Surely, this is a reminder; so whoever wishes may take the way that leads to his Lord.
In our domain we neither allow any Muslim to change his religion nor allow any other religion to propagate its faith.
Maulana Maududi’s desire for political power knew no bounds. The law of apostasy which he evolved was an extension of his dictatorial and intolerant personality—it had nothing to do with Islam. Dr Israr Ahmad, who worked closely with Maududi, said that Maududi borrowed the principles of his movement from Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and the Khairi brothers and the style of his presentation from Niyaz Fatehpuri. But he was so egocentric that he never acknowledged that his ideas came from anyone but himself.2
Similarly, the Maulana’s ideas on apostasy, though originating from an interpretive error of early Muslim jurisprudence (fiqh) are, in fact, based on medieval Christianity. The Deoband school; which was on one hand collaborating with a predominantly Hindu political organization the Indian National Congress—and on the other fighting a rearguard action against the shuddi campaign, provided the gloss to Maududi’s thoughts on the subject. The influence of Marxist writings, which the Maulana seems to have read when a young and impressionable editor, is markedly noticeable in his thinking. The Tahrik-i-Jamaari Islami is a curious blend of medieval Christian practices, Deobandi/Wahabi intolerance and Marxist incitement to disruption.
As we saw in the first chapter of this book, the concept of religious liberty is not evolutionary or lineal—it is a cyclical phenomenon. Whenever one of God’s prophets or a religious reformer appears, he is opposed. He is accused of dividing the community and breaking traditional conformity. He is pilloried as an apostate. Ultimately a prophet always succeeds in establishing religious freedom. The true faith spread by this religious freedom is hardened in rigid dogma, which actually results in the loss of the right to dissent.
On his last visit to the Temple, Christas said: ‘Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s.’ (Mark 12:17) This very clear statement separates religious belief from political authority. However, within a year of obtaining political authority (312), the Christian Church was tote by schism. For more than 300 years Christians had been persecuted and flourished, and yet, soon after Constantine’s conversion, the Church was confronted with monastic secession, Donatist schism and Arian heresy. Throughout the history of the Christian Church, heresy, or deviation from orthodoxy, has been a matter of deep concern. It invariably involves the very concept of deity, the divinity of Christas.
If Christ was divine in an absolute sense, yet distinct from God, there were two Gods and Christianity was a form of ditheism, not monotheism. On the other hand, if the filial relationship were literally interpreted, then God the Father would be the progenitor of God the Son. But the logic of this relationship meant that Christ would not be fully God, since there must have been a time when he ‘was not’ and God the Father alone existed.4
Orthodox Christians held Christas to be identical in being (homousinous) to God the Father, while Arius (c. 256–336) considered him only similar in being (homoiousios) to Him. Then there was the question of his mother. Nestorious (died c. 451) declared that Jesusas was two distinct persons, one human, one divine; and that Maryas was the mother only of the human, not the divine Christas. It would be better, therefore, to call her the mother of Christas. The orthodox doctrine is that Maryas is the true mother, not of the Godhead itself, but of the incarnate legos, or Word of God, containing both the divine and the human natures of Christas5
The first ecumenical Council of the Church met in 325 in Bithynian Nicea and issued a creed on the mystery of the Trinity. The unrepentant Arius was anathamatised by the council and exiled by Emperor Constantine. The emperor also ordered that all Arius’s books should be burned and their possession should be punished by death.
The cycle of religious liberty which began with Jesus of Nazarethas came full circle when Justinian (483–565) prescribed the death penalty for apostasy. The penalty became part of the codification of Roman law in AD535.
It is a tragic twist of fate that freedom of conscience was snuffed out by the very Roman Christians whose newly converted forefathers were burned to provide fire and fun in Nero’s Rome (64 AD). As long as Christians were persecuted by non-Christian political authorities, Christian writers defended religious liberty. But once the imperial throne was won over to Christianity, the Church looked ‘with the same hostile eye upon individualism in belief as the state upon secession or revolt’.6 By the middle of the fifth century things that were and still are God’s were rendered unto Caesar. Political authority had become the right arm of the Church. In the course of his campaign against the Donatists, St Augustine (354–430) argued: ‘There is a righteous persecution which the Church of Christ inflicts upon the impious. She persecutes in the spirit of love… that she may correct… that she may recall from error… [taking] measures for their good, to secure their eternal salvation.’7
In 385 a Spanish bishop, Priscillian, was accused of preaching Manicheism and universal celibacy. He denied the charge, but was tried, condemned and burned at the stake with several companions.
Martin Luther (1483–1546), the German leader of the Protestant Reformation, concurred with his Roman Catholic predecessor, Augustine, and said: ‘The clergy had authority over conscience, but it was thought necessary that they should be supported by the State with absolute penalties of outlawry, in order that error might be exterminated, although it was impossible to banish sin.’8
But it was the French Protestant theologian John Calvin (1509–64) who really inspired Maulana Maududi.
He [Calvin] wished to extend religion by the sword and reserve death as the punishment of apostasy… Catholics should suffer the same penalties as those who were guilty of sedition, on the grounds that the majesty of God must be as strictly avenged as the throne of the king.9
While the inspiration came to the Maulana from Calvin, the rationale was provided by the English thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) in his book, Leviathan. Since the power to work miracles is one of the signs of a true prophet, and, according to Hobbes, the days of miracles were over, there was no possibility of guidance by a prophet or through divine inspiration. The sovereign alone had civil or religious authority. He alone had the power to make law, ‘For whosoever hath a lawful power over any writing, to make it law, hath the power also to approve or disapprove the interpretation of the same.’10
Heresy, in Hobbes’s view, was private judgment and action contrary to popular belief as laid down by the sovereign:
It is not the intrinsic error of the judgment that makes the heresy punishable, but the private rebellion against authority. To make loyalty to the commands of conscience the ruling principle would sanction all private men to disobey their princes in maintenance of their religion, true or false.11
According to Hobbes, this is subversion.
There is no apostasy without heresy and no heresy without dogma. The Roman Catholic dogma was carefully spelled out in the Athanasian Creed, which says: ‘That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; Neither confounding the Persons: nor dividing the Substance.’
It is in this tradition of medieval Christianity, and not of Islam, that Maulana Maududi developed the original ideals of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and the Khairi brothers’ Hukumat-i-Ilahiyya (Kingdom of God).12 St Augustine, Martin Luther, John Calvin and Thomas Hobbes provided him with the non-Islamic concepts of orthodoxy, dogma and heresy—and also with the rhetoric of intolerance agre. accepted e there is no dogma and heresy in Islam. Goldziher says:
Even the orientalists, who never miss an opportunity of criticizing Islam. accepted there is no dogma and heresy in Islam. Goldziher says:
The role of dogma in Islam cannot be compared to that which it plays in religious life of any of the Christian Churches. There are no Councils and Synods which, after lively controversy, lay down the formulae, which henceforth shall be deemed to embrace the whole of the true faith. There is no ecclesiastical institution, which serves as the measure of orthodoxy; no single authorized interpretation of the holy scriptures, on which the doctrine and exegesis of the church might be built. The Consensus, the supreme authority in all questions of religious practice, exercises an elastic, in a certain sense barely definable junsdiction, the very conception of which is moreover variously explained. Particularly in unanimity what shall have effect as undisputed Consensus. What is accepted as Consensus by one party, is far from being as such by another.13
The contemporary Jewish Orientalist, Bernard Lewis, who would never be accused of being pro-Muslim, observes:
What matters was what people did—orthopraxy, rather than orthodoxy and Muslims were allowed on the whole to believe as they chose to do, so long as they accepted the basic minimum, the Unity of God and the apostolate of Muhammad, and conformed to the social norms.14
True Islam had ceased to be the inspiring force for Maulana Maududi. Having introduced the concepts of heresy and apostasy he could not escape from Calvin’s logic which prescribed ‘death as the punishment of apostasy’. But the Maulana had the audacity falsely to attribute the authority for this punishment to the Holy Prophet. The Maulana wrote a pamphlet on the subject in which he confidently quoted Abu Bakr’s military action against the rebel tribes as a proof that there was a death penalty for apostasy. Before discussing this, one ought to quote the Maulana’s writings to show how heavily he was influenced by his Christian models.
But first, in summary, to the Christian fathers of medieval Europe, recantation from Christianity was punishable by death and the only acceptable definition of Christianity was theirs. Similarly, the punishment for recantation from Islam was death and the only definition of Islam was the one the Maulana or his successors laid down. It is clear that under a Maududian government, the Maududian ruler would decide who was and who was not a Muslim. What would that decision be? The Maulana’s writings are quite clear.
According to Maududi, Ahmadis are apostates and a ‘non-Muslim minority’. But Ahmadis are not the only heretics—the Ahl-i-Quran, the followers of Mr. Parvez’s school of thought, are also heretics. They are kafir and apostates. In fact, their heresy is far more serious than that of the Qadiyanis. The following order of banishment given by Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi, who had not yet renounced the Maududian teaching—and was still considered the right-hand man of Maududi—was published in the Tasnim, the official organ of the Jamaati Islami:
Some people advise that since there is no possibility of the promulgation of the Islamic sharia, the government of this country [Pakistan] should be formed on the principles laid down in the Quran. If, by this, these people mean that the sharia is confined only to the Quran and that other rules are not sharia, then it is clearly heresy. This heresy is similar to that of the Qadiyanis, in fact, much more serious.15
This verdict is clearly against the Ahmadis and the Ahl-i-Quran. To discover whether ‘heresy’ and consequent apostasy is confined to only these two groups needs a closer look.
According to Maulana Maududi’s writings, anything not Maududian is heresy. The Maududian teachings are like the Athanasian Creed and any deviation from them is kufr. The Maulana says:
Ninety-nine point nine per cent of the Muslim nation has no knowledge of Islam or the ability to tell right from wrong. They have directed neither their moral values nor their thoughts towards Islam. A Muslim is a Muslim because his father was a Muslim and the faith is passed from generation to generation. These Muslims have not accepted this right because they believe it to be right, and neither have they rejected the wrong because they know it to be wrong. If Muslim affairs are ever handed over to these people and anyone thinks Muslim affairs will be properly run, he’s living in fool’s paradise.16
The process of democratic elections is like churning milk to obtain butter. If poisoned milk is churned, the butter will be poisonous too. So people who think that the Kingdom of God [Hukumat-i-Ilahiyya] will automatically result if Muslim areas are liberated from the Hindu majority, are wrong. They will end up with a heretic government of Muslims [Kafirana hukumat].17
The Maulana is more explicit in the following passage of the same book:
The nation called Musulman is made up of all kinds of rubbish. All types of characters found among unbelievers are found here. The number of liars appearing in law courts is no less than in the courts of other nations. Bribery, theft, adultery, falsehood, in short, there is no form of moral depravity in which they are second to the unbelievers. [kuffar].18
These Maududian edicts and injunctions are very comprehensive. However, some may still doubt that these injunctions refer to the ordinary 99.99 per cent of Muslims and that Muslim leadership and intellectuals are exempt from these constraints. But the Maulana made another statement about Muslim leaders and ulema to make it clear that any Muslim who does not accept the Maududian creed has gone astray. The Maulana says:
Western educated political leaders, ulema, and the scholars of Muslim jurisprudence, all these leaders are as misguided as each other, both in their means and their ends. They have lost the path of truth and have wandered blindly into the darkness. Not one of them has a Muslim point of view.19
So, according to the Maulana, neither the 99.99 per cent of Muslims nor their religious or secular leaders are on the right path. They have gone astray, their point of view is not Muslim, and all types of criminals found among the kuffar are also found among Muslims. If one were to have dubbed the umma a ‘bunch of apostates’ on hearing this description, Maududi would have replied: ‘You said it.’ He was not in the habit of mincing his words. Referring to those who quit the Jamaati Islami, he said: ‘This is not the path on which to retreat. To retreat means to apostasies.’20 If quitting the Jamaati Islami and joining another Muslim group is apostasy, then that other organization is automatically kafir. So are Muslims who pray for favors at saints’ tombs and also the Shiites, who consider the first three caliphs to be usurpers. It is well known that according to the Maulana—and all the ulema of Deoband agree with him—the mainstream Ahli Sunnat wal Jamaat of India and Pakistan, known as Brelvis, are kafir.
Now that the Maulana has, virtually declared all non-Maududians to be apostates, he deals in great detail with the subject of people who are Muslim by birth. It is one of the most difficult pieces of Maududi’s argument. Discussing his own Islam, the Maulana said: ‘I have castaway the collar of inherited Islam… I read the Quran and studied the life of Muhammadsa… and now I am a new (converted) Muslim.’ On the same basis, he devised a scheme for the re-conversion of other Muslims. He unveils his plan in the following words:
Whenever the death penalty for apostasy is enforced in a new Islamic state, then Muslims are kept within Islam’s fold. But there is a danger that a large number of hypocrites will live alongside them. They will always pose a danger of treason.
My solution to the problem is this. That whenever an Islamic revolution takes place, all non-practicing Muslims should, within one year, declare their turning away from Islam and get out of Muslim society. After one year all born Muslims will be considered Muslim. All Islamic laws will be enforced upon them. They will be forced to practice all the fara id and wajibat of their religion and, if anyone then wishes to leave Islam, he will be executed. Every effort will be made to save as many people as possible from falling into the lap of kufr. But those who cannot be saved will be reluctantly separated from society forever [executed]. After this purification Islamic society will start afresh with Muslims who have decided voluntarily to remain Muslims.21
The Maulana does not tell us under what rules of ijtihad a law laying down the death penalty for apostasy will be relaxed. In any case this law will be relaxed only at the time an Islamic state is established—a one-off concession. After this period of grace, Muslims who are born kafirs will lose out. The Maulana explains why he is unable to make any exception for these unfortunates. He says:
There is one final question about capital punishment which may disturb many of us. A non-Muslim who freely embraced Islam then returned to kufr can be said to have made a deliberate mistake. He could have remained a dhimmi, so why enter a religion of collective responsibility from which there is no escape? But what of the person who was born of Muslim parents and who has not embraced Islam? He is a Muslim by birth. If, on reaching adulthood, he wants to reject the faith, you threaten him with execution and he remains Muslim. This is unjust. And it also provides sustenance to the ever-growing number of born hypocrites in Muslim society. There are two answers to this question, one deals with the practical aspect, the other with the principle. In principle there can be no distinction between the born followers of a religion and that religion’s converts. And no religion has ever made that distinction. Both converts and born followers are governed by the same laws. It is both impossible and a logical absurdity to treat the children of the followers of a religion as kufar or aliens till they are adults, then give them the choice of choosing or rejecting the religion (or citizenship, for that matter) of their birth. No society in the world could manage its affairs in this way.22
Even if we accept the Maududian law that Islam prescribes death for apostasy and that all Muslims except Jamaati Islami are kafir, we cannot treat non-Maududian Muslims as apostates—even according to the Maulana’s own logic. They are ‘born kafir’. The Maulana wants to have his cake and eat it too! Muslims who disagree with the Maududian concept of Islam are first described as both ‘born Muslims’ and kafir, because they were brought up by their parents in a kafirana environment. Then they are called apostates because on reaching the age of consent they did not reject their parents’ Islam in preference to Maududian Islam. A non-Muslim who joins Islam and then recants should be executed because he became Muslim knowing full well there was no escape. Similarly, a non-Maududian-born Muslim should also be treated as an apostate because he did not accept Maulana Maududi’s version of Islam on reaching adulthood. This is the argument which clearly shows the Maulana’s dictatorial, manipulative and intolerant personality. No Muslim, convert or born, is out of his reach. The Quranic ordinance that ‘there shall be no compulsion in religion’ is explained away in the following words:
This means we do not compel anyone to embrace our religion. This is true. But we must warn anyone who wishes to recant that this door is impassable to free traffic. If you wish to come, do so with the firm decision that you cannot escape.
A leading scholar of the Ahl-i-Quran, Ghulam Ahmad Parvez, referring to this Maududian commentary on the Quranic verse, said ‘Maududi Sahib’s Islam is a mouse-trap: the mouse can get into it, but cannot escape.’
The central point of the Maulana’s argument is that every religion considers the descendants of its followers as its followers. Therefore, descendants of Muslim parents—even where the parents are practically kafir—will be Islamic property. If a right of ownership has been established over these children, how can they be free to choose another religion on reaching adulthood? In explaining this point, the Maulana seems to have overlooked the following saying of the Prophetsa ‘Every infant has an in-born predisposition to be a Muslim, but his parents make him a Jew or a Christian or a Zoroastrian.’23 If the central point of the Maulana’s argument is correct, then why confine it to the descendants of Muslims? Why not apply it to those of non-Muslims too, since they, according to the hadith, were also born with a ‘predisposition to be Muslim’? This would give full control of every non-Muslim child to the Maududian government. It makes no difference whether a child is within the Maududian realm or not. While the Maulana seems to have overlooked that hadith quoted above, the force of his logic leads him to this absurdity.
Maulana Maududi has, in fact, reproduced medieval Christianity almost word for word in the Jamaati Islami movement. Commenting on his policy of intolerance, Elisabeth Labrousse, an historian of medieval Christianity, observes: ‘On the individual level, it creates only martyrs or hypocrites.’24 Now compare Labrousse’s observation with the following passage from Maududi’s The Punishment of Apostasy in Islam: ‘If he [the apostate] is really so honest in not wishing to live as a hypocrite and really does wish to remain steadfast in his own faith, why does he not present himself for death?‘25
Since the Maududian concept of religion is the only way to salvation, the Maulana would not allow the same rights and privileges to the followers of any other religion. The missionary work of other religions would be forbidden in a Maududian state. The Maulana says:
The execution of apostates has already decided the issue. Since we do not allow my Muslim to embrace any other religion, the question of allowing other religions to open their missions and propagate their faiths within our boundaries does not arise. We cannot tolerate it.26
But can a kafir propagate his religion among other kafirs? For instance, can a Christian open missions to work among Jews or Hindus? Could Arya Samajists, who do not believe in idol worship and believe in one God, preach to the followers of pantheist Sanatan Dharma? The Maulana says:
Islam can never tolerate that false religions should spread in the world. How can the missionaries of false religions be given a license to spread falsehood and attract others to the fire towards which they themselves are advancing.27
Maududi himself accepts that Jews and Christians are Ahl-i-Kitab (people of the Book). But if they wish to convert idol worshippers, fire worshippers or polytheists to the worship of one God—the God of Mosesas and Jesusas thus bringing them nearer to Islam, they would-be forbidden.
In short, the Maulana concedes only that a born kafir cannot be killed if he does not accept Islam. But if this is so, why kill a new kafir who has recanted? If a new kafir is to be punished at all, why the death penalty? Why not exile, or life imprisonment, so that Muslim society may not be disrupted? Here Maulana Maududi, true to St Augustinian logic, explains that the apostate is executed in his own interests. He says:
There are only two methods of dealing with an apostate. Either make him an outlaw by depriving him of his citizenship and allowing him mere existence, or end his life. The first method is definitely more severe than the second, because he exists in a state in which ‘he neither lives nor dies.’28 Killing him is preferable. That way both his agony and the agony of society are ended simultaneously.29
But the punishment to which the Maulana is sentencing apostates is not actually St Augustine’s ‘spirit of love’ persecution. There is a life after death and by killing an apostate, the Maulana is directly consigning him to the fires of hell. By saving an apostate from the temporary agonies of an outcast’s life, the Maulana is sending him to the far greater agonies of hell. Above all, the Maulana is depriving the tragic apostate of the opportunity of repentance and therefore salvation. While a kafir has the opportunity of repenting at any stage in his life, the apostate cannot return to Islam and benefit from the compassion of the Great Forgiver (Al-Ghaffar) and the Acceptor of Repentance (Al-Tawwab).
Reducing the Maulana’s logic to its absurd conclusion, one might as well ask: ‘Since the death penalty is meant to discourage people who take change of faith lightly from entering our society, how do you propose to stop such wavering people from being born into Muslim homes?’
This Draconian policy of force and brutal intolerance is not restricted to the Maududian state. Its foreign policy is also based on force and intolerance. The Maulana says:
Islam does not want to bring about this revolution in one country, or a few countries. It wants to spread it to the entire world. Although it is the duty of the ‘Muslim Party’ to bring this revolution first to its own nation, its ultimate goal is world revolution.
Of course, the final goal of Islam is world revolution. But Islam wants a spiritual revolution, not the communist revolution which the Maulana has borrowed from communist ideology. It is no accident that Maududian polemic closely follow communist argument. Substitute the words ‘Communist Party’ and you find the echoes of Marx and Lenin in Maulana Maududi’s writings. The Maududian revolution is not based on adl (justice) but on materialism and consequent personal dictatorship. Maududian policy towards neighboring states and communist foreign policy are not very much different. Maulana Maududi writes:
Human relations are so integrated that no state can have complete freedom of action under its principles unless the same principles are not in force in a neighboring country. Therefore, a ‘Muslim Party’ will not be content with the establishment of Islam in just one area alone-both for its own safety and the general reform. It should try to expand in all directions. On one hand it will spread its ideology, on the other it will invite people of all nations to accept its creed, for salvation lies only therein. If this Islamic state has power and resources it will fight and destroy non-Islamic governments and establish Islamic states in their place.30
The paragraph above is virtually a copy of the Communist Manifesto. The Maulana has no hesitation in attributing his aggressive policy to the Holy Prophetsa himself. He says:
This was the policy adopted by the Prophetsa and his rightly guided caliphs. Arabia, where the Muslim Party was first formed, was the first to be subdued. After this the Prophetsa sent invitations to all neighboring countries. But he did not wait to see whether they were accepted or not. As soon as he acquired power, he started the conflict with the Roman Empire. Abu Bakr became the leader of the party after the Prophetsa and attacked both the Roman and Persian Empires, while Umar finally won the war.31
This is a general declaration of war against all non-Muslim neighboring states—they are safe only as long as the Maududian state is weak. As soon as the Maududian state has given one year’s notice to its Muslim-born subjects to opt for Maududian Islam or get out and has subdued domestic opposition, it will engage in a war of conquest against its neighbors. Maududi does not agree with the generally held Muslim view that war was actually forced upon the Prophetsa, Abu Bakr and Umar by powerful Christian and Zoroastrian empires wishing to crush Islam, and that Muslims, despite having fewer resources, had to fight back in self-defense.
Maulana Abut Ala Maududi, Murtadd
ki saza Islami qanun main , (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd, 1981
8th ed.), 32.
Dr Israr Ahmad, Islam
aur Pakistan. Tarikhi siyasi ilmi our thaqafati pas manzar (Lahore:
Anjuman Khuddam-ul-Quran, 1983),72. Dr Abroad is the former chief (Nazim-i-Ala)
of the Jamaati Is lami student organisation and, later, the Amir of
Jamaati Islami Montgomery. He is also the author of Tahrik-i-Jamaati
Research Paper. Dr Ahmad resigned from the membership of Jamaati Islami
after ten years of involvement in various capacities.
The Deoband seminary ( Dar-al-ulum )
was founded in 1867. Deoband is a small town near Delhi.
S.G.F. Brandon, Dictionary
of the History of Ideas (New York, 1973), vol. 11, 342.
C. J. Hefele, History
of the Christian Councils (Edinburgh, (1894), vol.
III, 12; see also Durant, Will, The History of Civilisation
(New York, 1950), vol. IV,
Will Durant, The
Story of Civilisation , 48.
P. Schaff, Select
Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers ,
1st series (Buffalo, 1887), vol. IV, 640.
J.E.E. Dalberg-Acton (1 st
Baron Acton), The History of Freedom and Other Essays (London:
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ,
or Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth
Ecclesiastical and Civil (Chicago: Great Books of the
Western World, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1952).
Dr Israr Ahmad, Islam
our Pakistan , op.cit .,
uber den Islam , 2nd ed. (Heidelberg,
1925), 1834; see Bernard Lewis, Islam
in History: Ideas, Men and Events in
the Middle East (London, 1973),
Bernard Lewis, The
Jews of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1983), 53.
Daily Tasnim , 15 August 1952,
12; see also Mizaj
Shanasi Rasul , 372.
Maududi , Musalman our maujuda
siyasi kashmaksh, (Pathankot: MaktabaJamaati
Islami,1941–2), vol. III, 130.
our maujuda siyasi kashmakash , op.cit .,
vol. III, 95.
lslami (Ichhra, Lahore:
Shu’ba Nashr wa Ishaat, Jamaati Islami,1970),
ki saza Islam main (1950), 80–1.
ki saza Islami qanun main (8th
ed.), op.cit .,
Kitab al-Jana’ iz .
of the History ofIdeas (New York), vol. IV,
ki saza Island qanun main , 51.
ki saza Island qanun main , 35.
ki saza Islami qanun main , 51.
Maududi, Haqiqat-i-Jihad (Lahore:
Taj Company Ltd, 1964), 64; emphasis added.