tedious work of disentangling the evidence for themselves.

— G. KITSON CLARK

Exiled but not exhausted, defeated but not dejected, the B. al-Naḍīr settled in Khaybar fairly quickly. In the peace and quiet which Khaybar offered, the leaders of the B. al-Naḍīr must have taken stock of the whole situation. The new religion was not only a threat to the Meccans, but to the Jews as well. If the initiative was left to the Muslims they might strike again and do so at a time of their own choosing. Individually neither the Jews nor the Meccans could destroy this band of poor but committed people under a leader who commanded absolute authority and unwavering loyalty. So the B. al-Naḍīr decided to send a mission to Mecca. It was a large delegation of twenty leaders. Prominent among the B. al-Naḍīr, who led the delegation, were Sallām b. Ābū al-Ḥuqayq, Ḥuyayy b. Akhtāb and Kinānah b. Ābū al-Ḥuqayq. A number of leaders from the B. Wāʾil also joined this delegation; the B. Wāʾil was a sub-tribe of the Khazraj but was closely linked with the Jews. This delegation arrived in Mecca in the summer of 5/626 and invited the Quraysh to join them in an all-out attack on Medina so that they might get rid of the Apostle once for all. The Quraysh responded gladly to their invitation to fight the Apostle. From Mecca this delegation of the Jews went to the Ghatafan and extended the same invitation. The delegation informed them that the Quraysh had already accepted their invitation. They also offered
them annually half of the date crop of Khaybar as the price of their joining the Quraysh.\(^1\) Later during the Battle of the *Ahzab* the Apostle, who obviously knew of this arrangement between the B. al-Naḍîr and the Gaṭa'an, matched the offer and promised them a third of the dates of Medina on condition that they would go back with their followers.\(^2\) The offer was, however, not ratified by the *Anṣār*. The Jews also contacted their allies among the Banū Sa'd, another sub-tribe of the Khazraj. The Banū Asad and the Banū Sulaym were also approached and they too accepted the invitation to fight against the Apostle.\(^3\)

Preparations for the joint attack started soon and tribal forces began to arrive in early February 9/627. The Gaṭa'an and the B. Fazārah came with 2,000 men and a thousand camels under 'Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn b. Ḥudhayfah b. Badr. The B. Sulaym sent a contingent of 700. Ashja\(^4\) and the B. Murrah sent 400 warriors each. The B. Asad's contingent, whose strength is not known, arrived under Tulayḥah b. Khaudaylid. The Quraysh marched under the leadership of Abū Sufyān b. Ḥarb b. Umayyah; there were 4,000 of them with 1,500 camels and 300 horses. The total strength of the army, which Abū Sufyān led against the Muslims was 10,000.\(^4\)

The Muslims dug a trench, which ran from Shaykhayn to the Mount of Banū 'Ubayd. The Apostle established his camp just ahead of the hill of Sa'il. The total Muslim strength was 3,000. The women and children were sent away from the main front. The B. Qurayjah were in the rear, which was not covered. (See map on the next page). As Watt observes, “an attack from the south on the Muslim rear by Qurayjah might have put an end to Muḥammad's career.”\(^5\) During the siege, however, no major action took place and the B. Qurayjah did not get an opportunity to attack. There were no large stocks of food in Medina and the Muslims began to feel the pangs of hunger.\(^6\) The food also ran short in the enemy camp; Abū Sufyān had made no provisions for such a long siege either. Outnumbered and starving

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2 Ibn Hishām, p. 676.
4 Ibn Sa'd, II, p. 66.
with their rear exposed the Muslim were in a bad shape; their plight has been described by the Qur'ān in the following verses:

"Your eyes became distracted and your hearts reached your throats, while you thought thoughts about Allāh. Then were the believers sorely tried, and were violently shaken."¹

To break the impasse Abū Sufyān sent Ḥuyayy b. Ḥabīb to the B. Qurayyah inviting them to join the Confederates.² After some hesitation their leader Ka'b b. Ḥadīd agreed. The Qur'ān refers to the B. Qurayyah as "the people of the Book who had backed up the Confederates".³ In the meantime, the Apostle got wind of Ḫuyayy b. Ḥabīb's approach to the B. Qurayyah and sent Sa'd b. Mu'rūdh and others to find the truth; they went, talked to the B. Qurayyah and confirmed the report. Later on, a scout of the B. Qurayyah who had been sent to reconnoitre in the area where the Muslim families were quartered, was killed by Ṣafyāh the aunt of the Apostle.⁴

The Battle of the Ḥazāḥ was actually a major siege in which three armies, "the Quraysh, the Ghaṭafān and the B. Qurayyah"⁵ invested Medina. "They came at you from above you and from below you."⁶ According to Ibn Ḥishām those who came from above were the B. Qurayyah and those who came from below were the Quraysh and the Ghaṭafān.⁷ It was an expensive mistake. The Confederates were reasonably optimistic about their ability to take Medina. During the siege which lasted nearly a month there were only two actions; an individual combat in which Ḥamr b. ʿAbd Wudd b. Abū Qays was killed by ʿAlī⁸ and the second in which Ṣafyāh killed a scout from the B. Qurayyah. None of the three investing armies got a chance to fight an open battle. Abū Sufyān, unable to endure the severe winter and wind, broke camp and withdrew. The Ghaṭafān followed him and withdrew to their own country. But the B. Qurayyah could not go with them. The Muslims now turned to them and they shut themselves in their forts. It was the same old story of the B. Qaynuqā and the B. al-Naḍīr. The Jews had not learnt the simple lesson that the Muslims had adopted a new strategy, and their ʿāfām had ceased to provide security against the new method of Muslim warfare. The Apostle went with his companions and laid siege till they surrendered.

This is more or less the standard version of the incident as reported by Ibn Ḥishām¹ and al-Wāqīḍi² and Ibn Sa'd³ with slight variations in details. These are the facts as they emerge from the Muslim sources. There is no corroborative evidence from the Jewish or Christian sources. The condemnation of the B. Qurayyah, however, as reported by Ibn Ḥishāq and other maghāzi-writers, does not stand to reason and it is at variance with the Qur'ān.

Before we analyse the various accounts of the conflict with the B. Qurayyah it is interesting to examine Ibn Ḥishāq's treatment of the pre-Islamic reports concerning this tribe. We are first introduced to the Banū Qurayyah, when two of their rabbis advised the Ṭubba (5th century A.D.) not to destroy Yathrib because "Yathrib was the place where a prophet of the Quraysh would seek refuge in future and it would become his abode and a resting place."⁴ The report is obviously written in the spirit of latter day history. The B. Qurayyah are mentioned for the second time when, after the Apostle's arrival, the Jewish rabbis, including those of the B. Qurayyah, told the polytheist Quraysh "your religion is better than his and you are on a better path than he and those who follow him".⁵ The third reference is to the arbitration referred to the Apostle by the B. al-Naḍīr and the B. Qurayyah. The B. al-Naḍīr used to pay half of the normal bloodwit instead of the full 100 ṭasq of grains to the B. Qurayyah, but the Apostle "awarded the bloodwit in equal shares".⁶

These three references which precede the main account of events connected with the affair of the B. Qurayyah show that Ibn Ḥishāq might have been swayed by the contemporary ideas about the Jews: they knew or at least their rabbis knew even before the birth of the

² Ibn Ḥishām, p. 674.
⁴ Ibn Ḥishām, p. 680.
⁶ The Qur'ān, Al-Ahzāb, 10.
⁷ Ibn Ḥishām, p. 694.
⁸ Ibn Ḥishām, p. 678.
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Apostle that a prophet would appear among the Arabs. In spite of that knowledge their rabbis told the polytheist Quraysh that their religion was better than that of the Apostle who like them believed in one God. Ibn Isḥaq has given the following account of the whole affair:

The Apostle besieged the B. Qurayzah for twenty-five nights until they were sore pressed and felt sure that the Apostle would not leave them until he had made an end of them. At this stage Kašb b. Asad² offered them three alternatives:
1) Accept Muhammad as a true prophet and save yourselves, or
2) Kill your wives and children and fight with Muhammad till God decides between you and him, or finally
3) Tonight is the eve of the Sabbath; take Muhammad and his companions by surprise.

The Jews did not accept any one of these proposals and requested the Apostle to send Abū Lubābah for consultations. Abū Lubābah told them to surrender, but at the same time pointed with his hand to his throat signifying slaughter. In the morning they submitted to the Apostle's judgment. The Aws said, 'O Apostle, they are our allies, not allies of Khazraj, and you know how you recently treated the allies of our brethren'. The Apostle asked, 'Will you be satisfied if one of your own number pronounces judgment on them?' When they agreed the Apostle appointed Sa'd b. Mu'adh.³ The Aws now requested Sa'd to treat his friends (the B. Qurayzah) kindly, to which Sa'd replied, 'The time has come for Sa'd in the cause of God, not to care for any man's censure'. Hearing this some of the Aws went back to the quarter of B. b. Malik Anṣārī.³ To accept the view that Ma'bad b. Malik Anṣārī's report does not conclude al-Zuhri's report and the rest of the account given by Ibn Isḥaq is also on the authority of al-Zuhri is to accept that al-Zuhri not only reported Kašb b. Asad's imaginary speech but also incidents which are mutually exclusive. In view of al-Zuhri's reputation for reliability⁴, it is difficult to concur with this view. A more reasonable explanation would be to consider that while some of Ibn Isḥaq's information was derived from al-Zuhri, he added details which were not sufficiently supported; on such occasions his sources are 'not always particularly clear'.⁵

After this introduction the subsequent account up to the delivery of Sa'd b. Mu'adh's judgment is of doubtful authority.⁶

Ibn Isḥaq tells us that (iii) the Apostle besieged the B. Qurayzah for twenty-five nights.² But Ibn Sa'd says that they were besieged for fifteen days.⁸ (iv) When the Jews felt sure that the Apostle would not leave them until he made an end of them, Kašb b. Asad addressed them in the following words:

'O Jews, you can see what has happened to you. I offer you three alternatives. Accept what you wish. (i) We will follow this man and accept him as true, for by God it has become plain to you that he is the prophet who has been sent and that it is he whom you find mentioned in your scripture; if you do so your lives, your property, your women and children will be saved.' They said, 'We will never abandon the laws of the Torah and never change it for another'. He said, 'Then if you won't accept this suggestion (ii) let us kill our wives and children and send men with drawn

1 Kašb b. Asad was the chief of the B. Qurayzah.
2 Ibn Hishâm adds without isnad that the Jews said, 'O Mohammad, we will submit to the judgment of Sa'd b. Mu'adh.'
3 The above summary is based on Ibn Isḥaq's account. Ibn Hishâm, pp. 684-69.
4 All incidents in the account of the B. Qurayzah have been given consecutive Roman numbers.
5 Ibn Hishâm, p. 685.
7 Ibn Hishâm, p. 685.
swords to Muhammad and his companions leaving no encumbrances behind us, until God decides between us and Muhammad. If we do perish, we shall not leave children behind us to cause us anxiety. If we conquer we can acquire other wives and children’. They said, ‘Should we kill these poor creatures? What would be the good of life when they were dead?’ He said, ‘Then if you will not accept this suggestion (iii) tonight is the eve of the Sabbath and it may well be that Muhammad and his companions will feel safe from us then, so come down, perhaps we can take Muhammad and his companions by surprise.’ They said, ‘Are we to profane our Sabbath and do on the Sabbath what those before us of whom you well know did and were turned into apes?’ He answered, ‘Not a single man among you from the day of your birth has ever passed a night resolved to do what he knows ought to be done.’

It is at once apparent that the first alternative of Ka'b b. Asad is a reflection of Ibn Ishaq’s questionable story of the rabbis of the B. Qurayyah who had told the Tubba' of the coming of the prophet. The Jews, according to Ibn Ishaq’s version of Ka'b’s speech, knew that the Apostle was right and was the true messenger of God, and still on the eve of their death they refused to accept him. The first alternative and the answer the Jews gave is patently absurd. If they were convinced that the Apostle was an impostor and they were ready to die then they were heroes, but if it had “become plain” to them that he was a prophet and they still persisted in their death-wish then it meant that the whole clan had gone mad. Obviously, it had not “become plain” to them and Ibn Ishaq has put in Ka'b b. Asad’s mouth what had “become plain” to him.

The second alternative shows Ibn Ishaq’s ignorance of the Jewish law and history. These 600 to 900 men were going to fight an army of 3,000 soldiers, who had returned victorious from the Battle of Alzûb. Though it seemed to be a mad act of self destruction, yet there was a slim hope. The victorious Muslims were in bad shape. The second alternative was, therefore, neither in accordance with the Jewish law, nor Jewish practice, and was above all devoid of logic. The general position in Judaism is that suicide is strictly forbidden “And surely the blood of your lives shall I require” is considered a prohibition referring to suicide. The preservation of one’s life is considered to be of such importance that man is not permitted to sacrifice his life even to avoid violating biblical commands, the exception being the three cardinal sins, murder, adultery and idol-worship.

Indeed concerning the three for which he must lay down his life, many authorities hold that he is to allow himself to be killed rather than violate them, but must not actively destroy himself.

There have been exceptions but the general rule is that while one should fight to death one should not die by his own hands, or murder. If this tribe of the Jewish priests could fight like the defenders of Masada, it could inflict very heavy losses on the starving Muslims. But the morale of the besieged Jews was so low that Ka'b’s advice portended suicide rather than victory.

Probably in the history of religious persecution Jews are the only minority group who while secretly remaining faithful to Judaism practised another religion which they or their ancestors had to adopt to save their lives. Marranos, Chuetas and Jadid al-Islam are some of the well known Crypto-Jews. But no one from the B. Qurayyah tried to save his life by accepting Islam. There is nothing intrinsically wrong in accepting that they all died as martyrs, but it seems to be too good to be true; it has the overtones of the story of the martyrs of Najrân. In 723 A.D. the Byzantine emperor ordered the Jews of Asia Minor to embrace Christianity under pain of severe punishment; many Jews submitted to this decree. They were of the opinion that the storm would soon blow over, and that they would be permitted to return to Judaism. Earlier in 654 the Jews of Toledo had to accept Christianity under similar circumstances. The second alternative was, therefore, neither in accordance with the Jewish law, nor Jewish practice, and was above all devoid of logic.

The answer to the third alternative which Ka'b b. Asad had suggested also does not comply with the Jewish law. In refusing to fight on the eve of the Sabbath the Jews of the B. Qurayyah said: “Are we to profane our Sabbath and do on the Sabbath what those

1 Ibn Hishâm, pp. 685-686.
2 The story as suggested earlier has a latter day Muslim gloss.
3 “... for by God it has become plain to you that he is the prophet who has been sent and that it is he whom you find mentioned in your scripture...” (Ka'b b. Asad’s speech).
4 See Sura, Chapter VI.
5 Genesis 9:5.
8 See Encyclopaedia Judaica, under Crypto-Jews and also under individual headings.
9 Graetz, p. 123.
10 Ibid., p. 103.
before us of whom you well know did and were turned into apes.”

This answer betrays the superficiality which Muslim scholarship normally shows when dealing with Judaism. No wonder Margoliouth complains that “the most woeful ignorance is displayed by the compilers and interpreters of the Qur’ān about the part played by the Jews”. Since the Maccabean revolt (175-135 B.C.) a rule had been promulgated that the preservation of life overrides the observance of the Sabbah. All laws of the Sabbath or even the Day of Atonement can be overridden in the face of the sacred duty of preserving life.

The reference to turning into apes is obviously an anachronism influenced by the later commentators on the Qur’ān. This is a reference to the Qur’ān where the word ‘apes’ has been figuratively used meaning that they became abject and humiliated men. There is no reference in Jewish literature to the conversion of Jews into apes because they profaned the Sabbath. Mujahid b. Jabr (d. 102/720), who is considered to be one of the great commentators on the Qur’ān and was a tābi‘i does not believe in the physical transformation of the Jews into apes.

It would be reasonable to consider Ka‘b’s speech to the B. Qurayṣah on the eve of their surrender as mainly imaginary or distorted by later tradition. Al-Waqidi has provided an extended version with embellishments. After this imaginary exchange between Ka‘b b. Asad and the B. Qurayṣah, the Apostle was requested to send Abū Lubābah b. Abd al-Mundhir for consultations. Abū Lubābah, when he arrived, was asked whether he thought the Jews should submit to the Apostle’s judgment. “He said; ‘Yes’, and pointed with his hand to his throat, signifying slaughter. Abū Lubābah said, ‘My feet had not moved from the spot before I knew that I had been false to God and His Apostle’. Ibn Hishām (not Ibn Ishaq) quotes two verses from the Qur’ān about Abū Lubābah’s indiscretion. Both of the verses have been quoted in a doubtful context. The first verse: “O ye who believe! prove not false to Allāh and the Messenger, nor prove false to your trusts knowingly” was not revealed at the time of the Battle of the Ḥāzhāb. It was revealed after the Battle of Badr (624/2).

The second verse quoted by Ibn Hishām is supposed to be about God’s forgiveness of Abū Lubābah:

And there are others who have acknowledged their faults. They mixed a good work with another that was evil. It may be that Allāh will turn to them with compassion, Surely Allāh is Most Forgiving, Merciful.

The above verse was actually revealed after the expedition to Tabūk (9/630) and refers to those true believers who stayed behind without permission.

(vi) Ibn Ishaq reports that in the morning the B. Qurayṣah submitted to the Apostle’s judgment and the Aws leapt up and said, “O Apostle, they are our allies, not allies of the Khazraj and you know how you recently treated the allies of our brethren”. When the Aws spoke thus the Apostle said, “Will you be satisfied, O Aws, if one of your men pronounces judgment on them?” When they agreed, the Apostle said Sa‘d b. Mu‘ādh was the man. Al-Waqidi and Ibn Sa‘d also report the B. Qurayṣah’s surrender to the Apostle’s judgment and the appointment of Sa‘d as ḥokam. But Ibn Sa‘d gives another report saying that they surrendered to the judgment of Sa‘d.

2 Ibn Hishām, pp. 686-87.
3 The Qur’ān, Al-Anfal, 27.
4 Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, Vol. II, p. 301. The verse was revealed after Hātib b. Abū Balta‘ah tried to send a letter to the Quraysh informing them of the Apostle’s intended attack on them. See also al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, Vol. XIII, p. 480.
5 The Qur’ān, Al-Taubah, 102.
6 Abū Lubābah, according to Ibn 5Abbās, was one of these true believers who had stayed away from the expedition to Tabūk with the Apostle’s permission and this verse was sent down about these people. Ibn Kathīr, Vol. II, p. 385; al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, Vol. XIV, pp. 447-453.
7 Ibn Hishām, p. 685.
10 Ibid., p. 77.
Both al-Bukhārī\(^1\) and Muslim\(^2\) give two contradictory reports, one saying that the B. Qurayyah surrendered to Sa‘d’s judgment and the other saying that they surrendered to the Apostle’s judgment, who in turn appointed Sa‘d as ḥakam.

(vii) When the Apostle appointed Sa‘d as ḥakam his people came to him and said, “Deal kindly with our friends, for the Apostle has made you ḥakam for that very purpose”. When they persisted Sa‘d said, “The time has come for Sa‘d in the cause of Allāh not to care for any man’s censure”. Hearing this clear pronouncement, some of the Aws went to the quarter of the B. “Abd al-Ashhal (the sub-tribe of the Aws to which Sa‘d belonged) and announced to them the death of the B. Qurayyah.\(^3\) Al-Wāqidi’s account is similar to that of Ibn Iṣḥāq.\(^4\) Ibn Sa‘d has dropped the whole story of the intercession by the Aws on the B. Qurayyah’s behalf. But he has referred to Sa‘d’s prayer that he might live till he had the pleasure of seeing the end of the B. Qurayyah.\(^5\)

(viii) After this announcement of the approaching death of the B. Qurayyah to the people of the B. “Abd al-Ashhal and Sa‘d’s prayer to have the pleasure of seeing the B. Qurayyah’s end, the umpire arrives at the scene and asks the Anṣār, according to Ibn Iṣḥāq, “Do you covenant by Allāh that you accept the judgment I pronounce on them?” They said, ‘Yes’, and he said, ‘And is it incumbent on the one who is here?’ (looking) in the direction of the Apostle not mentioning him out of respect, and the Apostle answered, “Yes”.\(^6\) Al-Wāqidi\(^7\) gives a similar account but Ibn Sa‘d has dropped it.

(ix) Sa‘d’s judgment was that “the men should be killed, the property divided, and the women and children taken as captives”.\(^8\)

(x) After the judgment has been given Ibn Iṣḥāq quotes on the authority of ʿĀṣim b. ʿUmar b. Qatādah who told him that the Apostle said to Sa‘d, “You have given the judgment of Allāh above the seven heavens”.\(^9\)

(xi) The Apostle went out to the market and dug trenches in it. Then he sent for them and struck off their heads in those trenches. There were 600 to 900.\(^1\)

The inner contradictions in the above account cannot be reconciled. To sum up Ibn Iṣḥāq’s account, the fate of the B. Qurayyah was already decided by the Apostle: Abū Lubābah already knew it and having revealed it inflicted upon himself a self-imposed punishment. Sa‘d b. Mūṭādh wished to live till he had avenged the B. Qurayyah’s treachery and when approached by the Aws he made it clear that in the cause of Allāh he did not care for any man’s censure. Furthermore he is the same Sa‘d who had gone to the B. Qurayyah before the Battle of the Ḥizbāb and when the Jews told him they had no agreement or understanding with the Apostle he “reviled them and they reviled him. He was a man of hasty temper and Sa‘d b. ʿUbādah said to him, ‘Stop insulting them, for the dispute between us is too serious for recrimination’;\(^2\) The Tradition reported by Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī and given by Al-Bukhārī and Muslim is very difficult to accept; it means that the B. Qurayyah surrendered on the condition that the man who so recently reviled them and was praying for vengeance should be appointed their judge. They were inviting a death sentence. It may be noted that the first two reporters Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī and Abū Umāmah were Anṣārī and were more interested in reporting the status of Sa‘d. This Ḥadīth is shāhīdī and ḫānīlī. Ibn Ḥajar has unsuccessfully tried to reconcile its apparent contradiction with “Ā”ishah’s report by quoting Ibn Iṣḥāq’s account.\(^3\) By the time Sa‘d arrived to judge, the news of his intention to sentence them to death had reached the quarter of “Abd al-Ashhal and yet he goes through the formalities of asking the Aws if they would accept his judgment and these very people who had asked for kind treatment for the B. Qurayyah, instead of denouncing him as prejudiced and as having disqualified himself as an impartial judge, say “Yes”. Afterwards he asks the Apostle the same question and the Apostle, whose intentions were known to Abū Lubābah, who in turn had disclosed them to the B. Qurayyah, says, “Yes.” If Ibn Iṣḥāq’s account is correct, one is obliged

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1 Al-Bukhārī, Sahīh, Chapter “Return of the Apostle from Al-Abzīb”, Vol. V, pp. 143-44.
6 Ibn Hishām, p. 689.
8 فَانَ أَهْكَمْ لَيْسَ اَنْ تَتَّمَّ الْرَّجْلَانَ Ibn Hishām, p. 689.
9 Ibn Hishām, p. 689.
to conclude that Sa‘d’s judgment was prearranged. It is not without reason that Caetani has questioned the whole account of Sa‘d’s selection by the B. Qurayyah as ḥakam. The evidence is contradictory and mutually exclusive.

It is not within the purview of a historian’s task to express an opinion on Muhammad’s claim to prophethood, but the belief of the Aws and Sa‘d b. Mu‘ādh in his prophethood is a historical fact. The Aws and for that matter all the Muslims of Medina, who supposedly saw Abū Lubābāh bound to one of the pillars in the mosque for being “false to God and his Apostle” and heard Sa‘d praying for vengeance watched this “simulated justice”, and yet there was not one who questioned it.

The account given by Ibn Isha‘q, without his usual phrases of qualification such as za‘ama or dhukira li or concluding remarks “God knows best”, is rather unusual; it does not comply with his own standard of caution and scrupulousness.

As we have seen earlier the incident concerning Abī Lubābah’s self-imposed punishment does not fit into the context. It must be rejected. “The story as we have it” Watt rightly points out, “must have been manipulated”. The B. Qurayyah’s choice of Sa‘d as ḥakam does not stand to reason. Sa‘d was not “Abd Allâh b. Ubayy; there is not a single incident in his life which shows that the B. Qurayyah could depend on him in the way the B. Quaynuqâ did on “Abd Allâh b. Ubayy. His loyalty to the Apostle and the cause of Islam was beyond doubt. Ibn Isha‘q’s report that the Apostle appointed Sa‘d as the judge is supported not only by al-Wâqidi but also by Ibn Sa‘d. Above all it has the authority of Al-Bukhari’s second Ḥadîth which is marfu‘ being reported by ‘Ā‘ishah, who was an eye witness of the whole affair. It seems to be more in line with the practice of the Apostle. In the absence of positive law during the earlier days of his stay in Medina the Apostle had adopted a policy of punishing a criminal through his kinsmen; it was based on two sound principles: there would be no tribal war of vengeance, and secondly it would be known that Islam had broken all tribal ties. Silkan b. Salâmah b. Waqṣh, who had conspired with Muhammad b. Maslamah in killing

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2 Ibn Hishâm, p. 686.
3 Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 188.
5 Ibid., p. 995.
6 Ibid., p. 696.
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and not adult. According to the first report he said:

'Slay their fighting men and take captive their families'.

In the second report, he said:

'Slay the fighting men and take captive their women and children'.

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim has also given two reports using the same word, muqātīl, that al-Bukhārī used.

Ibn ʿIṣḥāq's second report, that every adult should be killed, may be ruled out first. There is general consensus that the Apostle in the case of the B. Qurayzah did not give any orders. The first order to 'kill all men' is neither in keeping with the Traditions of al-Bukhārī and Muslim nor with the second report of Ibn Saʿd. Al-Waqidi's wording is more colourful but not exact. Since old men cannot be killed the killing was limited to muqātīl, the fighting men.

According to Ibn ʿIṣḥāq, 600 to 900 men of the B. Qurayzah were executed. It is not known what was the total strength of the B. Qurayzah. If each family is taken to consist of six persons—and this is a low average—3,600 to 5,400 men, women and children must have surrendered. They were all confined in the house of Bint al-ʿIṣrār, a woman of the B. al-Najjar, and bound with ropes. Incarceration of four to five thousand persons can create problems even in a large town in the present age of crime, police and jails.

If Ibn ʿIṣḥāq is to be believed, Medina must have been a very well-organized town which could provide detention arrangements for such a large number of prisoners. How much rope was used and what was the area of Bint al-ʿIṣrār's house? Were the prisoners fed? What sanitary arrangements were provided for such a large number of people in a town where there were no toilets and even women went out in the darkness for such necessities? None of these prisoners tried to escape and the Muslims seem to have no difficulty in locking up these tame prisoners. Ibn ʿIṣḥāq reports again without clear isnād, "Then the Apostle went out to the market and dug trenches in it".

Ibn ʿIṣḥāq has used the words fakhandaqa bihī khanadiqa. It is interesting that al-Waqidi has dropped this wording and instead used the words fa amara bikhudādin. The word khudā for trench is of a doubtful nature, but al-Waqidi, obviously, used it because some of the classical commentators of the Qurʾān consider that the aṣḥāb al-uxdād were the Christians of Najrān who were massacred by the Jewish king Dhū Nuwās. Most probably al-Waqidi was aware of the role of the Jews of Yathrib in inciting Yūsuf Dhū Nuwās to make war against Najrān.

"Ali and Zubayr were the executioners, and the prisoners were brought in batches. Ibn ʿIṣḥāq says:

As they were taken out in batches to the Apostle they asked Kaʿbah what he thought would be done with them. He replied, "Will you never understand? Don't you see that the summoner never stops and those who are taken away do not return? By Allāh it is death!"

These are the people who had surrendered to the judgment of Saʿd who had condemned all the adult males to be executed. It seemed they knew nothing about this sentence of death. But the woman who was sitting with ʿAʾishah as the "Apostle was killing her men", and was laughing a great deal, knew that she was to be killed. When her name was suddenly called ʿAʾishah cried, "What is the matter?" 'I am to be killed', she replied. "ʿAʾishah used to say", Ibn ʿIṣḥāq continues, "I shall never forget her cheerfulness and her great laugh, when all the time she knew that she was to be killed. Ḥuwayy b. Akhtāb died bravely and al-Zābir b. Bāṭā the Qurājī refused to take advantage of the pardon given to him and his family.

1 Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, Chapter “Return of the Apostle from Al-Ahzāb and his expedition to the B. Qurayzah and their siege”, Vol. V, p. 143.
2 Ibid., p. 144.
3 Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Hadith No. 245 and 246, Vol. II, pp 1112 and 1113.
5 ʿAʾishah reports: "We did not have those privies which foreigners have in their houses; we loathe and detest them; our practice was to get out into the open spaces of Medina". Ibn Hishām, p. 733. Al-Bukhārī also gives a similar report from ʿAʾishah, Chapter "Hadith al-Ik"., Book V, p. 150.

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1 Ibn Hishām, pp. 689.
2 Ibid., pp. 689-90.
8 Ibn Hishām, p. 690.
9 Ibn Hishām, pp. 690-91. The story must be rejected; neither al-Bukhārī nor Muslim who report from ʿAʾishah have accepted it.
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The same people who cowardly refused to fight on a Sabbath and in spite of being safe in their castles had lost their morale, died as heroes. None of the 900 wavered or accepted Islam even in the face of death.

It has all the common features of a religious massacre, even though the account has been provided by the partisans of the perpetrators of the slaughter.

1. The victims were outnumbered by their opponents; (Najrân and Masada);
2. They lost because of treachery;
3. There are always some who stand out as heroes (Ḥuyayy b. Akhtab, Zābir b. Bāṭā');
4. There are no waverers and no forced converts;
5. Few are left to give the details of the horror.

And like most massacres it is not true to life.

The first part of Ibn Ishāq's story gives us a picture of demoralized people trying to avoid fighting at any cost; the second part paints for us a picture of heroes ready to die for their faith. Walking in a flowered robe in which he had made holes so that no one might take it as spoil, Ḥuyayy b. Akhtab addressed the Apostle:

By God, I do not blame myself for opposing you, but he who forsakes God will be forsaken.

The discrepancies in Ibn Ishāq's account do not end here. The B. Qurayyīah lived at a six to seven hours' walking distance from Medina. On surrender they were brought to Medina and kept in a house. The next morning trenches were dug in the market place to bury the executed people. It is surprising that a general of the Apostle's astute knowledge of strategy and logistics would have brought nearly five thousand captives—nine hundred of them to be slain—all the way to Medina and bury them right in the middle of the town. It would have been far better, safer and more efficient to make short shrift of them outside their forts, and then to take only the women and children to Medina. The problem of the security of prisoners, and of sanitation in Medina, would have been solved. If they had to be marched to Medina then there was a ready-made trench which was dug outside Medina only a month back. It was not far.

1 According to Ibn Ishāq, the Muslims left Medina at noon time and reached the B. Qurayyīah after the last evening prayers. Ibn. Hishām, p. 685.

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Since the captives included women, children, and old and sick people they must have walked to Medina at a much slower pace—ten to eleven hours. Neither during this march nor during their captivity in the house of Bint al-Hārith did any incident take place. No one tried to escape except Su'īdā al-Quraṣi, and no one accepted Islam to save his life except Rifā'a b. Samaw'āl al-Quraṣi. It was both a tame and a brave crowd. If the story is true the martyrs who fell under Bar Kochba (A.D. 132) against overwhelming odds were nothing in comparison to the martyrs of the B. Qurayyīah.

The disposal of nine hundred bodies did not seem to have posed any problems. The trenches neatly dug were filled by the same night.

There was apparently a complete absence of any sentiment among the Muslims who watched this execution. It must have been a shattering experience for many and an unforgettable event even for those who thought it to be fully justified. Several heart-rending incidents must have taken place during the day; some must have tried to struggle and run, others would have uttered words of dismay and repentence, and there must have been many who either did not die at the first blow, or died of fright even before the executioner's sword struck. Swords must have blunted and broken. 'Ali and Zubayr, who were the executioners, must have faced several problems, and witnessed many facets of human nature on that day. But neither 'Ali nor Zubayr, in fact no one, ever later mentioned anything about his experience of this execution.

A detailed scrutiny indicates that the whole story of this massacre is of a very doubtful nature. As Ibn Khaldūn has pointed out "the rule of distinguishing what is true from what is false in history is based on its possibility or impossibility". We have already pointed out that Medina in the Apostle's time was not equipped to imprison four to five thousand people and execute 600 to 900 people in a day. Killing such a large number of people and disposing of the dead bodies created problems even for Nazi Germany, with hydrogen cyanide as an efficient lethal agent. A massacre in the midst of a town where people live is very different from a massacre in a town which is being sacked by a conquering army marching onwards from town to town with dead bodies left to make it uninhabitable.

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Under these conditions it is almost impossible that the people of Medina should have escaped typhoid, typhus, both epidemic and endemic, influenza, diarrhoea and above all cholera. As regards the dead bodies the infection would depend on the animals and birds having access to the remains. But even if there were only flies, and the people whose corpses were lying there had all been healthy, the proliferation of agents, especially bacterial agents, after death would have been a health hazard, since the healthy may be carriers of dangerous diseases such as meningococcus.

Discussing the mass execution of the B. Qurayzah under “the alleged moral failures” of the Apostle, Watt has remarked:

This may seem incredible to the European, but that is in itself a measure of remoteness of the moral ideals of ancient Arabia from our own.1

But the effect of such a mass execution on the spectators and executioners is not related to moral values—ancient or modern. The human psyche, as is well known to students of psychology, may have nothing to do with a sense of duty, or political and religious obligations. Executioners, grave diggers, undertakers deal with death in the ordinary course of life as an honest and moral profession, nevertheless this continuous association with death creates suffering and terror of blood guilt.2

No one could come out of such a holocaust—600 to 900 killed in cold blood in one day—without damage to his personality. 3Ali and Zubayr’s holocaust legacy of massive deadness would not have left them in peace. Though Zubayr’s life is not fully known to us, we do know well enough about the life of the fourth Caliph of Islam. His sermons, letters, political discourses and sayings collected in Nahj al-Balaghah do not reflect experience of such a mass execution. His scruples in “retaliation”, among other aspects of his personality, “cannot be disregarded for the understanding that it affords of his psychology”.3 After his victory at ‘the camel’, “he tried to relieve the distress of the vanquished by preventing the enslavement of their women and children, in face of the protests of a group of his partisans; when battles ended, he showed his grief, wept for the dead, and even prayed over his enemies”.4 5Ali was a brave soldier, not a hard-hearted executioner. 5All’s partner in the execution, al-Zubayr b. al-‘Awwām, was also renowned for gallantry and took part in all the great battles and campaigns of the Apostle’s lifetime. The very idea of such a massacre by persons who neither before nor after the killing showed any sign of a dehumanised personality is inadmissible from a psychological point of view.

To write history, one must know how to count.5 Ibn Ishāq, al-Wāqidi and Ibn Sa’d could not only count, but took care, wherever possible, to check their information. But they were writing approximately two centuries after the event and had no way of checking the number of people executed. Six hundred to nine hundred, given by Ibn Ishāq, is an impressionistic round figure. There was no method of taking a tribal census at that time. Circumstantial evidence such as tax figures, jizyah and kharāj accounts and the register of pension payments to the Companions were introduced in Umar’s time. Nabia Abbott6 in discussing the number of Muslim martyrs of Būr Ma‘ān (4/625) pointed out that Ibn Ishāq gave the number of people sent to Būr Ma‘ān by the Apostle as forty.7 Ibn Ḥanbal8 and al-Bukhārī9 however reported seventy, which is now accepted. According to Ibn Ḥabbā, however, the number of the missionaries who went was thirty. Since the whole party was massacred and only one companion was left alive, sixty-nine companions were killed. But al-Wāqidi lists only sixteen. Ibn Sa’d has not given any list, but taking account of all the entries in Ibn Sa’d one cannot arrive at a figure of more than twenty slain. There is a discrepancy of forty-nine. Even if the conservative figure of Ibn Ishāq is taken into account, there is a fifty per cent exaggeration.

Kister, who has collected all the available versions of the incident and analysed them, has reached the conclusion that the Apostle sent

1 Watt, Muḥammad at Medina, p. 327.
4 Ibid.
6 Nabia Abbott, Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri, 1, pp. 76-77.
7 Ibn Ḥishām, pp. 648-49.
8 Ahmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥanbal, Al-Masnad (6 volumes, Cairo, 1895), Vol. III, p. 196.
9 Al-Bukhārī, Sahih, III, p. 91.
10 Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb, Kitāb al-Muḥabbbar, (Hyderabad, 1942), p. 118.
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a group of fourteen companions, who were later joined by four more men.¹

One finds the same tendency to exaggerate when dealing with the Jewish persecution of the Christians of Najrān, who were probably punished for the so-called treason during the first Abyssinian invasion of the Jewish kingdom of Yemen.² The number of Christian martyrs according to Simeon of Beth Arsham, who received the information from “those who came from Najrān” was two thousand.³ Bell considers that a “moderate number” of 200 seems to be more correct.⁴ Baron considers “that some probably minor local persecution was exaggerated”.⁵ “The entire account is so completely legendary” says Graetz “that it is impossible to discover any historical fact”.⁶

The story that the captive women and children of the B. Qurayḥah were sent to the Najd to be sold for horses and weapons does not agree with the practice.⁸ The Jews always bought their captives from Arabs after every skirmish.⁹ The Jews of Khaybar, including the B. al-Naṣir, Wādāl Qura, Taʾymā, and even Medina itself were capable of buying these captives and, as al-Wāqidi says, they bought them.¹⁰

The Muslims, if interested in the money at all, were interested in it to buy weapons and horses. It made no difference to them if the captives were sold in the Najd or Khaybar. In fact it seemed to be far more convenient to sell them in the Ḥijāz than to travel with such a large number of captives to the Najd.

Finally, according to Ibn ʿIṣḥāq, the Apostle divided the property of the B. Qurayḥah among the Muslims. “On that day he declared the shares of horses and men, and took out the khums (the fifth). A horseman received three shares, two for the horse and one for the rider; a man without a horse got one share. It was the first booty on which lots were cast and the khums was taken. According to the precedent set on this occasion, divisions were made, and it became the custom for raids”.¹¹ In view of considerable controversy on the share of a horseman Ibn ʿIṣḥāq’s report assumes great importance because it sets two precedents regarding the spoil of war: the share of the horseman and the procedure of casting lots on the booty and taking the khums. Abū Ḥanīfa gives one share to the rider and one to the horse, while al-Awzāʾī (d. 157/774) gives one to the rider and two to the horse. Imām Shāfiʿī (150/767-204/820) has dealt with the subject and quoted several authorities on the question without any reference to Ibn ʿIṣḥāq’s reports.² Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798), one of the founders of the Ḥanafi school of law, in his well-known treatise on public finance, taxation and other related matters, Kitāb al-Kharāj, also does not mention the share of the horseman fixed on the defeat of the B. Qurayḥah. As regards khums, Abū Yūsuf is quite categorical: no khums was taken from the property of the B. Qurayḥah.⁴ Yahyā b. ʿĀdām,⁶ writing his Kitāb al-Kharāj approximately twenty years after Abū Yūsuf and dealing with the same subject does not mention the B. Qurayḥah at all. Imām Shāfiʿī, Abū Yūsuf and Yahyā b. ʿĀdām, who were compiling judicial works based on authentic traditions and well-established precedents, did not consider either Ibn ʿIṣḥāq’s account or the current qāṣṣ material reliable.⁶

Ibn ʿIṣḥāq’s account of the punishment of the B. Qurayḥah is a plethora of self-contradictory statements. So are the accounts of

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² The date of the massacre is controversial; See Irfan Shahid, The Martyrs of Najrān, pp. 235-42.
³ The date of the massacre is controversial; See Irfan Shahid, The Martyrs of Najrān, pp. 235-42.
⁵ Baron, Vol. III, p. 67.
⁶ Graetz, p. 38.
⁸ Ibn Hishām, p. 693.
⁹ Ibid., p. 253.
¹¹ Supra, Chapter III.

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MUHAMMAD AND THE JEWS

al-Waqidi and Ibn Sa'd. The account as given by them is untrustworthy both in detail and substance. Fortunately Ibn Ishâq has left some telltale references which help us to reconstruct the incident in conformity with the information which the Qur'ân gives on the subject. Since an author, writing with a bias is more likely to be unguarded and truthful in his casual reference, we could perhaps rely more on the evidence adduced in the following disquisition. Since "Arab culture was basically oral, and poetry was its documentary evidence and the best means of preserving traditions", we shall look into some of the verses which Ibn Ishâq has preserved and Ibn Hishâm has not rejected as spurious.

On the day of Qurayzah, by which Ibn Ishâq seems to mean the last day of their siege, the battle was probably heavy. Three Muslims lost their lives on that day. It is not known how many men of the B. Qurayyârah died in the battle. The fighting must have been fierce. Hassan b. Thabit said:

Qurayzah met their misfortune
And in humiliation found no helper,
A calamity worse than that which fell
B. al-Nadir befell them
With fresh horses bearing horsemen like hawks:
We left them with the blood upon them like a pool
They having accomplished nothing.
They lay prostrate with vultures circling round them.

After their defeat they surrendered to the Apostle. A party (fâriq) from among them who had fought but not taken a leading part was taken prisoner. The leaders of the B. Qurayyârah were, however, left to the judgment of Saed b. Mueadh. There are indications that the sentencing of these leaders was done right on the spot. Al-Samhûdi has pointed out, Saed was brought to the Qurayzah mosque and not to the mosque of Medina. The Ḥadîth in both al-Bukhârî and Muslim suggests that Sa'd, who was mortally wounded in the battle, went to a mosque. His tent was so close to the Apostle's mosque in Medina that in his grave condition it was not necessary to bring him there. Sa'd decreed that the combatants from among the leaders should be executed. Probably the main leaders included old men and ordained priests, who were not combatants, hence the word 'combatants'. This party (fâriq) was not brought to Medina, but was beheaded at the spot. The leaders, Ḥuyayy b. Akhtâb, Ka'b b. Asad, Nabbâsh b. Qays and Ghazzâl b. Samâwâl4 were executed by 'Ali and Zubayr. In conformity with the policy adopted by the Apostle that executions should be carried out by a member of the tribe who is in alliance with the tribe of the guilty party minor leaders were handed over to the Aws. Two of the condemned were given to each of the clans or sub-clans of the Aws; (i) ʿAbd al-Ashhal; (ii) Ḥâriðâth; (iii) Zafar; (iv) Muʿâwiyâh; (v) ʿAmar b. ʿAwf; and (vi) Umayyah b. Zayd, so that all the clans were involved in the blood of the B. Qurayzah. The culpable leadership of a tribe of 600 to 900 men; especially when some of them have already been killed in the battle and one group has been taken captive would not normally exceed sixteen, or seventeen accounted for in the above analysis. The decision to help the Abziib must have been taken by the leaders and the elders of the B. Qurayzah. The whole tribe could not be given the same punishment that was in store for their leaders. The Apostle himself was bound by the Qur'anic maxim of just retribution; "an eye for an eye and a life for a life." This principle, as we have shown earlier6, had been agreed upon both by the Muslims and the Jews, for we find it formalized in the Ṣâhīfah: "a person acquires guilt against himself."
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The Qur'an mentions only two groups which were punished: one was executed and the other was taken captive. Unfortunately Ibn Ishq and other maghāzi writers were not interested in those members of the B. Qurayzah who were not punished. Some of them might have stayed and others (as Jabal b. Jawāl al-Thaqābi said) might have migrated:

O Sa'd, Sa'd of B. Mu'ādh, 
For what befell Qurayzah and al-Nadir. 
By thy life, Sa'd of B. Mu'ādh 
The day they departed was indeed steadfast.¹

In the whole affair of the B. Qurayzah Sa'd b. Mu'ādh plays the most important role, and the account of his appointment as the judge is the most controversial and confusing element in it, as we have noted earlier. The strāh writers generally agree that the Apostle appointed him as a judge to satisfy the Aws; out of the two reports al-Bukhārī and Muslim give, one agrees with the strāh writers and the other says that the B. Qurayzah surrendered to Sa'd b. Mu'ādh's judgment. The reports of his appearance on the scene as the judge seem to be concerned with details regarding his personal status and standing; when the Apostle called Sa'd b. Mu'ādh Sayyid, a chief, did he mean Sayyid of the Anṣār only or the Muhājirūn as well; how did the Apostle describe the sentence pronounced by Sa'd: did he compare his sentence with the judgment of Allāh, the angel, or the King?² While the controversy throws some light on dissent and friction among the Anṣār and Muhājirūn, the significance of the whole episode seems to lie elsewhere. Al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) commenting on the Šāhīth Muslim report of Sa'd's judgment says:

In their disputes Muslims are allowed to resort to tabkim. There is general consensus on this principle; Khawārij, however, do not accept it. The Ḥadīth also establishes

¹ Ibn Hishām, p. 713. Guillaume's translation.
² See W. Montgomery Watt, "The Condemnation of the Jews of Banū Qurayzah", The Muslim World, XLII (3 July, 1952), pp. 160-171 for the different versions of the reports about Sa'd's appointment as hakam. The heading of Watt's learned article though not incorrect is misleading; it deals partly with Caetani's charge that "the tradition has tried to remove from Muḥammad the direct responsibility for the inhuman massacre" of the B. Qurayzah and partly considers how Schacht's "methods and conclusions (in Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence) affect the study of historical traditions". He has not dealt either with Sa'd's judgment, its execution, or the events leading to the "massacre".

THE FAILURE OF THE CONFEDERACY

the principle that once a hakam has given his judgment it will be enforced, it is not possible for any one to disobey it, although before the judgment is pronounced, one can refuse to abide by it.³

For Abū Yūsuf also the importance of the B. Qurayzah incident lies in tabkim. He gives it under the rules of tabkim.² The only time tabkim became a matter of controversy between Muslims was when arbitrators were appointed on behalf of Ṣāliḥ and Mu'āwiyah at Šīfīn. While the Khawārij protested against tabkim Ṣāliḥ did not repudiate the convention of Šīfīn. As it is well-known, Mu'āwiyah gained by the result of the arbitration. It is not necessary to repeat the main events here, but it is possible that the Ḥadīth of Sa'd's judgment of the B. Qurayzah strengthened the Umayyad's cause. Had this precedent sought to be established by Sa'd's judgment been really authentic, it would certainly have appeared during the controversy between Ṣāliḥ and the Khawārij. Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr has reported in full the debate which took place between ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbbās and the Khawārij on the question of tabkim in Jāmī Bayān al-ʿUlm wa Fadlīh,³ but there is no reference to Sa'd's appointment as hakam in that debate. The story as reported by Ibn Ishq and others had not been forged by then.

It is reasonable to conclude that a minor and unimportant incident in which probably Sa'd b. Mu'ādh was involved in dealing with the B. Qurayzah was blown up out of proportion by pro-Umayyad Tradition collectors. In course of time while the tabkim controversy became irrelevant due to the Abbasid revolution, the reason for investing this minor incident with the force of an important precedent was also forgotten. The incident of the B. Qurayzah occurred before the armistice of Ḥudaybiyah and the peace with Khaybar were achieved. It is impossible that the pagans and the munāfiqūn would have remained mused. When Jahsh violated the sacred month and shed blood therein, when the palms of the B. al-Nadîr were burnt, when the Apostle married the divorced wife of his adopted son, the people criticised and the Qur'an defended the Apostle.⁴ It is improbable that the Apostle's critics would have paid less attention to the lives of the B. Qurayzah

² (Cairo, 1320 A.H.) pp. 162-63. 
than to the palms of the B. al-Nadir. That the news of this “massacre” did not reach Syria, which included Jerusalem and Adhrarât, with which the Medina Jews had contacts, and the Exilarchate in Iraq, which exercised religious authority over them, is highly unlikely.

The Ṣahîfah gives the names of seven Jewish tribes who became part of the ‘ummah’². Ibn Ishâq gives us two additional names.³ Unfortunately the maghâzi-writers, the jurists and the Ḥadîth collectors have left no information about these Jews. They showed interest only in the three Jewish clans who either joined the munāfīqûn of Medina or the Quraysh of Mecca or both in opposing the Apostle, and even that interest was limited to their conflict with the Muslims. As soon as the conflict was over they lost interest in them as well.

1 See Chapter II for the definition of the ‘ummah’, in the context of this document.
2 Supra, Chapter II.

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CHAPTER V
THE LAST ENCOUNTER

... the hot-bed of anti-Muslim intrigue at Khaybar.

— MAXIME RODINSON

After the banishment of the B. al-Naḍîr from Medina and the discomfiture of the B. Qurayyah, Khaybar assumed great importance. The B. al-Naḍîr settled there after their expulsion from Medina and made it the centre of their activities to avenge their expulsion from Medina. The Jewish poet Sammāk warned the Muslims:

Haply time and the change of fortune
Will take revenge from ‘the just and righteous one’¹
For killing al-Naḍîr and their confederates
And for cutting down the palms, their dates ungathered
Unless I die we will come at you with lances
And every sharp sword that we have
In the hand of a brave man who protects himself.
When he meets his adversary he kills him.
With the army is Šakhr⁴ and his fellows.
When he attacks he is no weakling
Like a lion in Tarj protecting his covert,
Lord of the thicket, crushing his prey enormous.³

But Sakhr had been defeated in the Battle of al-‘Ahzâb and the B. Qurayyah had also been expelled from Medina, while their leaders—including Ka‘b b. Asad and Ḥuyayy b. Akhtaḥb, the leader of the B. al-Naḍîr (and the father-in-law of Kināh b. al-Rabi‘ b. Abī al-‘Uqayy)—had been executed. The recent defeat of the Confederates, whom the Jewish leaders had collected after a great diplomatic effort, had created a critical situation for the Jewish leadership. The Jews

1 Abū Sufyān.

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of Medina having lost influence and power, it was now up to the Jews of Khaybar to salvage what was left of their prestige and above all to find a *modus vivendi* with the rising power of Islam. They had several advantages. Khaybar unlike Yathrib was a homogeneous state of Jews and was thus free from Arab alliances and tribal feuds. It was rich, its strongholds were self-contained, and it could stand a long siege. It could either negotiate a peace with the Apostle from a position of strength or become a garrison state, an Arabian Sparta, to ensure survival. If history was any guide, it would be self-defeating, for its lines of communications were not safe for all time. The tribes which were hostile to Islam could change sides. The Meccans had already signed a peace treaty with the Apostle.

Abū Rāfi‘ Sallām b. Abū al-Ḥuqayq, who succeeded Ḥuyayy b. Akkāb, made lavish though judicious use of the B. al-Nadīr’s wealth to induce the neighbouring Arabs and especially the strong tribe of Ghatafan to join the Jews of Khaybar against the Muslims. Finally he succeeded in collecting a large army. The Khazraj, having obtained the Apostle’s permission, sent a party under the leadership of “Abd Allāh b. “Atīk to kill him. Muslims thought that by removing the leader it would be possible to avoid large scale bloodshed. After Sallām’s assassination, al-Yūsār b. Zarīm took over the leadership. He gathered the Jewish tribes and addressed them saying “My predecessors had adopted wrong tactics to oppose Muhammad; the best thing is to attack his stronghold and I intend to do so”. The news of al-Yusayr’s intentions created anxiety in Medina. So the Apostle sent “Abd Allāh b. Rawāḥah together with three other persons to investigate the truth. “Abd Allāh b. Rawāḥah returned to Medina and confirmed the news. Since the Muslims did not want war and were depressed with the seemingly unfavourable terms of the Treaty of Ḥudaybiyāh, “Abd Allāh b. Rawāḥah was sent again. But this time he was on an official mission and was accompanied by thirty other persons. On behalf of the Apostle, he proposed negotiations. The Muslims were ready to try for peace by offering al-Yusayr an honourable appointment as the chief of whole Khaybar. Since the distrust was mutual, al-Yusayr left for Medina with thirty of his own guards. The arrangement was that each Muslim would be accompanied by a Jew. However, in al-Qaṣqar, which is about six miles from Khaybar, al-Yusayr changed his mind about going to the Apostle. In that atmosphere charged with suspicion al-Yusayr made a move to draw his sword, but “Abd Allāh b. Unays was quick to perceive his intention, rushed at him and killed him.

It was an unfortunate incident. Neither Ibn Sa‘d nor Ibn Isḥāq say that it was a ruse. In fact the Apostle’s remarks to “Abd Allāh b. Rawāḥah on his return indicate that the Apostle did not anticipate the incident. He said, “It was Allāh who saved you from this company of oppressors.” If al-Yusayr, however, thought it was a ruse, he was not unjustified; “Abd Allāh b. Rawāḥah and “Abd Allāh b. Unays were the Ḵvaṣīr who had already killed two Jewish leaders, Ka‘b b. al-Ashtar and Abū Rāfi‘ Sallām b. Abū al-Ḥuqayq, by deception. This unfortunate incident must have exacerbated the situation. The Jews were now in active negotiations with the Ghatafan to join them in attacking Medina. Khaybar became a rallying point of anti-Muslim forces. Both sides were getting ready for a final battle. The Jews at Khaybar, homogeneous, strong and safe in their forts, Muslims depressed by the peace at Ḥudaybiyāh (6/628), uncertain of the waverers at Medina and surrounded by Arab tribes who were still uncertain of this new message and religion, both weighed their chances and waited.

The incident of Ḵhūḥ Qaṣṣar, however, clinched the issue for the Muslims. They had no choice, but to deal immediately with the situation of Khaybar. Ibn Isḥāq, al-Wāqīḍī and Ibn Sa‘d have placed it before Ḥudaybiyāh, whereas it took place immediately before the Apostle’s expedition to Khaybar. Al-Ṭabarī, reported it from Salāmāh b. Aḥmād b. al-Aslāmī who was himself involved in this attack and rightly places it after Ḥudaybiyāh; so does al-Bukhārī, who also reports from Salāmāh b. Aḥmād b. al-Aslāmī, and dates it three days before the expedition to Khaybar. It so happened that ‘Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn b. Ḥudayfah b. Badr al-Fażārī with the cavalry of the Ghatafan raided the Apostle’s milch camels in al-Ḡābah. A man of the Banū

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3 Ibn Hishām, pp. 719-20.
6 Al-Ṭabarī, pp. 596-604.
Ghifār, who was in charge of the camels, was killed. His wife and the camels were carried away by al-Fazārī. Al-Ghābah is near Medina in the direction of Syria. That the Ghatafan should have ventured so near Medina was not only a provocative act but also a signal of danger for the Muslims. Further efforts to seek a peaceful settlement seemed to be futile. So the Apostle took immediate action to break the alliance between the Jews of Khaybar and the Ghatafan.

The Apostle marched (Muḥarram 1 Ḥijrī, May/June 628) from Medina to Khaybar by way of ʿIsr, a mountain between Medina and Wādī al-Furʿūn, where a mosque was built for him. From there he continued his march to al-Sāḥbān, which is an evening’s journey from Khaybar. Then he went forward with the army and halted at al-Rajiy to prevent the Ghatafan who had marched out to join forces with Khaybar, “but after a day’s journey, hearing a rumour about their property and families, they thought they had been attacked during their absence, so they went back on their tracks and left the way to Khaybar open to the Apostle.”

The Apostle reached Khaybar at night. Looking at Khaybar he prayed:

“We ask Thee for the good of this town and the good of its inhabitants and the good of what is in it, and we take refuge in Thee from its evil and the evil of its people and the evil that is in it”. When the Muslim army passed the night there, it seems the Apostle was still not sure whether the Jews really wished to give battle. However, when he saw the Jewish preparations any doubts on that count were removed. Taking into consideration the position of the Khaybar strongholds and the surrounding swamp, the date palms and valleys providing a natural protection, this must have been the most difficult military expedition for the Muslims. But unfortunately very few details of the battle are given by Ibn Isqāq; those which are given are grist to a story-teller’s mill rather than material for a historical examination. Ibn Isqāq’s account is replete with isnāds. The account begins with a long chain of isnāds but all that the report

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1 Ibn Hishām, p. 757. The whole account is given in detail by Ibn Hishām as well as Ibn Saʿd, pp. 106-117.
2 Ibn Hishām, p. 757.
3 Ibid. pp. 755-778.
says is that Ibn al-Akwa® was asked to dismount and chant one of his camel songs. "Abd Allâh b. "Amr b. Ḍamrah al-Fażârî told Ibn Ishâq that the Apostle prohibited the flesh of domestic donkeys and Sallâm b. Kirkîrâh added that when the Apostle forbade the flesh of donkeys he allowed them to eat horseflesh. Yazîd b. Abû Ḥabîb told Ibn Ishâq from Abû Marzâq client of Tujîb from Ḥanash al-Ṣân`ânî that he learnt it from a preacher that the Apostle said, "It is not lawful for a man who believes in Allâh and the last day to mingle his seed with another man’s." All these reports and many more are very important from the point of view of Muslim law, and would not have the force of law if they were not given with proper isnâd. As far as the account of the battle is concerned practically all reports are without any authority. It is the same pattern that we found in the account of the B. Qurayyâh. Had Ibn Ishâq come across any authorities he would have quoted them, but there were none. In more than twenty-three pages of Wûstenfeld’s edition there is little that can give us a reasonable account of how these forts on such heights and protected by people who had catapults were conquered by a small army who had no siege-machine.

According to Ibn Ishâq, the first to fall was the castle of Nâ’îm, where Mâlîmûd b. Maslamah was killed while resting, crushed by a millstone which was thrown on him by Kînânah b. al-Rabî® b. Abû al-Ḥuqayq. The fort of al-Qâmis was difficult to conquer. Several commanders failed to subdue it. The casualties of both sides exceeded those of Badr (2/624), but not Uḥûd where 72 Muslims and 22 Meccans were killed. At Khaybar, 19 Muslims were killed® and 50 were wounded. The enemy casualties at Badr were 70 killed and none wounded; at Khaybar 93 were killed.

Both sides knew that for the vanquished it was, probably, the last battle; a dominant elite, if defeated, would never get a chance to recover. A new group trying to establish its ascendancy, had been very recently shown its weakness by the Quraysh of Mecca at Ḥudâybiyâh. The Jews at Medina and all the Arab tribes were waiting for the defeat of this new group which threatened the whole pattern of Arab life. This was one of the most important battles of the Apostle’s life. The Jews, though they could not unite under one command, fought bravely. Unlike the Jews of Medina, who had no will to fight and surrendered without giving battle, the Jews of Khaybar put up a stiff resistance. Every day the Muslims would storm and return unsuccessfully till finally "Abi, flying the Apostle’s standard—which was "Ā'ishah’s wrap—won the day for the Muslims.

The Jews of Khaybar won back the honour, which had been lost by the B. Qaynuqâ’i’, the B. al-Nâdîr and the B. Qurayyâh by their trickery and cowardice. Marhâb came out of his castle carrying his weapons and saying:

Khaybar knows that I am Marhâb
An experienced warrior armed from hand to foot,
Now piercing, now slashing
As when lions advance in their rage.
The hardened warrior gives way before my onslaught;
my kimâ cannot be approached. ²

When after a heroic struggle with Muhammad b. Maslamah, Marhâb was killed, his brother Yâsîr came out with the challenge:

Khaybar knows that I am Yâsîr
Fully armed, a doughty warrior
As when lions advance at a rush
The enemy give way before my onslaught. ³

The Jews did not lose at Khaybar, but signed a negotiated peace with the Muslims, which suited the Apostle. The maghâzi-writers’ account is improbable and, as Lammens has pointed out, incorrect. ⁴ As a result of the treaty Khaybar changed its alliance from the B. Fazârah to the Muslims. As Abû Hurayrah, who was in Khaybar with the Apostle, plaintively reports, “We conquered Khaybar, in the booty we took neither gold nor silver, but cattle, ¹

4 See next chapter, pp. 115-117.

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camels, food and palm groves. His report represents the correct position. Yahya b. Adam reports from Nafi that the Apostle gave Khaybar to its inhabitants against payment of half of the produce, and the palm trees. Ibn Ishaaq's account of the division of the spoil concurs in principle with other reports, but as Abu Hurayrah has pointed out there was no hidden treasure of gold or silver.

When Khaybar had been "conquered", Ibn Ishaaq reports without isnad, al-Hajjaj b. Ilah al-Sulami went to Mecca to collect his money, which was scattered among the Meccan merchants. He took the Apostle's specific "permission" to tell lies to collect the money. On his arrival in Mecca the people collected around him and asked how the Apostle fared in Khaybar. Al-Hajjaj told them, "He has suffered a defeat such as you have never heard of and his companions have been slaughtered; you have never heard the like, and Muhammad has been captured." The Meccans, pleased with the news, helped Al-Hajjaj to collect his money. To a distraught 'Abbas, whom he took aside, Al-Hajjaj said,

'I left your brother's son married to the daughter of their king, Safiyah, and Khaybar has been conquered and all that is in it removed and become the property of Muhammad and his companions ... When three nights have passed let it be known if you so wish. On the third day 'Abbas put on his robe, scented himself, took his stick and went to the Ka'bah and performed the tawif. When the people saw him they said, 'O Abu al-Fadl, this is indeed steadfastness in a great misfortune!' 'Abbas answered, certainly not, by Allah by whom you swear, Muhammad has conquered Khaybar and was married to the daughter of their king. He has seized all that they possess and it is now his property and property of his companions'.

Neither of the two stories of Al-Hajjaj, are true.

Chapter VI

The Nature and Extent of the Conflict

What does it profit the reader to wade through wars and battles and sieges of towns and enslavements of peoples, if he is not to penetrate to the knowledge of the causes which made one party succeed and other fail in the respective situations?

—POLYBIUS

The Jews of the Hijaz on the eve of the Hijrah, as we discussed in the first chapter, were a declining elite, a group which was in the process of losing its dominance, though it was not necessarily aware of the loss.

Group status reversal is not a new phenomenon. History is full of cases where the dominant elite declined and became a subordinate minority. The reversal of such status can be either sudden and violent or peaceful and gradual. A shift in economic conditions and change in the skills required for dominance, such as the invention of gunpowder, the industrial revolution, replacement of the mastery of the seas by air power, can greatly contribute to the decline of a group, which for various reasons, has not been able to keep up with the times.

Towards the end of the fifth century the Jews ruled Himyar, the last of the successive kingdoms of al-Yaman, dominated Yathrib and controlled Tayma', Fadak, Khaybar and Wadi al-Qura on the line of the caravan route running from north to south. With the reign of Dhū Nuwās (510-525) which "provides one of the most remarkable atrocity stories of history", the Jewish dynasty of Saba ended after a run of a century and a half. This may be taken as the beginning of the decline of the Jewish dominant elite. About 522 Dhū Nuwās gave the Christians of Najrān the choice between apostasy

and martyrdom. On refusal to accept Judaism they were mercilessly exterminated in the trenches.¹ The news was received with horror in Christendom. An Abyssinian army landed in Himyar and Arabia Felix was once more restored to Christendom. At approximately the same time the Aws and the Khazraj were unified under the able leadership of Mālik b. ʿAjlān and eventually achieved parity with the Jews if not dominance over them.² The Jewish settlements of the Hijāz, which according to Torrey were constituted “primarily as commercial enterprises”,³ had gradually changed into agricultural farms and palm groves, and their āṯām, originally built to stave off Bedouin razias, lost their utility as strongholds against an opponent whose tactics were very different from those of the raiding Bedouin. When the Aws and the Khazraj came to Yathrib they could manage to build only thirteen strongholds, while the Jews had fifty-nine āṯām.⁴ But on the eve of the Hijrah, the Aws and the Khazraj and other tribes had more than eighty strongholds.⁵

The war of Buṣāth, which had ended five years before the Hijrah, had weakened both the Aws and the Khazraj. The dissipation caused by this war had a far reaching effect on the early history of Islam as it helped to encourage the Apostle’s refuge in Yathrib. As ʿAʾishah said:

God caused the war of Buṣāth to take place for the benefit of His Apostle. When the Apostle arrived in Yathrib their (the Anšār’s) important personalities had been dispersed and their leaders killed; they were in a bad state and God had caused the day of Buṣāth so that they (the Anšār) may enter Islam.⁶

This war had a far more damaging effect on the Jews of Yathrib. First, as the allies of the Aws and the Khazraj they too suffered in the same proportion as the two Arab factions. But far more important was the loss of their position as a group whose support was sought for by both the Aws and the Khazraj and who played a considerably important role in maintaining a balance of power.

² Al-Samhiidi, Vol. I, pp. 177-98 and pp. 190-215. See also supra, Chapter I.
may have realized already that the Emigrants would generally have more influence on Muhammad than the Ansār….for some of them hopes may have been set on a league with Ibn Ubayy”.

Even when they failed they did not realize the necessity of adaptability. “Thus the Jewish opponents of Mahomet placed a ridiculous meaning on his sayings and revelations, and treated him contemptuously.”

The Jews of Yathrib epitomised the tragedy of a group which had lost its moorings. The tensions in the Medina of A.D. 627 reflected the strains and stresses of the larger social structure of which they were only a minor part. Having been assimilated in the Arab majority they had preserved only the external forms of an identity. Nothing distinguished them from other Arabs except their monotheism and the dietary laws. The differences between the two should have been still reduced by the Islamic monotheism, but research has shown “that groups might become more conscious of their opposed identities precisely at a time when external differences between them are being reduced.”

They failed to respond to the new situation by changing their attitude and social organization and fell back on the old tried methods of forging new alliances with non-Muslim Arabs, not anticipating that the winner would be the Muslim and not the Meccan Quraysh. Unfortunately for them, not only the fundamental changes in the larger society, but the character of the Jewish minority was determined by the personal qualities of two of its leaders, Ka'b b. Asad and Ḥuyayy b. Akhtab, one a wavering weakling and the other an incorrigible intriguer.

While a decline in the economic sphere is gradual and a declining elite gets time and opportunity to retard and even reverse the process of decline, a shift in the skills of war and a failure to comprehend the nature of that shift, and to adapt or retreat accordingly, is always fatal. The Jews of Yathrib lost and the Jews of Khaybar failed to destroy the small Muslim force investing it because they did not realize till the end that their āṯām had ceased to provide protection.

The origin of the word āṯām is doubtful. According to Arab scholars it is an Arabic word denoting height and according to Jewish scholars it is a Hebrew word. These were fortlike castles which were built on heights. Within the stronghold of the āṯām there were stores, silos, halls for conferences, schools, synagogues, treasury and armoury. There were springs of fresh water. They provided protection against the raiding Bedouin. The Arab raiders had neither the equipment, nor supplies nor patience for a prolonged siege. Arab warfare itself was more or less like a medieval European tournament. It started with reciprocal insults and panegyrics in self-praise. Hijār (satire) was “an element of war just as important as the actual fighting.”

The poet reviled his enemies, hurled curses on them and extolled the qualities of his tribe. Though the vendetta was prolonged and the vengeance transmitted from generation to generation, the individual battles themselves were not long and sustained. The wars of Fujār and Buṭāth for instance were long, but each episode during these wars was short. While a war may erupt at any time and a decisive battle can be fought at short notice, a siege demands an elaborate build-up. It is not easy to assess the strength of any well-fortified place. History abounds in expensive mistakes.

The most important and indeed the decisive factor in a siege is the endurance and determination of both the sides.

These qualities need to be particularly highly developed in the besieged, who must believe most strongly in the justice of their cause, as well as having faith in the ultimate success of their stand; fear may well play a great part in hardening the defenders’ will to resist … A siege brings out the best and the worst in those enduring it.

It is different from any ordinary warfare, where most of the combatants on both sides are soldiers. But in a siege which is not of a purely garrison nature, the majority of those besieged are non-combatant men, women, and children. As a consequence morale and discipline can easily be undermined. Children and old people suffer the same privations as the soldiers, and are directly affected. In case of defeat they share the same fate. Disease and hunger can easily undermine even the strongest fortress.

In all the four major encounters with the Apostle the Jews of the Ḥijāz chose the shelter and protection of their āṯām. In a
sieve the heaviest burden falls upon the leader of the defenders. He
has to combine in himself a veritable galaxy of talents. He must be brave and
appear to be brave without being foolhardy; he must have, or soon acquire, suffi­
cient personal authority to be the unquestioned leader of his troops:... such a
man must remain serene in the face of setbacks and disappointments, so that he
generates an air of confidence in eventual victory ....

These qualities, as the three sieges of Yathrib amply show, were
completely absent in the Jewish leadership. Khaybar presented a
different picture, but there, too, a unified leadership was not possible.

Ibn Išāq, al-Waqidi and Ibn Saʿd in their accounts of the
conflict with the B. Qaynuqāʿ have not given the name of any person
who led these unfortunate Jews. They were not short of prominent
people whose names have been mentioned in other contexts. Ibn
Išāq has given the names of twenty-eight prominent adversaries of the
Apostle from the B. Qaynuqāʿ. Rafāʿah b. Qays was one of them;
he went to the Apostle asking why he turned his back to Jerusalem
as the qiblah. He also went to the Ansār asking them not to con­
tribute to the public expenses and when he spoke to the Apostle he
twisted his words. Finḥās is another rabbi of the B. Qaynuqāʿ
who infuriated Abu Bakr by saying that the Jews were not poor
compared to Allāh. Another, Shās b. Qays, had earlier ordered a
Jewish youth to recite the poems of Buʿath to the
Ansār. But neither
on the eve of the siege nor during the siege nor after the siege is the
name of any leader of the B. Qaynuqāʿ mentioned. There were seven
hundred well-fed and well-provided combatants among the B. Qaynuqāʿ;
three hundred of them had their armour. Any leader with even a
modicum of military experience would have given battle to the Apostle
in the open field. With their fortress at their back the B. Qaynuqāʿ
could effectively deal with the three hundred-odd Muslims with ease.

Unlike the Quraysh at Badr they were not short of water, and were
not camped in the open. They were strategically in a stronger position.
Their market was near the bridge of the Wādi of Baṭḥān and an ʿutm

on the eastern side of the bridges. With their quarter straddling the
bridge they could inflict the maximum losses on the Muslims in an
open combat, retreat to their fortress and open the charge again at a
time of their choosing. The Muslims were out of the town and,
though they were assured of their supply route, they could not insure
a continuous supply for a long-drawn-out battle. The B. Qaynuqāʿ
instead shut themselves up in their ʿutm. They seemed to have made
no attempt to either fight or break the siege. The Apostle just went
and sat down outside with his men. There was no action. He could
patiently sit and wait; the B. Qaynuqāʿ could not endure beyond
fifteen days. Our sources tell us that they were the bravest of the
Jews and were “men of war”. These were the people who protected
Abd Allāh b. Ubayy from all his enemies. The days of
B. Qaynuqāʿ bravery had passed, and the decline seems to have been
rapid.

The B. al-Naḍīr had many ʿāṯām and were well provided.
According to al-Waqidi they had food supplies to last a year and their
water resources were abundant; they had even provided themselves with
stones to drop on the attacking force. Even granting al-Waqidi’s
tendency to exaggerate and lace his narrative with imaginative details,
the B. al-Naḍīr were far more prepared for a long siege than the
B. Qaynuqāʿ. The Muslims, on the other hand, after their discomfiture at
Uḥud and the massacre at Bīr Maʿīnāh, were in no position to main­
tain a long siege. The Apostle seemed to be conscious of their strength
and his weakness, and therefore to break the spirit of the defenders
he ordered, contrary to Arab custom, that the palm trees should be cut
down and burnt. The palm trees were in any case lost—it made no
difference to the B. al-Naḍīr whether they were burnt or taken over by the
Muslims. If the B. al-Naḍīr won they could plant new palms; if they
were defeated they would be expelled and could not make any use of
these palms. But Ḫuyayy b. Akḥtab was not a military leader. He
was an intriguer. He could not foresee that a long siege would be to
their advantage, it would not only disrupt the daily life of Yathrib but
would also provide an opportunity to Abd Allāh b. Ubayy b. Saflū

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1 Belfield, p. 5-6.
2 Ibn Hishām, p. 352.
3 Ibid., p. 381.
4 Ibid., p. 390.
6 Saleh Ahmad Al-Ali, “Studies in the Topography of Medina (During the
8 Ibn Saʿd, II, p. 29.
10 Ibn Hishām, p. 546.
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and other disaffected people whom the Qurʾān described as munāfiqūn to foment trouble and join the battle at an appropriate time. They had sent to them a message saying, “stand firm and protect yourselves ... if you are attacked we will fight with you”. But there was no occasion to attack; all that the Apostle did was to burn a few palms and sit with his companions. The Jews lost nerve and surrendered without fighting. The Qurʾān has explicitly referred to the lack of military action: “You urged neither horse nor camel for it; but Allāh grants power to His Messenger over whomsoever He pleases”.2

While the B. Qaynuqā and the B. al-Naḍīr merely shut themselves inside their āŷām the B. Qurayzh according to al-Wāqīḍī and Ibn Saʿd offered resistance; arrow shots were exchanged and stones were hurled,3 and there were some casualties on both sides. According to al-Wāqīḍī and Ibn Saʿd the siege lasted only fifteen days, but Ibn Išḥāq says it continued for twenty-five days. The B. Qurayzh were taken by surprise. It was blitzkrieg—the lightning war. For almost a month the Muslims themselves had withstood a siege. The B. Qurayzh did not expect that they would directly return from the front and invest them. This time the Muslim army outnumbered the Jews; there were three thousand Muslims as against six hundred to nine hundred Jews. But it was winter and the Muslims were in the open; the Jews were in their strongholds well protected and provided. Above all they were fresh and the Muslims were hungry and tired. Had the Jews decided to give battle in the open they had the advantage of being on the home ground. They could retreat and rally forth in a war of attrition, which was not to the Muslim advantage. The Quraysh, the Ghatafīn, the Jews of Khaybar, in fact none of the Arab tribes had been so far subdued by the Muslims and would, probably, have taken advantage at the slightest sign of Muslim weakening. Though Ḥuyayy b. Akḥab was with the B. Qurayzh, other leaders of B. al-Naḍīr were free to organize help and rally support. In fact the munāfiqūn of Medina seemed to be still hoping that the Confederates would return to attack Medina. There is a pointed reference to this hope in the Qurʾān.

They think the Confederates have not departed; and if the Confederates should come again, they would wish to be with the (nomad) Arabs in the desert asking for news of you.4

2 The Qurʾān, Al-Ḥaṭīr, 6.
4 The Qurʾān, Al-Abzāb, 20.

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But the Jewish leadership was as demoralised as ever. The feebleness shown by the B. Qurayzh made it apparent that they had no leader. Kaʿb b. Asad acted like a man driven by despair. While adversity can bring out almost superhuman heroic qualities among besieged people, the B. Qurayzh were plunged into the depths of depression. They had lost the qualities of leadership, courage and endurance, most probably, during the war of Buṣāth or even earlier.

The division of the Apostle's life in two periods, the Meccan and the Medinan, seems to be neat and logical. But it is an oversimplification. After the Hijrah the Apostle and the Emigrants had escaped persecution, but the struggle for survival had not ceased. A more logical periodization would be to divide the Apostle's life into three phases: the first up to the year of his call to the Ministry, the second from this date to the truces of Ḥudaybiyah and Khaybar, and the third from Khaybar to his death. We might subdivide the second phase in two periods, one of persecution and the second of armed struggle, or call them the periods of (1) Meccan struggle, (2) Medinan struggle and (3) the propagation of the faith. Ḥudaybiyah and Khaybar, whatever be the periodization, are definite watersheds in the history of early Islam. The largest number of people the Apostle could gather around him on a battle-field was 3,000 up to the end of the sixth year of the Hijrah. According to our sources this was the number of people who took part in defending Medina during the Battle of the Abzāb.1 But the people who went out on an expedition did not exceed 1,600.2 This gives a fairly correct idea of the Muslim strength during the first six years of the Hijrah. Except for the Muhājirūn and the Ānasr the Arab tribes had not accepted Islam. “Islam had touched only a few tribes on the neighbourhood of Mecca and Medina”.3 The continuos conflict with the Quraysh of Mecca and the cold war with the Jewish elite of the Hijāz was not conducive to the propagation of the faith, which required stability and peace. The Apostle was nearing sixty and had accomplished little except a few local successes. The failure of the Meccan-Jewish attempt to liquidate the Apostle and his followers at the Battle of the Abzāb was only a negative success for the Muslims. They remained bottled up in Medina, safe within their own confines, free to send expeditions,

1 Ibn Ḥishām, p. 673.
3 Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 40.
but unable to expand. Mecca and Khaybar with their tribal alliances and alignments stood firm in their opposition to Islam. They had failed to destroy Islam; the Apostle was also probably conscious of his inability to win them over. The two actions which he took soon after the Battle of the "Abziib seem to indicate a change in his strategy. He would try to neutralize them and now, being an established power in Medina, would seek a modus vivendi with Mecca and Khaybar.

In 628 (6 A.H.) while the exhausted Byzantine and Sassanian empires were negotiating peace after twenty-six years of war the Apostle also took a step towards peace; he announced that he was going to Mecca for the "Umrah (the lesser pilgrimage). The pilgrimage by its very nature was to be peaceful. He invited other Muslims to accompany him. They took animals for sacrifice and were armed only with the traveller's weapon—the sheathed sword. Sixteen hundred Muslims, including four women, went with him. Some ten miles northwest of Mecca the Apostle camped and the Quraysh took a position between the Muslims and the city to prevent their entry. The Apostle was not allowed to perform the "Umrah, but got a nonaggression pact instead. The terms of the pact were as follows:

1. The Muslims and the Quraysh will lay aside war for ten years during which men can be safe and refrain from hostilities;
2. If one of the Quraysh should go over to the Muslims without the permission of his guardian, they would hand him over to Meccans, but if any Muslim goes to the Meccans, the latter would not return him to Muhammad;
3. The parties to the pact will not show enmity to each other and there shall be no secret reservations or bad faith;
4. Those who wish to enter into alliance with the Muslims or with the Quraysh will be at liberty to do so;
5. The Muslims shall retire this year without performing the "Umrah;
6. Next year Muslims may come with swords in sheaths, but nothing more; and can stay in Mecca for three nights.¹

These terms were humiliating. "'Umar jumped up and went to Abū Bakr saying, 'Is he not God's Apostle, and are we not Muslims, and are they not polytheists?' to which Abū Bakr agreed, and he

¹ Ibn Hishām, pp. 747-8.

(‘Umar) went on 'Then why should we agree to what is demeaning to our religion?... Then he went to the Apostle and put the same questions... '" The Apostle had bought peace, which he needed most, at the cost of a great many concessions.

Having negotiated the nonaggression pact with the Quraysh of Mecca the Apostle seemed to be anxious to reach some settlement with the second most important power in the Hijaz, the Jews of Khaybar. It was one of the most hazardous of expeditions undertaken so far. The Apostle led a force of 1,600 men against approximately 10,000 Jews within their fortifications and 4,000 men of Ghaṭafān waiting outside in the open. It did not seem to be a normal expeditionary force. The odds were heavily against the Muslims. Most of the Arabian tribes were still pagan and had witnessed the retreat of the Muslims from Ḥudaybiyah. Our primary sources are silent on the subject; for them history and hagiography are so fused with each other that it is difficult to reconstruct the events from their narrative. Having suffered a setback at the hands of the Quraysh why did the Apostle undertake an expedition which seemed to have little chance of success? After the unfortunate incident at al-Qarqarah where al-Yusayr b. Zārim was killed, the Apostle appears to have decided to go himself to negotiate peace with the Jews of Khaybar. He took a large party of dependable and devoted people. These were the people who had taken "their pledge unto death" under a tree at Ḥudaybiyah, known as the pledge of al-Rijwān.² This seems to be a reasonably precautionary action. He did not wish war. He made it clear that those who wished to go for booty need not accompany him on this expedition.³ He was going into the heart of enemy's stronghold to negotiate peace and sign a treaty with the enemy which would guarantee peace. If he succeeded, it appears, he would bring a nonaggression pact; if not, it might turn out to be a rout like the battle of Ḫud.⁴ There was no booty in either case and he did not want to take with him on this occasion anyone who would tend to lower the morale of this small force.

¹ Ibn Hishām, pp. 747.
³ The battle of Ḫud was fought in March 625 (X/3). The Apostle went out of Medina to fight against the advice of ʿAbd Allāh b. Ubayy who said, "We have never gone out to fight an enemy but we have met disaster and none has come in against us without being defeated". (Ibn Hishām, p. 558). Muslim losses were 70 killed and 40 wounded as against three Meccans killed.
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He had earlier taken a peace initiative and had sent a letter to Khaybar. The Apostle wrote to the Jews of Khaybar:

In the name of Allah the Compassionate the Merciful from Muhammad the Apostle of Allah, friend and brother of Moses who confirms what Moses brought. Allah says to you, O people of the Book, and you will find it in your Book, “Muhammad is the Apostle of Allah, and those with him are hard against the disbelievers, compassionate among themselves. Thou seest them bowing and prostrating themselves seeking grace and acceptance from Allah. The mark of their prostrations is on their foreheads. That is their description in the Torah. And their description in the Gospel is like a seed which sends forth its shoot and strengthens it, and it becomes thick and rises straight upon its stalk, delighting the sowers, that He may cause the disbelievers to burn with rage at (the sight of) them. Allah has promised those who believe and do good works forgiveness and a great reward”. I adjure by Allah, and by what He has sent down to you, by Pharaoh and his works, that you tell me, do you find in what He has sent down to you that you believe in Muhammad? If you do not find that in your Book then “there is no compulsion upon you. The right path has become plainly distinguished from error” so I call you to Allah and His Apostle.

The letter contains nothing which has not been said before. Both in tone and form it represents the Apostle’s approach of identifying his message with that of Moses. Mention of his brotherly relations with Moses was made when he was carried by night to al-Aqsa Mosque for his ascent to heaven. The letter is an invitation to Islam qualified with the formula that there is no compulsion in matters of religion.

The Khaybar Jews however, had by now lost control of their affairs. Their leadership had passed into the hands of the exiled Naḍirite leaders. They had failed their own tribe earlier and were now playing with the destiny of those who had everything to gain by reaching a compromise with the rising power of Islam. The

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not given with the account of Khaybar, but in the chapter dealing with references to the Munāfiqūn and the Jews in the second surah of the Qurʾān Al-Baqarāh. No later falsifier could have adopted a style which in its attempt to conciliate sounds like an appeal. Ibn Isḥāq has not given the date of this letter. But it can be easily discovered. The letter quotes the last verse of the surat al-Fath. There is consensus among Muslim scholars that the surah was revealed when, after signing the Treaty of Ḥudaybiyah, the Apostle was on his way back to Medina (May-June/628/63 A.H.).

In the same year in the month of Dhū al-Hijjah he sent letters to kings. The Battle of Khaybar took place early in the seventh year of the Hijrah (May-June/628) the letter must have been sent along with these letters. This letter had no response from the Jews of Khaybar or, if it had, Muslim historians have not recorded it.

The chain of events, the nonaggression pact at Ḥudaybiyah, the letter to the Jews of Khaybar, the invitation to Zārīm to come to Medina, leads us to conclude that the Apostle needed peace at any cost. Looking at the terms of Ḥudaybiyah one might even think that peace with honour had almost changed into peace at any cost. The conciliatory tone of the letter to Khaybar is indeed remarkable when one takes into consideration the bitter opposition the Apostle had received from the Jews of Medina. He called himself “friend and brother of Moses” and claimed to “confirm what Moses brought”, he adjured them “by God, and by what He has sent down to you, by the manna and quails He gave as food to your tribes before you, and by His drying the sea for your fathers when He delivered them from Pharaoh and his works, that you tell me, do you find in what He has sent down to you that you believe in Muhammad? If you do not find that in your Book then “there is no compulsion upon you.”

Having entreated them to accept him as the Apostle of God he added “If you do not find that in your scripture then there is no compulsion upon you.”

The aging Apostle needed peace and was appealing for it. The Khaybar Jews however, had by now lost control of their affairs. Their leadership had passed into the hands of the exiled Naḍirite leaders. They had failed their own tribe earlier and were now playing with the destiny of those who had everything to gain by reaching a compromise with the rising power of Islam.

2 Among the chiefs of B. al-Naḍir “who went to Khaybar were Sallām b. Abū al-Ḥuqayq, Kīnānah b. al-Rabīʻ b. Abū al-Ḥuqayq, and Ḥuayy b. Akhtāb. When they got there the inhabitants became subject to them”. Ibn Ḥishām, p. 653.
Apostle later repeated the Qur'anic injunction of “no compulsion”, making it clear that the invitation to Islam was not compulsory. The new ummah needed reassurance. A hostile people only 90 miles from Medina posed a great danger to the new community.

The Apostle, on the other hand, as a good general, could foresee the dangers of a siege. Located on a high mountainous plateau and surrounded by heavily cultivated valleys and malarial swamps the Khaybar fortifications covered a wide area. This was one location which defied siege. Discussing the nature of sieges Belfield observes:

For those attacking, the first essential is to seal off the besieged place from the outside world. This is always a laborious and often lengthy undertaking, and thus no government will embark upon a major siege without considerable thought, nor will it do so unless there seems to be encouraging prospects of a relatively rapid success. To assess the strength of the natural and the prepared defensive features of any well-fortified place is a very complex matter. Here history abounds in expensive mistakes... In general, natural fortresses, such as Malta and Gibraltar, nearly always seem to defeat the attacker, or cause terrible losses before being taken.1

The Apostle took the field as a last resort. It did not seem to be a conclusive battle, though Muslim historians have tried to depict it as such. Ultimately a peace was negotiated, but it was after a great loss of life in battle. Half of the dates which were offered to the Ghatafan were now annually given to the Muslims as tribute. “This practice, far from being considered at that time a sign of political weakness, was freely indulged in also by the great Byzantine and Persian empires to secure peace from many unruly neighbouring tribes. It was far less expensive than keeping permanent garrisons to stave off raids. By arranging with Mohammad to pay him half of their annual produce, the Khaybar Jews may have thought that they had merely exchanged one recipient for another.2 They exchanged the alliance of the Ghatafan with that of the Apostle. The only loser were the Fazara. As Lammens has pointed out it is not correct to talk of it in terms of Muslim conquest of Khaybar. Later historians have painted it as a victory to justify acts which took place during 'Umar’s time.3

The Jews of Khaybar had not adopted a condescending attitude towards the Muslims, but they had certainly over-estimated their

1 Belfield, pp. 4-5.
2 Baron, Vol. III, p. 79.
3 Lammens, L'Arabie occidentale avant l'Hégire, p. 72.
with grief, and to enter the mosque (The Temple) as they entered it the first time, and to destroy all they conquered with their destruction.
8. It may be that your Lord will now have mercy on you; but if you return (to your previous state), We too will return, and We have made hell a prison for the disbelievers.
9. Surely, this Qurʾān guides to what is most right; and gives to the believers who do good deeds the glad tidings that they shall have a great reward.
10. And that for those who do not believe in what is to come later we have prepared a grievous punishment.
11. And man asks for evil as he should ask for good; and man is hasty.

In these verses of the Bani Israʿil the use of the personal pronoun in the second person is highly significant. Lammens after an examination of early sources has rightly pointed out that there were no Jews in Mecca, and there is general consensus that the verses are definitely Meccan. These verses do not point towards an Apostle looking forward to be accepted by the Jews. They also do not indicate an active controversy between the Apostle and the Jews. It is a general statement without polemics. A later verse on the subject is clear.

And we prepared for the children of Israel a blessed abode, and We provided them with all manner of good things. They differed not in anything till true knowledge came to them. Surely thy Lord will judge between them on the day of Judgment concerning that in which they differed. (Yūnus, 93).

Muir, Nöldeke and Grimme are in agreement with Zamakhshari, and al-Bayḍawi that it is a Meccan sūrah. Wherry calls it "undoubtedly of Meccan origin" and goes on to say that "the knowledge intended here is that of the Qurʾān, and the allusion is to the rejection of Muhammad by the Jews".

1 Supra, Chapter I.
3 See Bell, p. 207.
6 Wherry, p. 321.
7 Ibid., p. 338.

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The Apostle knew before his arrival in Medina that he would be rejected by the Jews and yet offered them the terms of the Sahifah on the basis of the Unity of God. But the Jews considered him not even a false Messiah, but an outright usurper; being a gentile (ummi) he could not be a prophet unto them, and as a prophet to the Arabs he could endanger their already declining position of influence. Two of their major allies in Medina had already accepted this refugee prophet; the Meccans were unable to crush him alone, and their own efforts in Medina to dislodge him had rebounded. The decline was rapid and they were unable to do anything to stop it.

The actual encounter with Judaism took place at a later period, and not during the time of the Apostle. The strah writers, maghāzī narrators, Qurʾānic commentators and the Ḥadith collectors read the Old Testament and the Jewish literature and applied all suitable signs to the Apostle. The Messianic movements among the Jews helped to confuse the situation. The abiding hope of the Jews in galut centred around a king in the house of David who would rule over a new golden age. Derived from the Hebrew mashiah (anointed), the term Messiah in Jewish history applied to the long-awaited, Divinely chosen king who "shall be called wonderful... The Prince of Peace", who would destroy the enemies of Israel and establish a paradise-like reign of peace and prosperity. Though appearing in many shapes and permutations, the messianic hope has been an activist element in Jewish history. It has retained the binding spell of Jewish kingship to be realized through God's will. It was not only an article of faith but an emotional necessity in times of distress to hope constantly for the advent of the Messiah. One element basic to Jewish messianism is anticipation of the "birth

2 "This influence of the Jewish Agada and Christian legend is attested with regret by orthodox theologians from the earliest times of Islam up to later periods", Goldziher, Muslim Studies, Vol. II, p. 131.
3 The idea of Jewish kingship seems to have changed to the idea of a Jewish state since the eighteenth century.
The Jews have never ceased their vigil for "one like the son of man", who will be given "dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve Him". Many of the Jewish patriots who fought in the Great Revolt against Rome believed that they were participating in a battle which was to be followed by the Messiah. Their unflinching heroism can be understood in the context of a messianic movement. The Jewish revolt against Emperor Trajan in 115-17 and the Bar Kochba uprising in 132-35 were influenced by messianic speculations. In the fifth century a Jew in Crete said he was Moses and promised the Jews of the island that he would take them to Judea without ships. He fixed a date for the miracle and the Jews gathered at the appointed time. They were ordered to jump into the sea and many of these credulous Jews were drowned.

During the sixth century the continuous conflict between the Byzantine and Sassanid empires gave rise to messianic expectations, which most probably played a major role in shaping the image of Arab Jewry. Zerubbabel, a grandson of King Jehoiachin, was the leader of the Jewish exiles who returned from Babylonia to Judea with the consent of Cyrus. Under Darius I in 521 B.C. he was appointed governor of Judea and thus became the last ruler of Judea from the House of David. The pseudepigraphical work, the Book of Zerubbabel written in his time tells about the visions of Zerubbabel concerning the appearance of the Messiah. The literature which developed around the messianic hopes arising from the Book of Zerubbabel was vast. Though “it is difficult to date the various works in this literature; some of them may even be earlier than the Book of Zerubbabel... (yet it) had an enormous impact upon medieval Jewry”.1

Until the beginning of the sixth century at least two successive Judaised dynasties ruled in the Yemen. There was a large Jewish population in Arabia and it is very likely that the messianic hopes might have sustained the Jewish people of Arabia during the destruction of the kingdom of Himyar and the decline in the position which followed it. The various references by Ibn Ishaq to the Jewish prophesies regarding the advent of a “prophet” seemed to be the result of a variant reading. Ibn Ishaq and Muslim scholars following him thought that the Jews whose rabbis had predicted the advent of a prophet were really waiting for Muhammad and when he claimed the prophethood, the Jews deliberately denied him. It seems the Jews of the Hijaz saw no signs, and did not witness any prophesies being fulfilled. Salām b. Mishkam of the B. al-Naḍīr told Muṣṭafā b. Jubayl “He (the Apostle) has not brought us anything we recognize and he is not the one we spoke of to you”.1

The language and the idiom of the argument between the Apostle and the Jews was unmistakably religious. But “ideological differences, no matter, how mutually antagonistic they become, alone are not enough to sustain negative patterns of conduct. However when some breakdown, crisis, or structural stress, e.g., economic, social, or political disintegration occurs, such differences become vital”2 Religious conflict becomes lethal only when social, political and economic conflicts are conjoined with it. The Aws and the Khazraj, who were trying to take over the control of the oases from the Jews, did not seem to have any experience in trade and commerce. By inviting Muhammad and some seventy of his Quraysh companions the Ansār gave refuge to the Apostle of God, and got, among many things, a leader with commercial expertise in the bargain. The Apostle, earlier in his career, had established a reputation for managing the commercial interests of the richer Quraysh merchants. The maghāzī writers do not tell us how the Muḥājirūn made a living in Medina during the early period of their sojourn. There is no evidence to show that they changed their vocation and took up agriculture, but there are occasional notices of their commercial transactions. As Abū Hurayrah reported, the Muḥājirūn spent their time in the markets.3 Umar did not hear the message conveyed by the Apostle as he was engaged in the market.4 When “Abd al-Rahmān b. "Awf was offered half of his wealth by his Medinan ‘brother’ Sa‘d b. al-Rabi”,

1 Ibn Hishām, p. 379.
3 Supra, p. 105.
he said, “May God bless your wealth and family; you just show me the market”. 6 Abd al-Ra'ūman was shown the way to the B. Ḍa‘lār market, where he soon earned a skin of butter and cheese. 4 It is not surprising that the B. Ḍa‘lār were the first to feel threatened by this new mercantile element, and played into the hands of Ṣā‘īd Allāh b. Uba‘y to save their business. The Jewish trading post of Tā‘if was saved because the people of Tā‘if as a whole rejected the Apostle. 3 A section of the Medinan Arabs, on the other hand, brought the Apostle to Medina. Not accustomed to competition the B. Qaynuqā could not think of buying off the superior business acumen of the Muhājirūn; they tried to remove them instead. The B. al-Naḍir, the B. Qurayyah and other Jewish clans were mainly engaged in farming and agriculture. The danger posed to them by the new entrepreneur class of the Muhājirūn was of a different nature. The B. Qaynuqā through their market provided Yathrib and its environs opportunities to change goods and barter produce, and acted as middlemen and retailers and were an adjunct to the agrarian economy of the oasis. But the Muhājirūn did not grow up “in the atmosphere of the desert, but in that of high finance”. 4 The Meccans were “financiers skilful in the manipulation of credit, shrewd in their speculations, and interested in any potentialities of lucrative investment from Aden to Gaza or Damascus”. 5 The Jewish farmer and landowner was threatened by the merchant. Not only his social values, but his prosperity, as usual with all agrarian societies, faced danger from the new merchant class. The B. al-Naḍir and the B. Qurayyah fought and lost; other Jewish clans accepted their temporary decline and reigning of the Muhājirūn entrepreneur had brought to Yathrib.

It was a local affair. It was not an encounter between the two religions. That encounter began in Mecca, where there were no Jews and reached its highest point under the Abbasids in the Eastern Caliphate and under the Umayyads in Spain during the periods when there was no persecution. The rise of Islam and the Jewish

2 Al-Baladhurī, Fātiḥat al-Buldān, ed. by M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1866), p. 56.
3 Ibn Hishām, pp. 279-81.
4 Watt, Muhammad at Mecca, p. 3.
5 Ibid., p. 3.
7 Rodinson, Mohammed, pp. 280-81.
8 Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 287.
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The result of the two peace treaties, at Ḥudayyibiyah and Khaybar, was a great success. Two years later (1.1 630/10.IX 8), when the Apostle marched to Mecca, his army numbered 10,000 men as compared to 1,600 in 628 (6 A.H.). Ḥudayyibiyah and Khaybar had paid a great dividend.

Watt finds it "interesting to speculate on what would have happened had the Jews come to terms with Muḥammad instead of opposing him. At certain periods they could have secured very favourable terms from him, including religious autonomy, and on that basis the Jews might have become partners in the Arab empire and Islam a sect of Jewry. How different the face of the world would be now, had that happened!" Unfortunately a declining elite does not act that way.

Among the migratory peoples of ancient times the Greeks, the Italians and the Hebrews "looked upon their neighbours with greater apprehension than did any of the others. These three peoples lived in deep fear of the societies beyond, and even among themselves there was mutual antagonism and distrust." While the Greeks and the Italians had settled by the beginning of the Christian era, the Jews, due to their unfortunate circumstances, retained the characteristic of a migratory society. We have noted earlier that the B. Qaynuqa, the B. al-Nagir and the B. Qurayyah bore their misfortunes alone. No other Jewish tribe moved to help them. They had shown the same "mutual antagonism and distrust" at the Battle of Buṣāth. "They were continually conscious, indeed too conscious, of a distinction between their society and others, between themselves and the out-group". Their apprehension over strangers and foreigners prevented them from accepting the invitation to join the ummah. Things became far more difficult, because they formed an elite group, which would have lost its exclusiveness by joining an out-group. Even where the Jews have broken physical restrictions of a gentile-instituted ghetto, the ghetto as a Jewish institution holding the Jews under intellectual repression has survived. Unfortunately the Jews of the Ḥijāz as if by instinct withdrew physically and mentally to their ufum.

In less than twenty years after the death of the Apostle they demolished the walls of their mental and spiritual ufum and walked out to accept the challenge of a Muslim society which opened for them the doors of its mosques, its schools, its bazars, markets and civil service, for education, social assimilation and their participation in the civic and political life. They took the fullest advantage of the somatic, intellectual, and spiritual comforts offered by the dominant elite without disappearing as a marginal minority. They joined the ummah as sustaining members. For seven hundred years their destiny was bound with that of the Muslims.

Every phase of Islamic growth was accompanied by a positive and creative reaction among Jews. Every phase of Muslim breakdown was accompanied by a disintegration: a golden age when Spain's wealth grew; humiliation and exile when it dwindled.2

Carmichael considers it "very strange that while Christianity was gradually to disappear in most parts of Muslim Empire, Jewish communities survived and flourished—in Bukhara, formerly a great Christian centre; in Yemen, once a Christian bishopric; and in North Africa, the home of Saint Augustine".3 It would not look strange if the restricted nature and the limits of the Muslim-Jewish conflict were seen in their proper perspective.

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1 Islam in any case gave religious autonomy to the Jews and it lasted in the form of the "milīt" system up to the downfall of the Ottomans.
2 Watt, Muḥammad at Medina, p. 219.
4 Freeman, p. 32.
There was never a time from the birth of Islam to the present when large number of Jews did not live under Moslem rule. There is no phase in Islamic history that does not resonate through Jewish history and no form of Islam that does not have its Jewish counterpart. And though during many periods the differences between Islam and Judaism were stressed to rationalize hostility, these differences also were responsible for catalyzing some of the most creative Jewish achievements of the Middle Ages.

Under the Umayyads and the Abbasids, Jews prospered and found their way to virtually every part of the Moslem empire. Thriving communities sprang up in North Africa and Spain. The Abbasids, particularly, encouraged Jewish enterprise, with the result that by the tenth century a small but significant class of large-scale merchants and bankers had come to play a prominent role in the finances of the caliph. The policies of the caliphs were pragmatic, following from a reading of their own interests, not from a reading of the Koran.

The relationship of Jews to Islam was complex, at times positive, at times negative. During the tenth century, Jews living under the Abbasids in the east were experiencing a major breakdown, while Jews in Andalusia were embarking on a golden age. In the twelfth century, Maimonides fled from a hostile Islam in Andalusia, tarried briefly in hostile Islamic North Africa, only to become welcome in Islamic Egypt, where he became physician to the vizier of Saladin. Islam created climates favourable to Jewish creativity and climates altogether inimical to Jews. The record is clear: the differences setting Islam apart from Judaism did not always generate hostility.

ELLIS RIVKIN

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